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THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 




Drawn bij Charles De Lacyjroiu details snjiplied by the Author 

STORMING THE MOLE 



THE BLOCKING OF 
ZEEBRUGGE 

BY 

Captain A. F. B. CARPENTER, V.C, R.N. 

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY 

AND APPRECIATIONS BY 

MARSHAL FOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS 

AND 

COUNT VISART 

(burgomaster of Bruges) 

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

Wi)t 3^ibete(tit l^ttse Cambntroe 

1922 



D 






COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



3o-^ 



tlTbc Slibetsiitie ^reiss 

CAMBRIDGE • MASSACHUSETTS 
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. 



APR 2G 1922 
©CI.A661436 



TO 

THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET 



INTRODUCTION 

By admiral EARL BEATTY 

IN appreciating the military reasons which directed 
the operations connected with the blocking of 
Zeebrugge, it is desirable to recall to mind the 
general naval situation at the beginning of 191 8. 

Briefly stated, the German High Seas Fleet was 
contained within the waters of the Heligoland Bight 
by the British Grand Fleet, whilst German subma- 
rines were engaged on vast operations, having for 
their object the stoppage of the trade of Great Britain, 
and interference with our lines of communication. 

In the face of such an attack, the aim of Great 
Britain was either to destroy the enemy submarines, or, 
failing destruction, to prevent their egress from their 
bases. Convoy operations, patrol operations, and min- 
ing operations in all seas were carried out to achieve 
the former aim, and accomplished great results. 

But enemy submarines continued to be built almost 
as rapidly as they were destroyed. It was essential, 
therefore, to take what measures were possible to 
render useless their bases and interfere with their 
freedom of exit, and it was with this military object 
that plans for the blocking of Zeebrugge were initiated. 

Emphasis has been laid on the military reason which 
underlay this operation, because an erroneous impres- 
sion has existed in some quarters that the Zeebrugge 
operations were more in the nature of an offensive de- 
signed to lower the morale of the enemy and enhance 
that of the British Navy, which, as a whole, had little 
opportunity of coming to grips with the enemy. 



viii INTRODUCTION 

Whilst these moral results undoubtedly were felt 
after the operation, they were not the military 
reasons, reasons alone which justified so complex and 
difficult an undertaking, reasons which were never 
lost sight of during the planning and carrying out of 
the operations. 

The plan was surely laid ; simple in general design, 
details were worked out with foresight and exactitude. 
The factors of surprise, mystification, and diversion 
were utilised to the utmost. The resources of science 
were given full scope. Training to carry out the plan 
proceeded with energy and understanding, co-ordina- 
tion and co-operation being apparent throughout. 
It was carried out with determination. 

In Captain Carpenter's book we are let into the 
full secret, and are led step by step through the va- 
rious phases referred to above, which were to be 
crowned by the glorious achievement of St. George's 
Day, 19 1 8. His pages bring out once again the moral 
and military virtues of the British Navy, Officers and 
Men. They demonstrate that the spirit which existed 
in our Naval Wars of past centuries, wars which laid 
the foundation of the Empire, remains undiminished 
in the naval personnel of to-day. 

It is for us to ensure that these glorious traditions 
are understood by all, and in being understood are 
handed on to those who come after us. This book, 
in placing on record the matchless qualities displayed 
by all concerned in the blocking of Zeebrugge, I wel- 
come for this purpose. 

BEATTY 

Admiral oj the Fleet 
igth July J 1 92 1 



APPRECIATION 

By marshal FOCH 

C'EST dans un sentiment de solidarlte que s'est 
realisee I'union des Allies, en 1914, quand la 
cause de la Civilisation s'est trouvee menacee. 
A tous les moments critiques de la guerre, I'union 
s'est ainsi resserree devant le danger, et lorsqu'il s'est 
agi de fermer un des repaires d'ou les sousmarins 
ennemis mena^aient les communications vitales des 
A-llies, dans une manoeuvre splendide, avec un esprit 
commun de sacrifice absolu, le port de Zeebrugge a 
ete attaque et definitivement ferme. 

Le Commandant du Vindictive a tenu a rappeler 
les details de I'operation dans laquelle il a joue un 
role si brillant, et son livre constituera un precieux 
enseignement et donnera aux generations futures un 

exemple splendide.^ 

F. FOCH 

* When in 1914 the cause of civilisation was menaced, it was the in- 
stinct of solidarity that brought about the Union of the Allies. 

At every critical moment of the war, in the face of peril, this bond 
was renewed; and when it became a question of closing one of the lairs 
from which the enemy submarines threatened the vital communica- 
tions of the Allies, the port of Zeebrugge was attacked and closed once 
and for all by a superb manoeuvre involving a common spirit of su- 
preme sacrifice. 

The Captain of the Vindictive has undertaken to tell in detail the 
story of the action in which he played so brilliant a part, and his 
book will afford a valuable record and set forth a fine example to future 
generations. 



APPRECIATION 

By rear-admiral SIMS, U.S.N. 

FEW incidents of the Great War had a greater in- 
fluence in inspiring enthusiasm in the fighting 
forces and increasing their morale than the suc- 
cessful attack upon Zeebrugge ; and it will long remain 
as an example of what can be accomplished by the 
thorough co-ordination of the elements of a sound plan 
with the various limiting conditions of place, time, 
state of sea and air, and the material equipment suit- 
able and available. 

The reader of this volume will at once be struck by 
the painstaking care with which it was necessary that 
each detail be worked out, and each unit assigned its 
particular task to be executed at a specified time and 
place. Also that the amount of detail was necessarily 
so great, and their dependence one upon another so 
vital to ultimate success, that the whole may be com- 
pared to a complicated mechanism so designed to 
meet peculiar conditions that the failure of any part 
— any unit or group — or a material change in any of 
the conditions, would have deranged essential ele- 
ments of the plan and might have jeopardised the suc- 
cess of the expedition. 

But the principal lesson to be learned from the 
attack is not so much the thoroughness of the prepa- 
ration and training and the efficiency of the weapons, 
essential as they of course were, as it is the influence 
of the spirit and the initiative and loyalty of the per- 



xii APPRECIATION 

sonnel that carried it out. These elements supplied 
the "steam," the flexibility, and the lubrication that 
ensured the harmonious working of the whole mecha- 
nism of which they were the soul. The basic principle 
was the splendid morale of the personnel inspired by 
the high character of its leaders. 

Apart from the great interest of this narrative to 
the laymen, as a military exploit of the most brilliant 
character, and an inspiring story of heroism in war, 
it will always prove of great value to those military 
men of both branches of the service who realise the 
tremendous influence of the morale of their forces — 
the confidence in the ability of the leader which 
encourages initiative and inspires the highest type of 

loyalty. 

Wm. S. SIMS 



APPRECIATION 

By count VISART 

{Burgomaster of Bruges) 

j4TNSI que tous mes concitoyens j'ai appris 

/JL avec une grande satisfaction que la fameuse 
JL .m. attaque de Zeebrugge par le Vindictive allait 
faire le sujet d'un livre public prochainement par 
Capitaine Alfred F. B. Carpenter, un des heros qui 
ont pris une part glorieuse a cet exploit. 

Cette entreprise de la Marine de Guerre Anglaise 
a ete assurement une des faits de guerre les plus extra- 
ordinaires des temps anciens et modernes. Elle a ete 
accomplice avec une energie et une audace qui a de- 
joue toutes les previsions des Allemands. 

Ainsi en depit de toutes les difficultes, de tous les 
dangers, et de pertes cruelles, I'assaut prodigieux du 
mole a jete I'epouvante parmi les ennemis et en meme 
temps le Vindictive et les bateaux qui le suivaient ont 
emboutcille dans leur repaire les abominables U.B. 

La cannonade entendue a Bruges nous avait deja 
donne I'eveil et bicntot les rumeurs que les Allemands 
n'avaient pu intercepter et la consternation qu'ils 
tentaient vainement de dissimuler nous ont appris 
que I'Angleterre avait frappe un grand coup. Un tel 
evenement relcva tous nos courages. 

Nous esperons qu'a Zeebrugge, sur le territoire de 
Bruges, un magnifique monument immortalisera ce 
fait inoui, mais c'est avec le plus grand interet que 
nous connaitrons par le livre de Capitaine Carpenter 
toutes les circonstances de cette bistoire hero'ique et 



xiv APPRECIATION 

les noms des hommes qui ont donne une nouvelle 

gloire a la Marine Anglaise.^ 

AMIDER VISART 

BouTgemestre de Bruges 

* It was with great satisfaction that I and all my fellow citizens 
learned that the famous attack on Zeebrugge by the Vindictive was to 
be the subject of a book, to be published in the near future, written by 
Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter, one of the heroes who took a glorious 
part in that exploit. 

This enterprise of the British Navy was assuredly one of the most 
extraordinary feats of war in both ancient and modern times. It was 
accomplished with such energy and audacity as to baffle all the German 
plans. 

In spite of all the difficulties, dangers, and cruel losses, the wonderful 
assault on the mole created consternation amongst the enemy; and the 
ships which followed the Vindictive bottled up the abominable sub- 
marines in their base. 

The sound of heavy firing heard in Bruges had already warned us; 
later, the receipt of rumours which the Germans had been unable to 
intercept, and their consternation which they were vainly endeavouring 
to conceal, proved to us that England had struck a mighty blow. Such 
an event renewed our courage. 

We hope that at Zeebrugge, which is within the territory of Bruges, a 
magnificent memorial will eventually immortalise this unprecedented 
action, and it is with the greatest interest that we shall learn from Cap- 
tain Carpenter's book all the circumstances of this heroic episode and 
the names of the men who added this new glory to the British Navy. 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

A S a result of having delivered many lectures, 
/ \ under official auspices and in compliance 
JL JL withprivateinvitationSjOn" The Blocking of 
Zeebrugge," the author has received several requests 
to record the story in more permanent form. Under- 
lying these requests there appears to be a feeling that 
first-hand accounts of enterprises in the Great War 
should be of some value towards preserving that spirit 
which rallied all classes of individuals in the British 
Empire, in the Allied Countries, and in the United 
States of America, to the common cause of upholding 
civilisation in the face of danger. That opinion, in- 
deed, has been openly stated to the author in Great 
Britain, by leading members of the educational pro- 
fession and of the Church, by naval and military 
officers and others. Opinions of a similar type also 
have been received from the United States, where, 
during a recent series of visits to many of the larger 
cities, the author personally experienced that solid 
friendship for Great Britain which is sometimes hid- 
den beneath surface irritations of a political nature. 

Misunderstandings must occasionally arise be- 
tween communities and between the members of any 
single community; they readily take root and develop 
into serious argument where the existence Oii z common 
cause is forgotten. For that reason the author feels 
that the above-mentioned opinions are not without 
foundation. Whilst attempting to show that co- 
operation between the several units of a fighting force 



xvi AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

and confidence between superiors and subordinates 
are important factors towards success in war, he has 
made this humble endeavour to induce the belief that 
co-operation and confidence in other walks of life 
are no less necessary. 

There is danger of this blocking enterprise being 
allotted a false position in the contemporary histories 
of the late war owing to the somewhat prevalent 
custom of describing war operations with little refer- 
ence to the various considerations, factors, and events 
which gave them birth. 

The man-in-the-street is sometimes carried away 
by enthusiasm or despondency, as the case may be, 
when unexpected events occur during hostilities; he 
is apt to give little thought to the "why" and "where- 
fore" of the occurrences. That fact has been exem- 
plified clearly enough with respect to this particular 
event, for, on all sides, one heard the public verdict, 
given in the colloquial vulgarism of the period, that 
the aff^air was a fine "stunt." The word "stunt," 
as unmusical to the ear as it was offensive to those 
concerned in the operations, has been defined as 
"a voluntary act, spectacular, usually unnecessary, 
sometimes involving risk, and designed to attract 
attention." However, the man-in-the-street meant 
well, and, after all, could justifiably plead that his 
lack of education on naval matters was to blame. 
The author has therefore addressed this book to the 
man-in-the-street, and has endeavoured to "put him 
wise," as our cousins across the water are in the habit 
of remarking. 

The ofl^icial despatches dealing with the bloc-king 
operations on the Flanders coast were published early 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE xvli 

in 1919, and, as far as despatches can go, gave a 
splendid account of the enterprise forming the subject 
of this book. But despatches are strictly limited in 
length and necessarily deal more with cold-blooded 
statements of fact than with psychological aspects. 
When one reads despatches of the great leaders of the 
past concerning the operations in their campaigns 
one cannot fail to notice the almost complete absence 
of any reference to the moral factor in war. Yet 
Napoleon himself declared, "The moral is to the 
physical as three is to one." Material results can 
easily be gauged under peace conditions, whereas 
moral effect on human nature in war is only discover- 
able from one's own war experiences, which are neces- 
sarily limited, and from the experiences of others as 
set forth in the historical records of past wars. It was 
partly for that reason, presumably, that Napoleon 
studied the campaigns of Caesar and Hannibal al- 
though their instruments of war were long since out of 
date. 

The usual reasons for the omission of the moral 
factors from despatches are twofold. Firstly, the 
leader from whom the despatch emanates may con- 
sider it inadvisable to publish his preconceived ideas 
as to the eventual effect of the operations on the mo- 
rale of the enemy; this concealment is especially neces- 
sary if the despatch is published before the declara- 
tion of peace. Secondly, the writer of the despatch is 
often unaware, at the time of writing, of the effect 
already obtained against the enemy's morale; such 
effects may not be discoverable for many months 
after the operations have been concluded. Under 
certain circumstances it may also be temporarily in- 



xviii AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

advisable to present to the enemy, through the me- 
dium of despatches, information concerning psycho- 
logical effects on one's own personnel. These omis- 
sions, therefore, must not be taken to infer that the 
moral factors were ignored. It is clear, then, that 
post-war accounts 'of operations may be far from 
superfluous whether considered from the point of 
view of the man-in-the-street or that of the student 
of war. 

Without some conception of the strategical situa- 
tion arising from the German occupation of the 
Flanders coast it would be difficult to grasp the true 
nature of the enterprise described herein. An ex- 
amination of the strategical outlook alone, however, 
would be insufficient. The geographical and hydro- 
graphical, and even the meteorological, situations 
largely influenced the choice of tactical methods to be 
pursued for the attainment of the object in view. It 
is therefore important to consider the situation from 
these various standpoints in some detail. 

The book has been divided into two parts. Part I 
deals with the Situation, the Object, the General Plan 
for the attainment of the Object, the Preparatory 
Work involved, and the various occurrences up to the 
eve of the Attack. Part II describes the events which 
occurred during the operation itself, and includes 
some consideration of both the material and moral 
results of the enterprise and the lessons to be drawn 
therefrom. 

For the illustrations the author is much indebted 
to the Admiralty, Air Ministry, Imperial War Mu- 
seum, and Press, to whom he makes this grateful 
acknowledgment. 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE xix 

With regard to the personal side of the story, it may 
be as well to point out that many of the officers and 
men concerned were mentioned in the official des- 
patch; that fact lessens one of the difficulties attached 
to the author's task. A compromise between the 
purely impersonal attitude and the very natural desire 
to render full justice to each individual, regardless of 
the reader's patience, has been aimed at. 

The author trusts that the reader will be tolerant 

of omission and repetition, and will forgive the rather 

obvious shortcomings of a literary nature which, alas, 

appear all too frequently in the book. 

ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER 
Sth March, 1921 



CONTENTS 

PART I 

Introduction by Admiral Earl Eeatty . . vii 

Appreciation by Marshal Foch . . . . ix 

Appreciation by Rear-Admiral Sims, U.S.N. . xi 

Appreciation by Count Visart .... xiii 

Author's Preface . . . . . . xv 

I. The Strategical Situation. The German Bases 

in Flanders. The Conception of the Plan . 3 

II. The Local Situation. The Local Defences . 22 

III. The Outlying Obstacles. Considerations of 

Salvage 35 

IV. Past Experience. Smoke Screens. The Chances 

of Success . . . . . . . . 54 

V. Planning the Operation. Matters affecting 

THE Plan. Attacks on the Mole . . .64 

VI. The Vessels Involved: Their Duties. The 

Rescue Work 83 

VII. Matters affecting the Passage. The Support- 
ing Forces. The German Sea-forces. The 
Preparatory Work 90 

^III. The Personnel. Secrecy. Training. Some Per- 
sonalities lOI 

IX. The Waiting Period. The Volunteering Spirit 118 

X. Meteorological AND Tidal Conditions. Visibil- 
ity 131 

XI. The Orders and Instructions. The Time Factor . 136 



xxii CONTENTS 

XII. The First Attempt. The Return to Harbour 141 

XIII. The Second Attempt and Return. Preparing 
FOR THE Third Attempt. Rewriting the Or- 
ders, German Optimism 153 

PART II 

Foreword 161 

I. The Start. The Oversea Passage . . .165 
II. The Approach . . . . . . .173 

III. The Commencement of the Attack . . . 178 

IV. The Fight on the Mole. H.M.S. Iris . . 200 
V. The Attack on the Railway Viaduct . .210 

VI. The Smoke Screening. Subsidiary Attacks . 216 

VII. The Work of the Blockships .... 226 

VIII. The Retirement 236 

IX. The Material Results 249 

X. The Moral Effect 255 

XI. Some Remarks on the Enterprise . . . 261 

Appendix. A List of Vessels and Craft in the 

Operations 269 

Index . . , 271 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Storming the Mole Frontispiece 

Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author 
Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter .... 14 

A Portion of the German Battery on the Lighthouse "" 
Extension of the Mole 

View of the Canal Entrance with its Curved Piers 

Aerial Photograph of the Canal Entrance 

The Northeastern End of the Mole 

The Blockships fitting out for the Enterprise 

H.M.S. Vindictive before Fitting Out . . 

A Portion of the Broad Part of the Mole 

The Outer Wall, showing the Parapet Pathway 
Sixteen Feet above the Floor of the Mole 

H.M.S. Vindictive's Specially Constructed Gang 
ways ....... 

One of the Monitors . . . 
H.M. Ships Iris (right) and Daffodil 
LiEUT.-CoL. Bertram N. Elliot . 

LlEUT.-CoMMANDER ArTHUR L. HaRRISON 

Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock 
Captain Henry C. Halahan 
Vice-Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes . 
Diagrammatic Sketch of the Attack . 

Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author 

H.M.S. Vindictive's Bridge and Flame-Thrower 
Hut (right) jqg 



28 
28 
30 
32 
70 
70 
72 

76 

78 
84 
84 
112 
112 
112 
112 
168 
178 



XXIV 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



The Fight on the Mole 204 

Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author 

Lieut. George N. Bradford 208 

Lieut. Claude E. K. Hawkings 208 

Lieut. Richard D. Sandford 208 

Commander Valentine F. Gibbs 208 

The Railway Viaduct 212 

Aerial Photograph taken through the Clouds a Few 

Hours after the Enterprise 226 

The Three Blockships shortly after the Attack . 230 

Intrepid and Iphigenia 230 

The Westeiin Side of the Blocked Channel . . 232 

The Eastern Side of the Blocked Channel . . 234 

H.M.S. Vindictive at Dover after the Attack . . 244 

H.M.S. Vindictive on her Return to Dover . . 248 



MAPS AND PLANS 

Chart showing the Relative Positions of Dover, 
Zeebrugge, Heligoland, and the Exits from the 
North Sea 

The Canal System of Belgium 

The Port of Zeebrugge 

Chart of Dover to Zeebrugge 

Plan of Canal Entrance Channel 

Sectional Sketch of Sunken Blockships 

Section of the Mole through No. 3 Shed 



6 ^ 

9 ^ 

22 ^ 

36' 

50 

SI 

IS 



Specimen Diagram for ascertaining Available Period 133 



THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 
PART I 



I 



THE BLOCKING 
OF ZEEBRUGGE 



CHAPTER I 

THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION. THE GERMAN BASES 
IN FLANDERS. THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLAN 

THE main function of a navy in war is that of 
obtaining the command of the sea. The pur- 
pose for which such "command" is desired is 
the utihsation of the sea-lines of communication and 
the denial of the same to the enemy. 

Soon after the commencement of the war in 19 14 
the sea-lines of communication across the English 
Channel assumed considerable, if not paramount, 
importance for the transfer of personnel and material 
from Britain to the Allied forces in France. It was 
equally incumbent on the navy to maintain the trans- 
Atlantic and other lines of communication along which 
the necessities of life and war were carried to the 
Allies in all theatres of war. 

The first step towards obtaining " command of the 
sea" is the removal of the obstacles which stand in 
one's way. In this particular case the main obstacle 
(admittedly constructed for the purpose) was the 
German High Seas Fleet. Thus the first duty of the 
British Grand Fleet was that of destroying the so- 



4 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

called High Seas Fleet, or, if destruction was found to 
be impracticable, of reducing it to inactivity. The 
German Fleet was fully alive to that fact, and, almost 
throughout the war, hid themselves away in their 
naval bases under the protection of their coast de- 
fences. Thus, as events showed, the High Seas Fleet 
did not prove to be a very serious obstacle to our 
command of the sea ; but, and this fact is easily for- 
gotten, we could not joresee the continuance of their 
ineptitude and lack of spirit. The German subma- 
rines, however, were a formidable obstacle indeed. 
It is unnecessary to reiterate what is already common 
knowledge on that point. • 

Submarines, by their nature, have certain limita- 
tions. Except in the case of the submarine cruisers, 
which only materialised in the latter part of the war, 
such craft are considerably hampered in their move- 
ments by their comparatively small radius of action. 
Owing to the geographical situation of Germany, her 
submarines were forced to expend an important per- 
centage of their fuel during the outward and home- 
ward voyages between their bases and the trade 
routes. This expenditure cannot merely be judged 
by the distances which had to be traversed; the ex- 
penditure of fuel in the submarine bears some relation 
to the whole circumstances of the voyage. 

The endurance of the personnel is another im- 
portant factor, and is similarly affected by the cir- 
cumstances under which they are employed. For 
instance, in waters patrolled by enemy vessels, high 
speed must always be readily available and the strain 
on the personnel, consequent on the danger of sudden 
attack from surface craft, aircraft, or other subma- 



THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION s 

rines, to say nothing of the presence of mine-fields, 
is increased. Thus the longer the passage that the 
German submarines were forced to undertake in 
comparatively narrow and dangerous waters — such 
as the North Sea — the less work could they do on 
our more important trade routes. That statement is 
closely connected with the subject of this book. 

It did not require very much intelligence on the 
part of the German Admiralty to realise that the 
possession of bases on the Flanders coast would 
greatly facilitate their submarine campaign owing to 
the consequent reduction of the voyages to and from 
the trans- Atlantic, or Channel, trade routes. Flanders 
was therefore used, as will be explained later in detail, 
to provide advanced bases for German submarines. 

The coast of Flanders lent itself to other naval uses. 
In addition to the guerre-de-course tactics of the 
enemy — i.e., the direct attack on Allied merchant 
vessels — it was always open to Germany to take 
their whole main fleet to sea for the purpose of seeking 
advantageous conditions for bringing a portion of our 
Grand Fleet to action. 

Movements of modern fleets under war conditions 
necessitate the use of various types of small craft to 
precede them — e.g., mine-sweepers for clearing chan- 
nels for the fleet to pass through, destroyers for sup- 
porting the mine-sweepers and for driving back the 
enemy's small craft, light cruisers for scouting pur- 
poses, etc. Mine-sweepers and torpedo craft, by vir- 
tue of their small size, are unable to keep the sea for 
long periods. It will therefore be realised that, in the 
event of the High Seas Fleet putting to sea for opera- 
tions in southern waters, the Flanders coast provided 



6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Germany with an advanced base from which their 
Hght craft could operate. 

The German torpedo craft based in Flanders, there- 
fore, would be able to serve a double purpose, viz., 
that already mentioned and that of attacking our 
patrol craft, our coast and our merchant vessels when 
opportunity offered. The mine-sweepers could also 
serve a double purpose in that they were required to 
sweep channels for the ingress and egress of subma- 
rines based in Flanders whilst being suitably placed 
for sweeping duties in advance of the main fleet. 
That Flanders was also suitable for aircraft bases is 
as well known as it is obvious; but it may not be 
generally understood that such aircraft would also be 
of special vaiue to the main fleet under the conditions 
stated above. Thus, to sum up, the occupation of the 
Flanders coast by the German sea forces would be of 
treble value — to provide, firstly, a base for the sub- 
marines employed on commerce destruction ; secondly, 
a base for the advanced flotillas and aircraft operating 
in conjunction with the main fleet in the event of the 
latter coming south ; and, thirdly, a base from which 
to attack our southern coasts or sea-patrols and from 
which to indulge in air raids against British and 
French territory. 

The foregoing consideration of the possible uses of 
Flanders to the German Navy shows the inherent 
value of an advanced base in that locality; tht in- 
trinsic value obviously depended upon the existence 
of suitable harbours for use as bases. Let us now 
examine the geographical situation. 

In the latter part of 1917 the Flanders coast, as far 
westward as Nieuport, was in the possessio-n of the 




CHART SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DOVER, ZEEBRUGGE, HELIGOLAND, 

AND THE EXITS FROM THE NORTH SEA 

Reproduced by Admiralty Permission 



THE FLANDERS COAST 7 

Germans. The northern extremity of the line separat- 
ing the German and AUied armies was situated ap- 
proximately on the Yser Canal, which emanates from 
Nieuport harbour. The latter was dominated by the 
gun-fire of both armies; its use was, therefore, denied 
to both. The only other harbours on the coast of Flan- 
ders were Ostende, Blankenberghe, and Zeebrugge. 
These will be described in some detail presently. 

The Flanders coast consists mainly of flat country 
barely elevated above the level of the sea. Sand-hills 
along the shore act as a barrier between the sea and 
the land. Parallel to the shore the tidal current runs 
to and fro with considerable velocity. The tendency 
for the tidal current to wash away the sand from the 
shore is partially countered by the use of groynes, 
such as are similarly used to maintain our own coast- 
line in many parts of England. Although the groynes 
on the Flanders coast are carried well out into the 
sea — they are often 100 yards in length — the move- 
ment of sand along the coast is very considerable, 
and, as will be explained later, has a strong influence 
on the harbour situation in that locality. 

The approaches to the coast are beset with shoals 
reaching to a distance of eight miles from the land. 
These shoals have always provided serious obstacles 
to navigation. During times of peace the charts of 
this locality had been kept corrected by virtue of 
continual surveying. The shoals were frequently 
moving and new shoals appeared from time to time. 
The channels required almost constant dredging. 
For obvious reasons during the occupation of Flanders 
by the Germans it was not possible for the Allies to 
continue either the surveying or the dredging. 



8 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Before the war navigation off this coast required 
the use of many faciUties such as buoys and light- 
houses. At the best of times buoys are not very 
dependable as navigational aids owing to their ten- 
dency to break away in heavy weather or to drag 
their anchors along the bottom. Their positions need 
to be "fixed" from time to time by means of angles 
to shore objects, or by methods of astronomical ob- 
servation, and then compared with the positions 
shown on the charts. Lighthouses, however, unless 
they are of the small type without lighthouse-keepers, 
are more efficient aids to the navigator. During the 
war the lighthouses east of Nieuport were only used 
by the Germans during short periods when specially 
required for their own craft; the majority of the 
buoys were withdrawn and the remainder were 
moved to new positions which were frequently altered 
to prevent the Allies from making use of them. 
Thus, during the war, the charts available to the 
Allies were very soon obsolete; no others were ob- 
tainable. Navigation off the Flanders coast, for 
Allied vessels of any size, therefore, became decidedly 
hazardous. 

The tides on the coasts, in addition to running al- 
ternately eastward and westward with considerable 
velocity, also caused large differences in sea-level 
amounting to fifteen feet between the highest and 
lowest states of the tide. 

Mention has already been made that the only har- 
bours on the coast eastward of Nieuport were situated 
at Ostende, Blankenberghe, and Zeebrugge. But 
these were not natural harbours. They had been 
artificially cut out of the coast-line by means of 



THE CANAL SYSTEM 9 

dredging. The entrance channels were preserved by 
piers built out into the sea and by dredging opera- 
tions designed to retain the desired depths of water. 
Ostende, before the war, had been much used as 
a commercial harbour, and was therefore provided 
with numerous wharves, basins, and docks. It was 
a suitable harbour for all classes of submarines and 
torpedo craft. Blankenberghe was a little harbour 
about nine miles east of Ostende and three miles west 




bird's-eye view of canals 

of Zeebrugge. Its depth was exceedingly small; it 
could, therefore, only be used for shallow draught 
vessels such as fishing boats, motor boats, and the 
like. It was true that the rise of tide, amounting 
to approximately fifteen feet, would enable larger 
vessels to enter or leave near the time of high water, 
but any naval vessel stationed in a harbour from 
which it can only proceed to sea during a limited 
portion of the twenty-four hours at once loses much 
of its value. Zeebrugge could accommodate vessels 
up to a considerable size: the harbour works and 
depths will be described in detail presently. Although 
these three places provided the only harbours on the 
coast, there was a harbour of great importance at 
Bruges, about eight miles inland from Zeebrugge. 



10 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Bruges harbour was also entirely artificial, consist- 
ing of locks, basins, and waterways built on the canal 
system. Bruges was connected to the sea by means 
of canals running to Zeebrugge and Ostende, these 
canals converging on the waterways of Bruges in such 
a manner that vessels of a certain limited size could 
pass from Ostende to Zeebrugge, and vice versa, with- 
out actually proceeding into the open sea. A series of 
small canals also connected Bruges to Antwerp, via 
Ghent, but this canal system, being only constructed 
to accommodate barges, did not materially add to the 
value of Bruges as a harbour for sea-going vessels. 

Of the three canal systems connecting at Bruges, 
the canal to Zeebrugge easily held first place in im- 
portance. This canal was built by the Belgians. It 
was commenced in 1896 and completed in 1907. Six 
and a quarter miles in length, it was almost entirely 
straight throughout. It could accommodate torpedo- 
boat destroyers or submarines, both of the largest 
size, and could, if required, have been used by light 
cruisers. 

At the seaward end of the Ostende and Zeebrugge 
canals, locks were constructed so that vessels could 
pass from the canals to the sea, or the reverse, at 
any state of the tide, without lowering the level of the 
water in the canal. 

The above-mentioned harbours were used for naval 
purposes by Germany as follows. Bruges was chosen 
as the main naval base. Shelters for protecting sub- 
marines from aerial attack, floating docks, repair 
workshops, all the other facilities which go to make a 
modern dockyard for small vessels, and the necessary 
stores and ammunition, were to be found there. The 



THE HARBOURS IN FLANDERS ii 

number of naval craft based on Flanders appeared 
to vary considerably; but, at the beginning of 191 8, 
approximately eighteen submarines and twenty-five 
destroyers or torpedo-boats would be at Bruges on an 
average day. The submarines lay in the special shel- 
ters which were covered by roofs of reenforced con- 
crete several feet in thickness. Bruges, then, was not 
only the dockyard but also the resting-place of prac- 
tically all the German naval craft based on Flanders. 

The sea exits from Bruges, as already mentioned, 
were situated at Ostende and Zeebrugge. There was 
some doubt, however, whether the Bruges-Ostende 
canal could be used for the passage of anything larger 
than very shallow draught vessels such as motor boats 
or barges. The Ostende canal was known to be nar- 
row, tortuous, and shallow; it had been constructed 
many years earlier than the Zeebrugge canal. 

At Zeebrugge and Ostende a few German craft 
were usually stationed for duties of an immediate 
nature such as mine-sweeping, patrolling, and duties 
connected with the defence of the coast. These har- 
bours were specially useful as taking-off places for 
vessels which had concentrated in readiness for 
operations at sea, or as bolt-holes for the same craft 
when pursued by our patrol vessels. Both harbours 
were open to bombardment from the sea; that reason, 
more than any other, probably influenced the Ger- 
mans to use Bruges for their main base. Ostende, 
being more open to attack from the sea and air than 
was Zeebrugge, was the less important harbour of 
the two. 

Blankenberghe harbour, owing to its small size and 
shallow depth, was used as a base for the German 



12 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

armed motor boats; It is believed that about thirty 
were stationed there. This harbour, being uncon- 
nected with the canal system, was not in direct inland 
communication with Bruges by water. 

In addition to the submarines and torpedo craft 
already mentioned, the Germans had a large number 
of trawlers based on the various harbours for mine- 
sweeping and patrol duties. At Zeebrugge they had 
their largest seaplane base in Flanders; another sea- 
plane base was situated at Ostende. 

In due course Flanders had become a veritable 
hornet's nest. Let us consider for a few moments to 
what extent these hornets could trouble us. 

Across the English Channel, and especially in its 
eastern portion, we had established lines of com- 
munication of tremendous importance. It is no ex- 
aggeration to state that, every few minutes of the day 
and night, a vessel, of one sort or another, left the 
English shore for France with her cargo of personnel, 
guns, ammunition, food or fuel, etc. Day after day, 
night after night, for months on end, a constant 
stream of vessels poured across the Channel in sup- 
port of the Allied armies or on the return trip to Eng- 
lish ports with wounded, men to whom a welcome 
spell of leave had been granted, empties for refilling, 
motor transport vehicles for repair, and the like. 
The wounded were carried in hospital ships; but, as 
the world knows and can never forget, the Germans 
ruthlessly torpedoed them whenever the chance 
offered, regardless of the Geneva Convention, heed- 
less of the damnable inhumanity of the proceeding, 
seeking only for opportunities for indulging in the 
f rightfulness which formed part of their Kultur. 



OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION 13 

All these vessels were continually open to attack, 
not only from submarines but also from the surface 
craft and aircraft based in Flanders. At any chosen 
moment, preferably at night or during misty days, 
these hornets could emanate from Ostende or Zee- 
brugge on their deadly missions. Further westward 
our trans-Atlantic lines of communication offered in- 
numerable opportunities for the German submarine 
commanders to display their brutality against com- 
paratively defenceless merchant vessels, or to attack 
transports carrying munitions of war and troops from 
the American Continent. The passage through the 
English Channel afforded the most direct route for 
German submarines proceeding to, or returning from, 
their hunting-grounds. 

The mercantile traffic off the southeast coast of 
England and in the entrance to the Thames was also 
within easy reach of the German bases in Flanders; 
so were our seaside resorts, such as Ramsgate and 
Margate, which provided favourable opportunities 
for bombardments with resultant casualty lists of 
innocent women and children. 

Dunkerque and Calais on the French coast were 
the nearest seaport objectives to the Flanders coast; 
they both experienced frequent aerial attacks and an 
occasional bombardment from the sea. 

As a counter to the German craft in Flanders the 
British Admiralty had established a force known as 
the "Dover Patrol." As the name implies, this force 
was primarily based on Dover. Their duties were 
mainly those of protecting the transports bound 
across the English Channel, preventing the German 
naval craft from passing through the Straits of 



14 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Dover, and watching the exits from Bruges so as to 
obtain timely information of concentrated German 
forces putting to sea. The story of the Dover Patrol 
is of intense interest, but so many pages would be 
required to do it even bare justice that I can only 
refer the reader to books written especially on that 
subject. Suffice it to say here that, day and night, 
winter and summer, fair weather and foul, the Dover 
force patrolled the sea so successfully that the Ger- 
man attempts to use their surface craft for attacking 
the Allies were few and far between. The difficulties 
of preventing the submarines passing through the 
Straits of Dover were immense. We must realise that 
the maximum portion of a submerged submarine 
visible above water amounts to a periscope of a few 
inches in diameter. Compare that dimension to the 
width of the Strait which at its narrowest part is 
twenty miles. A jew inches in twenty miles — if I have 
calculated aright that means that the visible portion 
of the submarine would cover little more than one^ 
millionth part of the surface between Dover and Cape 
Grisnez. And when we also realise that the periscope 
would only be raised above water for a few seconds 
at long intervals we shall begin to understand the 
difficulty of the problem. Yet, as we know now, the 
Dover Patrol force, under the diiection of Vice- 
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, eventually rendered the 
passage through the Straits to all intents and purposes 
impossible for a submarine. All honour to the Dover 
Patrol! 

A point which, until recently, unaccountably 
seemed to have escaped notice was that the work of 
the Dover Patrol was carried out on behalf of all the 




Copyright by Underwood !( Underwood 

CAPTAIN ALFRED F. B, CARPENTER, V.C., R.N. 



THE DOVER PATROL 15 

Allies and of the United States. It was not a British 
force acting solely in British interests. Though it is 
difficult, and perhaps invidious, to apportion the 
credit for protecting the Allied lines of communica- 
tion, yet there is no shadow of doubt that the troops 
from Canada and from the United States of America 
owed to the Dover Patrol force a tremendous debt 
of gratitude for their safe passage overseas. Recog- 
nition of this fact has since been shown by the erec- 
tion at New York, and on the French coast, of 
memorials to the Dover Patrol. When the late war 
has faded into history, and those of us who took part 
have long since "gone west," such memorials will re- 
main to bear witness to the splendid sacrifice and 
unselfish gallantry of those hardy seamen who did 
their utmost to uphold the honour of civihsation 
and to destroy the forces working for its overthrow. 
(This opportunity of acknowledging the success of 
their extremely arduous efforts, humble and brief 
though the acknowledgment may be, partially coun- 
terbalances my regrets at not having had the chance 
of serving with the "Dover Patrol" except on the 
occasion which this book is designed to describe.) 

The final closing of the Straits, however, was far 
from accompHshed by the spring of 191 8. At that 
time we had reason to believe that a large percentage 
of the total Allied losses in merchant ships was caused 
by the Flanders submarines, and that the percentage 
was on the increase. 

Now patrol work of the type described above is 
essentially defensive in its nature. This statement is 
not intended to imply that the Dover Patrol force 
were always employed on defensive tactics; such was 



i6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

by no means the case. Our monitors frequently bom- 
barded the coast defences and the harbour works at 
Ostende and Zeebrugge; our motor boats were con- 
tinually patrolling close off the three coast harbours, 
watching for opportunities to torpedo any German 
vessels which ventured to sea; our mine-laying craft 
were employed, night after night, in laying mines to 
the detriment of the German submarines. But from 
time to time various suggestions had been made that 
we should adopt still more offensive measures against 
the enemy. It is a very simple matter to make sug- 
gestions, but by no means so simple to accompany 
them with a reasoned statement, based on logical 
deduction, which will convince the authorities of their 
value. Until a particular Plan has been put into 
execution it may, in the literal sense, be rightly des- 
ignated a "paper scheme." It is both unreasonable 
and unfair to attach a derogatory sense to the term. 
It is equally unreasonable for authors of schemes 
which have not passed the paper stage to belittle 
operations when the latter, based on schemes which 
differed from their own, have actually taken place 
with successful results. 

Whatever suggestions were made, it is clear that 
there could be only two radical methods of attaining 
our object. The most satisfactory, of course, would 
have been the recapture of the Flanders coast and 
of Bruges, with all the hornets in their nests, by 
means of military operations. Unfortunately that 
was impracticable; the Allied armies were not yet 
sufficiently strong. The only alternative to capture 
of the craft in their harbours was that of preventmg 
them putting to sea — i.e., destroying or blocking 



PAPER SCHEMES 17 

their exits. Several schemes for blocking operations 
had been proposed. In tactical method they had 
varied from blowing up the harbour entrances, as 
suggested by the Halifax disaster, to "building in" 
the entrances under cover of poison gas. Whether 
such methods were considered too risky, too expen- 
sive, or too hopelessly fantastic is more than the 
author of this book knows. 

An attack on Zeebrugge had been strongly advo- 
cated by an eminent flag officer in November, 1916, 
but no details were given by him as to the nature of 
the operation. In May, 1917, detailed proposals for 
an attack had been submitted to the Admiralty by 
another distinguished officer. This attack involved a 
landing on the Mole at Zeebrugge, the general idea of 
which was not dissimilar from that eventually fol- 
lowed. This particular scheme had not earned the 
approval of Their Lordships, nor was it considered 
suitable by the Vice-Admiral then in command at 
Dover. 

Many months after the blocking of Zeebrugge 
had become an accomplished fact two earlier schemes 
came to light — these having emanated from the 
author of that submitted in May, 1917. In Novem- 
ber, 191 7, however, the only previous proposals 
which were available for consideration by the Plan- 
ning Division of the Staff were those of November, 
1916, and May, 1917, mentioned above. 
* In November, 1917, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was 
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. He had 
requested the Director of Plans to consider, amongst 
many other things, the possibility of blocking the 
Belgian ports. 



i8 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

The Plan was evolved in the Admiralty, being com- 
menced on November 13th, and laid before Their 
Lordships on December 3d. The Plan was accepted 
as feasible, and earned Their Lordships' decision to 
have it carried out. No previous Plan had reached 
that stage. The original edition of the Plan did not 
- emanate from another country, or from civilian 
sources, or from any other source outside the Ad- 
miralty buildings in Whitehall except in so far as the 
details of one particular phase of the operation were 
the outcome of conversations, at the headquarters 
of the Air Force, with an expert on the formation of 
artificial fogs. 

The foregoing definite fact has been purposely In- 
serted to correct other statements which have been 
published elsewhere, presumably in error. I shall deal 
with the details of the Plan in a subsequent chapter. 

Before leaving the consideration of the origin of the 
Plan, I should like to emphasise one particular point. 
Perhaps this can be most readily illustrated by a sim- 
ple simile. An uncorked bottle, containing some 
noxious fluid, stands upon the table. You realise the 
disagreeable results which will follow on the escape 
of its contents. You cork the bottle. Now your action 
is so obviously correct that yoa scarcely give it an- 
other thought. If any credit was due to anybody you 
would probably take it to yourself; you would not 
apportion any particular merit to that fond parent 
who first initiated you into this obvious solution of 
the problem. In the case, therefore, of the Blocking of 
Zeebrugge one need not apportion credit to the person 
who first suggested the mere idea; the credit is entirely 
due to the man who, in spite of all the diflficulties, 



THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLAN 19 

evolved a method of "corking the bottle" and who, 
later, overcoming the great obstacles in the way, 
carried the method into execution. 

Before we pass on to review the difficulties of 
blocking the exits from the German bases it would be 
advisable to consider the probable effects of such an 
operation; this being the logical sequence actually 
followed before the details of the Plan were formu- 
lated. 

The results to be attained by blocking the exits 
would probably be as follows. Firstly, there would 
be a reduction in the number of Allied vessels sunk by 
mine or submarine warfare; secondly, a decrease in 
raid activity on the part of the enemy torpedo craft; 
thirdly, the loss of a convenient advanced base for 
small craft operating in conjunction with certain 
movements of the High Seas Fleet; and, fourthly, the 
reduction in the number of enemy vessels available 
for the purposes mentioned. 

The first two results concerned reduction of enemy 
activity arising from the longer passages involved by 
the use of more distant bases such as Heligoland or 
the German rivers from which the small craft could 
continue their depredations. The third result speaks 
for itself. With regard to the fourth, it has already 
been stated that, on an average day, there would be 
many torpedo craft or submarines resting and re- 
pairing at Bruges. If the exits were blocked the use of 
these craft would be denied to the enemy, just as 
effectually as if they were sunk, for as long as the 
exits remained unopened. This loss to the enemy, 
temporary or permanent, could doubtless be de- 
scribed in terms of reduction of Allied losses of mer- 



20 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

chant tonnage. The Admiralty authorities could 
probably have calculated, within fairly correct esti- 
mates, the average loss of merchant tonnage caused to 
the Allies by a single enemy submarine or surface 
torpedo craft. Our former average loss per given 
period would thus be lessened in proportion to the 
number of enemy vessels bottled up in the canals 
during that period. 

There would, of course, be other, less important, 
consequences arising from the blocking of these exits ; 
e.g., the inconveniences caused by the necessary 
transfer of fuelling and repair facilities elsewhere, the 
extra work thrown on the escorting vessels in the 
Bight, and the fact that the craft already at sea and 
operating from the Flanders coast would be forced to 
curtail their current trips if they desired to arrive at 
their new bases with their usual reserves of fuel. 

All these material gains to the Allies would be of 
considerable importance, but the moral effect was not 
unworthy of consideration. The more audacious an 
undertaking against an enemy the more intense will 
be the victor's enthusiasm consequent on success, 
and the greater the despondency and loss of moral to 
the vanquished. Attempts to block a hostile port in 
the face of carefully prepared defence measures may 
certainly be described as audacious, unless the word 
"impertinent," which the author is inclined to allo- 
cate to this particular event, is deemed to be more 
truly descriptive. If we endeavour to imagine what 
our own feelings would be on hearing that enemy 
vessels had entered one of our strongly defended har- 
bours and blocked the entrance, we shall arrive at 
some idea as to the probable moral effect produced 



RESULTS TO BE OBTAINED 21 

by such an enterprise. In spite of the almost entire 
absence of activity on the part of the High Seas Fleet, 
the Germans had never ceased to sing its praises with 
all the bombast of which their waning spirit was 
capable. It was not difficult, therefore, to estimate 
the dejection and consternation that would spread 
throughout Germany when the success of our efforts 
became known. The loss of prestige in the German 
Navy would be not merely certain but perhaps of vital 
consequence later on. 



CHAPTER II 

THE LOCAL SITUATION. THE LOCAL DEFENCES 



I 



"^HE village of Zeebrugge stands near the en- 
trance to the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal. At 
about half a mile inland from the coast at 
Zeebrugge the canal lock was situated. To seaward 
of the lock, the entrance channel, being open to the 
sea, was tidal. On the eastern side of the entrance 
channel, about midway between the lock and the 
coast-line, a small tidal harbour had been constructed 
for the use of fishing craft. This tidal harbour was of 
no special value for naval purposes, owing to its small 
depth. From the coast-line the entrance channel was 
continued into the sea for a distance of about two 
hundred and seventy yards by means of estacades — 
i.e., wooden piers. These piers, curving outwards 
from the shore, are conspicuous in the illustrations. 
For the purpose of protecting the canal entrance from 
rough seas, which might interfere with the passage 
of vessels to and from the canal, the famous Zeebrugge 
Mole had been constructed for the Belgians. Semi- 
circular in shape, it emanated from the shore at a 
distance of about half a mile to the westward of the 
canal entrance; thence it curved round to the north- 
ward and eastward. This curved Mole protected a 
roadstead, of some three hundred acres in extent, 
from northerly and westerly gales. Easterly winds 
did not cause such heavy seas as those from the direc- 
tions already named owing to the protection afforded 
by the Netherlands coast. 







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ZEEBRUGGE MOLE 23 

The construction of the Mole was a colossal task. 
There are no similar works of such magnitude in 
Great Britain or the United States. When lecturing 
in the latter country I always made a point of em- 
phasising that fact to our American cousins; their 
unfailing humour never failed to appreciate this little 
friendly "dig." 

The total length of the Mole was over one and a 
half miles. For purposes of description it may be 
divided into four portions. Commencing at the shore- 
ward end, the first portion of the Mole took the form 
of a stone railway pier built into the sea for a distance 
of two hundred and fifty yards. This pier was con- 
nected to the second portion, which consisted of an 
iron-piled railway viaduct three hundred and thirty 
yards in length. This, in turn, was connected to the 
third portion, which formed the Mole proper. The 
latter was built of concrete blocks on its seaward and 
shore sides, the central part being filled with gravel 
and paved with granite. The width of this portion of 
the Mole was no less than eighty-one yards, and its 
length about eighteen hundred and seventy-five, or 
rather over a land mile. At its northeastern end, the 
fourth portion consisted of an extension piece, two 
hundred and sixty yards long and fifteen feet broad, 
with a lighthouse at its eastern extremity. 

If the Mole had been constructed soHd throughout 
its entire length, the task of keeping the channel, 
leading to the canal entrance, or the roadstead, at 
a convenient depth would have been impossible 
owing to silt. 

Silt may be defined as the movement of sand or 
mud, according to the nature of the sea bottom in the 



24 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

locality, due to current. The bottom of the sea in this 
locality was sand. The current off the Flanders coast 
is caused by tide — it is usually spoken of as tidal 
stream. Tidal streams reverse their direction of 
movement about every six hours. Now the move- 
ment of sand caused by a tidal stream tends to de- 
posit that sand in or against any irregularity with 
which it meets, whether the latter is a groove on the 
sea bed or an obstacle such as a wreck. This deposit 
first takes place from one direction, and then, when 
the tidal stream reverses, from the opposite direction. 
It will therefore be seen that, where a channel is 
artificially cut on the floor of the sea, silt will con- 
tinually tend to fill that channel again until the bot- 
tom is level once more. And a ship which grounds in 
a locality affected by silt will have sand deposited 
against her sides much to the detriment of salvage 
operations. These facts are well enough known to 
seamen and have an important bearing on this nar- 
rative. 

Suppose for a moment that the entire Mole had 
been built in solid formation — i.e., that the tidal 
stream had no free passage under the viaduct. The 
west-going stream would tend to carry sand into the 
roadstead between the Mole and the canal entrance, 
whereas the east-going stream would be unable to 
remove the deposit a few hours later. Thus the road- 
stead would soon have become useless, and access to 
the canal would have been impracticable. 

The sand along the whole Flanders coast was ex- 
tremely susceptible to movement. Such tendency 
was partially countered by the extensive use of 
groynes. These latter, however, could not be carried 



CONCERNING SILT 25 

very far out into the sea owing to the difficulties of 
construction and repair. There were, therefore, no 
artificial barriers to prevent the movement of the 
sand to the eastward or westward beyond a short 
distance from the shore. Hence the necessity for 
keeping a portion of the Mole open to allow the tidal 
stream to flow in both directions. Even so, a large 
shoal had formed in the roadstead, and reduced the 
acreage available for anchorage purposes. 

When first designed the open viaduct was of shorter 
length than that eventually constructed; the altera- 
tion was considered necessary after local experience 
of the silt had been obtained. The iron piles, or pil- 
lars, on which the viaduct was supported were of 
great strength and much interlaced with steel rods to 
allow for severe buffeting in heavy gales and to take 
the strain of railway traffic. A portion was actually 
demolished by a gale when under construction, and 
the completion of the Mole was consequently delayed 
for many months. 

When making enquiries in search of expert advice 
on questions of salvage, I had an interesting conversa- 
tion with an individual who had had considerable 
experience in salving vessels in other waters. Maybe 
this book will remind him of our discussion. In his 
opinion salvage work presiented no great difficulties. 
It was only a matter of obtaining the necessary ap- 
parat?js, he thought, and any vessel — concrete-filled 
or otherwise — could be removed in a month or so. 
"How about silt.?" I asked. 

"Oh, silt shouldn't make much difference," he re- 
plied, and added, "but we have no silt to speak of ia 
that part of the world, so I cannot say for certain." 



26 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

We then discussed the possiblHties of salving a 
blockship at Zeebrugge, for he had been informed of 
the proposed operation. Eventually our conversation 
nearly resulted in a wager; that we came to no terms 
was perhaps due to the fact that payment might have 
necessitated application to a war widow. 

The first and second portions of the Mole had not 
been materially altered by the Germans during their 
occupation. 

The third portion of the Mole will require detailed 
description. In peace days the Mole had been used as 
a commercial wharf as well as a breakwater. Ships 
used to secure alongside its inner wall. All the neces- 
sary facilities, such as bollards for securing hawsers, 
fixed and travelling cranes for loading or unloading 
cargo, and arrangements for embarking passengers, 
had been provided. A large railway passenger sta- 
tion, nearly two hundred yards long, was situated 
near its southwestern end ; a goods station aad a coal 
shed, both very large buildings, stood further to the 
northeastward. The floor level of this portion of the 
Mole was about nine feet above the level of high tide. 
On the outer (seaward) side a high wall, of great 
strength and thickness, had been constructed for the 
purpose of preventing rough seas from breaking over 
the Mole and damaging the sheds or washing away 
the railway. The top of this wall was twenty feet 
above the floor level of the Mole and therefore twenty- 
nine feet above the level of high tide: at low tide it 
towered forty-four feet above the sea. 

The fourth portion of the Mole was really formed 
by a continuation of the outer wall, which extended 
beyond the third portion to the lighthouse. 



THE OUTER WALL AND THE PARAPET 27 

The appearance of all portions of the outer wall, as 
viewed by anybody situated in a boat alongside it, 
was exactly similar throughout its entire length from 
the lighthouse to the railway viaduct. Thus the in- 
dividual in the boat, except in the unlikely event of 
being able to see over the top of the wall, would be 
unable to tell, at all definitely, whereabouts his boat 
was situated relative to objects on the Mole. But this 
fact had not been accidentally overlooked by the de- 
signer of the Mole; there was no object in taking it 
into consideration, for there was then no idea of any 
vessel berthing alongside the outer wall. For instance, 
there were no bollards, no cranes, no capstans for 
working hawsers, in fact no arrangements whatever 
for berthing a ship. I have already stated that this 
outer wall was of great thickness, varying from 
twenty-five feet on the sea bottom to ten feet in that 
portion standing above the floor level of the Mole. 
Four feet below the top of the wall there was a path- 
way, nine feet broad, running the whole length of the 
wall. This pathway was known as the parapet. The 
parapet was bounded on its seaward side by the four- 
foot wall just mentioned; on its inner side iron rail- 
ings, three feet high, were placed to prevent anybody 
falling from the pathway to the floor of the Mole six- 
teen feet below. Flights of steps led up from the 
Mole floor to the parapet, but these flights were very 
few and far between. 

That portion of the outer wall which formed the 
lighthouse extension of the Mole was broadened, 
above the sea level, to about seventeen feet through- 
out its length. The pathway was similar to that just 
described, but fifteen feet in width. This portion of 



28 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the Mole was hollow, a tunnel inside it running from 
the third portion of the Mole to the base of the light- 
house. 

The navigable channel from the open sea to the 
canal entrance could only be maintained in an effi- 
cient state by means of continual dredging, owing to 
the silt. The channel passed close to the lighthouse at 
the end of the Mole, and then in a fairly direct line, 
for a distance of three-quarters of a mile, to a position 
midway between the extremities of the two piers 
marking the canal entrance. Thence the deep water 
channel passed slightly to the westward of the central 
line between the piers. This latter portion of the 
channel had become exceedingly narrow by virtue of 
the sandbanks which had formed on either side of it 
and which actually uncovered at low water. A vessel 
drawing more than twelve feet or so was forced to 
keep exactly in the middle of this dredged channel 
to avoid grounding. Photographs taken at or near 
high tide gave the channel the appearance of extend- 
ing from one pier to the other, at least a distance of 
one hundred yards ; those taken near low water showed 
how narrow the channel really was. In the region of 
the two piers the silting of the sand was more rapid 
than elsewhere: the narrowest part of the channel 
was situated near the shore ends of these piers. 

The Germans had not rested satisfied with either 
the Mole, the canal entrance, or the lock as they 
found them. The Mole itself had been transformed 
into a fortress, and further defences had been con- 
structed for the purpose of guarding the canal. 

Batteries were placed on both sides of the canal 
entrance. These ranged from four-inch guns to 



fp 




Crown copyright — Imperial War 3Iuseur7» 

A PORTION OF THE GERMAN BATTERY ON THE LIGHTHOUSE 
EXTENSION OF THE MOLE 




VIEW OF THE CANAL ENTRANCE WITH ITS CURVED PIERS 

This photograph was taken at high tide. Note the Mole in the distance 



DEFENCES ON THE MOLE 29 

twelve-inch guns. Barbed wire entanglements were 
erected along the shore line ; trenches, containing ma- 
chine guns, were dug close behind them. It was be- 
lieved that a boom of some sort, capable of being 
hauled across the channel or removed at will, was kept 
handy to the outer lock gate. The gate itself, " cais- 
son" is the correct technical term, was withdrawn 
into an armoured housing, impervious to shells or 
bombs, when the lock was opened to allow vessels to 
pass through. The caisson was also provided with an 
armoured roof for defence against aerial bombs. The 
lights on the wooden piers were only lit when spe- 
cially required to guide a German vessel to the en- 
trance. 

On the Mole a very large seaplane base was estab- 
lished with the original passenger station as its prin- 
cipal building. Several other buildings for housing 
seaplanes, fuel, or bombs, and workshops were erected 
by the Germans close by. A merchant steamer, the 
Brussels, formerly commanded by the ill-fated Cap- 
tain Fryatt, whom the Germans did to death so 
abominably, was moored alongside the station, and 
was believed to be used as living quarters for the per- 
sonnel of the seaplane base. 

The broad portion of the Mole was used as a base 
for submarines passing through Zeebrugge en route 
for Bruges or to the open sea; it was also used for such 
torpedo craft and mine-sweepers as were required for 
immediate duty in that locality. From the north- 
eastern large shed to the lighthouse the Mole had 
been turned into a veritable fortress. It was believed 
that the lighthouse was used as the Mole signal sta- 
tion. A battery of six or seven guns was situated on 



30 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the lighthouse extension of the Mole. These guns 
were at first surmised to be 3.5-inch guns, but it is 
probable that they were larger — in fact, up to 5.9- 
inch guns firing a shell of approximately one hundred 
pounds in weight. It was believed that the guns of 
this battery could fire out to sea and could be turned 
to fire towards the shore. 

Any vessel approaching from seaward and passing 
into the dredged channel, en route to the canal, would 
be within the danger zone of this battery, from the 
latter's extreme range out at sea to the canal lock, 
always provided that the state of the visibility al- 
lowed the vessel to be seen. Incidentally, owing to the 
situation of the deep channel, the vessel would be 
obliged to pass within a few yards of this battery when 
rounding the Mole end. A vessel endeavouring to 
berth alongside the outer wall would have to approach 
close to this battery, i.e., on a westerly course. At 
first sight it might appear feasible to approach from 
the westward on an easterly course and thus avoid 
passing close to the battery, but that is not so. High 
tide and slack stream do not coincide on this coast. 
For about three hours on each side of high tide the 
streams run to the eastward: at other states of the 
tide there would be insufficient depths of water for a 
vessel to berth alongside. It would therefore be nec- 
essary to approach from the eastward, i.e., to stem 
the tidal stream. 

Now let us imagine for a few moments a duel be- 
tween this battery and a warship within — say — 
one thousand yards. The reader probably knows that 
such a distance nowadays comes within the definition 
of "point-blank range''; i.e., a range at which a gun 










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DEFENCES ON THE MOLE 31 

practically cannot miss a ship. Picture, then, an 
average-sized vessel of three hundred feet in length. 
The guns could hardly miss her — in fact, the gunners 
could select which particular portion of her should 
serve as their target. The ship's guns would return 
the fire. The most vulnerable portions of the battery 
ashore are the guns themselves. The muzzle of each 
gun showing just above the wall would, as viewed 
from the ship, cover barely one square foot in size. 
Now at golf we call it a "fluke" when a golfer holes 
out from the tee although he has attained his object. 
(I apologise for this to non-golfers.) Similarly, if the 
ship's gun hits the shore gun we should call it a 
"fluke," although that is the object forming the 
target. And, as already implied, if the shore gun 
misses the ship, that also will be a "fluke." On the 
face of it, it certainly does not look as if the ship 
would stand much chance, even at a distance of one 
thousand yards. But how if she is closer.? If a thou- 
sand yards is point-blank range, how shall we desig- 
nate a hundred yards ? 

At the eastern end of the broad part of the Mole, 
and on its floor level, the Germans had erected a bat- 
tery of three heavy guns. These were so placed that 
they could fire on any incoming vessel immediately 
she rounded the lighthouse. Woe betide a vessel at- 
tempting to do so in the face of such guns. The latter 
were probably of the 5.9-inch type. Under water, 
immediately below this battery, we eventually found 
some submerged torpedo tubes, but I am not aware 
as to whether they were constructed before the 
blocking operation or not ; their direction of fire was 
similar to that of the guns above them. 



32 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Close westward of these batteries of heavy guns 
and torpedoes, and standing against the high outer 
wall, the Germans had constructed a long shed of 
reenforced concrete; this shed provided the living 
space for the personnel of the Mole garrison. 

The total numbers of Germans on the Mole prob- 
ably reached not less than a thousand. Although this 
number may include the personnel of the seaplane 
base yet they would all be available for the defence of 
the Mole in case of an attack. 

Slightly to the westward of the garrison's quarters, 
trenches had been sunk in the floor of the Mole and 
surrounded by three complete sets of barbed wire 
entanglements. It was believed that the usual ac- 
cessories of a coast fort — e.g., searchlights and 
range-finders, etc. — were placed on the outer wall 
parapet, and that there would probably be some 
small guns there also. 

So much for the Mole itself. Across the channel 
the Germans had placed booms. One of these, con- 
sisting of four Rhine barges, was moored between the 
eastern end of the broad part of the Mole and a buoy 
situated two hundred and seventy yards to the south- 
ward. These barges were filled with stone, had nets 
slung beneath them, and were connected together by 
wire hawsers. If a surface vessel attempted to pass 
between the buoy and the Mole she would be brought 
up by this boom and probably damaged by collision 
with one of the barges. If a submarine attempted to 
dive underneath the barges she would be caught up 
in the nets. The other boom consisted of entangle- 
ment nets moored between a series of buoys to the 
southeastward of the barges. Any ship attempting 




THE NORTHEASTERN END OF THE MOLE 

a. The shadows of the parapet wall and of the lighthouse at its extremity 

b. The Mole batteries 

c. Trench system surrounded by barbed wire 

d. German torpedo craft alongside Mole 

e. The barge boom 

f. The boom of entanglement nets 



THE BOOMS AND TORPEDO CRAFT 33 

to pass through them would probably have her pro- 
pellers entangled, with the result that her engines 
would be brought to a complete stop. Thus, which- 
ever boom was encountered by a ship, the latter 
would, at the least, be partially disabled and stopped. 
The Mole batteries could then have sunk her at their 
leisure by gunfire. The only route by which a vessel 
could pass clear of these two booms was that between 
the southeastern barge and the northern entangle- 
ment net; i.e., within two hundred and fifty yards of 
the heavy gun battery on the Mole. But even if, by 
dint of good fortune or special good management, a 
vessel managed to pass the Mole batteries and the 
booms, she would still have to run the gantlet of 
the naval vessels in the anchorage and the batteries 
on shore before reaching the canal. 

The German torpedo craft, which were available 
for local duty, used to berth alongside the inner side 
of the Mole, close to the westward of the barge 
boom. By virtue of their guns, torpedoes, and search- 
lights, and the fact that they probably kept up 
steam in readiness for instant action, these craft 
provided a valuable addition to the Mole and canal 
defences. 

The foregoing description of the local defences at 
Zeebrugge has probably been sufficiently detailed to 
lead to the conclusion that the Germans were fully 
alive to the possibility of attacks on the Mole or canal. 
Whether or not they considered that such attacks 
would only form part of some more ambitious opera- 
tion, such as a military landing on the coast, our 
enemies had left practically no stone unturned to 
repel them. The defence measures must have ap- 



34 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

peared, especially to those on the spot, to be more 
than sufficient. 

It is well known that, although the possession of 
detailed local knowledge will usually be of great 
value towards the formation of plans of attack, there 
are occasions when local knowledge is apt to make 
local difficulties loom extremely large. For instance, 
in this particular case, the navigational difficulties 
caused by the strong tidal stream, the difficulty of 
recognising objects on the low-lying shore during 
darkness, the uninviting appearance of the outer 
Mole wall as an obstacle to be surmounted, and many 
other matters would probably have induced the be- 
lief, in those who were actually acquainted with these 
difficulties, that such attacks would have no chance 
of success. There is, therefore, reason to believe that, 
although they realised an attack might be attempted, 
the Germans were perfectly satisfied that the defences 
could neither be improved nor penetrated. 

The reader will probably have arrived at the con- 
clusion that the Germans were devilish in their thor- 
oughness. Yet there was still one joint left in their 
armour — and we penetrated it. But I must not 
anticipate. 



CHAPTER III 

THE OUTLYING OBSTACLES. CONSIDERATIONS OF 
SALVAGE 

THUS far I have only dealt with the local de- 
fences of Zeebrugge. But there were many 
other obstacles in our way — such as the 
coast batteries, mines, surface patrol vessels, sub- 
marines, aircraft, and the vagaries of the weather in 
addition to the navigational difficulties mentioned in 
the first chapter. 

The coast-line of Flanders bristled with guns. The 
section of the coast from three miles west of Ostende 
to six miles east of Zeebrugge, approximately twenty- 
one miles in length, was defended by two hundred 
and twenty-five guns; one hundred and thirty-six of 
these were of the heavy type, i.e., six-inch and above, 
up to fifteen-inch guns. 

At one period of the war, soon after the Germans 
first obtained possession of that locality, the coast 
defences had been few and far between. In those days 
our ships used to bombard from such short ranges as 
ten thousand yards. In course of time heavier guns 
were set up on shore so that our vessels were forced to 
keep at a more respectful distance. The first bom- 
bardments from ten thousand yards had been an- 
swered by the establishment of German guns having 
a range of fifteen thousand yards. When better 
weapons became available for bombardment from 
twenty thousand yards the Germans replied with guns 



36 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

firing up to twenty-five thousand yards. And thus the 
duel continued. Finally, the ranges increased to up- 
wards of forty thousand yards (twenty-three land 
miles). Monitors were specially constructed for this 
purpose and their marksmanship was wonderfully 
accurate. This accuracy is borne out by the fact that 
scarcely any damage was caused to the residential 
quarter, although Ostende was bombarded again and 
again; yet works of military importance, such as 
docks and railway stations, closely adjoining the resi- 
dential quarter, were hit time after time. 
' In a straightforward gunnery duel between a ship 
and a fort, within the effective range of each, the 
former stands no chance. In these days, however, 
such duels savour little of the old-time broadside 
fighting between ships. 

Even the largest and most modern coast guns are 
of comparatively small avail for defensive purposes 
unless the attacking ships are visible, or unless the 
firing can be controlled satisfactorily by such indirect 
means as the use of aircraft for observational pur- 
poses. At night the attackers must be illuminated by 
star-shell, flares, or searchlights. Under the ordinary 
fog conditions — i.e., when the whole locality is ob- 
scured by fog — aircraft cannot observe the results 
of firing nor can the attacking forces be illuminated. 

Under exceptional fog conditions — i.e., when a 
fog (natural or artificial) lies between the shore guns 
and the attacking vessels, the latter being in clear 
weather — good co-operation between the batteries 
and aircraft in daylight enables the fire to be directed 
so accurately as to ensure destruction to vessels which 
remain in the danger zone. 



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GERMAN COAST DEFENCES 37 

The only alternative to directed firing is that of 
barrage firing, such as is used so greatly in modern 
land warfare. The defence guns can establish a shell 
barrage, for a limited period, across any zone which 
the attacking ship is attempting to penetrate en route 
to her objective. The vessel which steams into an 
efficient heavy gun barrage from modern guns is 
unlikely to survive. 

I afterwards visited one of the large German bat- 
teries near Ostende, called the Jakobynessen battery, 
which mounted fifteen-inch guns and fired projectiles 
weighing nearly one ton each — seventeen hundred- 
weight to be precise. They were mounted in specially 
constructed gun-pits amongst the sand-hills close 
behind the shore, and were so well hidden that they 
could not be seen from a distance of little more than 
a single gun's length. The projectiles stood over six 
feet high and were murderous-looking instruments of 
warfare. These particular guns, and there were others 
of a like nature, could probably have ranged up to 
sixty thousand yards (over thirty-four land miles). 

The whole area off this section of the coast, up to 
about twenty miles to seaward, was included in the 
danger zone of the coast batteries. No vessel could 
maintain her position in that area, under ordinary 
conditions of visibility, for more than a few minutes 
at the outside limit. The reader may consider, how- 
ever, that a ship desiring to attack the coast would 
merely have to approach in foggy weather or under 
cover of darkness. In foggy weather she would be 
unable to locate her objective — so that can be ruled 
out. At night she might conceivably arrive within a 
few thousand yards without being seen or heard. 



38 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

But immediately she was located by the defences the 
latter would fire their star-shell and switch on their 
searchlights. The whole area would thus be illumi- 
nated like daylight. The vessel discovered under such 
conditions would probably be blown to pieces within 
five minutes. 

Thus it is manifest that ships cannot approach a 
hostile coast, in the face of modern defences, under the 
ordinary conditions of daylight or darkness, or in fog. 

We will now consider the mine problem. The Ger- 
man mine-fields extended to a distance of several 
miles from the coast. We had reason to know of their 
presence ; from time to time, as reported in the press, 
our vessels had been blown up. 

Mine-fields off one's own coast provide a certain 
measure of defence. But they are also an embarrass- 
ment in that one's own vessels cannot pass through 
them, when approaching or leaving harbour, unless 
safe channels are kept clear for the purpose. This 
applied to the mine-fields under review. 

The reader may possibly have jumped to the con- 
clusion that all we had to do was to navigate calmly 
through the German safe channels. It certainly 
sounds plausible. As a matter of fact, such an idea 
borders on the ridiculous. Let us think this matter out 
carefully. Our forces could not pass through such 
channels unless they possessed information as to the 
positions of those channels. But if such information 
were received, the chances would be long odds on the 
information having been "made in Germany." Far 
from such information being correct, therefore, the 
positions mentioned would probably be those of the 
most dangerous mine-fields. Nevertheless, suppose 



THE GERMAN MINE-FIELDS 39 

we received information which, from the nature of its 
source and data, we had every reason to credit; and 
suppose we acted on such information. Well, on the 
voyage across the sea, or even before we actually 
start, the enemy discover that we intend to attack. 
What will they do? Their argument would be as fol- 
lows : "The British are coming over to attack us; they 
may have discovered the positions of our safe chan- 
nels; we dare not take any chances so we will mine 
our own safe channels immediately." Mine-layers, 
kept ready for instant use, would be sent to sea at 
once. In a very short space of time, probably an hour 
would be more than sufficient, the previous safe chan- 
nels would have been converted into areas of the 
greatest danger. 

There are alternative methods which the attackers 
may adopt. Firstly, they may advance to the attack 
preceded by a force of mine-sweepers. Now mine- 
sweeping is a very slow process if it is to be carried out 
thoroughly. It is inconceivable that a large force of 
these vessels could steam about, mine-sweeping, near 
the enemy's coast for a considerable period without 
being discovered. Their discovery would give the 
whole show away; the enemy would know that we 
were approaching; the whole element of surprise 
would be lost. 

The other method open to the attackers is that of 
proceeding to their objective without mine-sweepers, 
after having carefully weighed the probabilities of 
danger existing on the various alternative routes, and, 
on arriving at the danger area, passing through it and 
chancing the result. And that is what we did — we 
chanced it! But I am anticipating once more. 



40 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Outside the German mine-fields, and in any inshore 
areas which were unmined, German patrol craft would 
probably be stationed. Patrol craft, in comparatively 
narrow waters, are effective for discovering the ap- 
proach of surface vessels in clear weather by day or 
night. The minimum harm that they could do to the 
attacking force would be that of reporting the latter's 
approach. A single alarm rocket might be sufficient. 
It is, therefore, almost inconceivable that the patrol 
vessels could be passed without the alarm being given. 
Any gun-firing would, of course, act as an alarm; 
ramming, a much more silent method, would be the 
best course open to the attacking craft if they en- 
countered the patrols. 

There were two other forms of patrol, however, 
which could provide even more serious obstacles. 

Submarines, stationed on the route between the 
attacker's base and the objective, could patrol at 
periscope depth. The passing of the squadrons, 
viewed through the periscope of the unseen sub- 
marine would be reported by wireless telegraphy im- 
mediately the submarine could come to the surface. 
Thus, long before the attack commenced, the de- 
fenders would be perfectly well aware of the at- 
tacker's approach, whereas the latter would imagine 
that their mission was unsuspected. This use of a 
submarine, as a lookout, would be of infinitely greater 
importance, in such an event as this, than her use as 
a torpedo vessel. 

Aircraft patrolling off the coast — say at a height 
of five thousand feet — would be able to see as far as 
the southeast coast of England, provided the atmos- 
phere were clear. Under average conditions of visi- 



SUMMARY OF OBSTACLES 41 

bility there would be no difficulty in discovering a 
naval force several miles distant. Such discovery 
would be immediately reported to the defences with 
the same result as that just described in the case of 
the submarine. The Germans had a strong force of 
seaplanes based on the Flanders coast. These ma- 
chines were generally patrolling the vicinity — pro^ 
vided the Allied aircraft were not about. 

We have now arrived at the stage where we can 
make a summary of the main obstacles in the way of 
a blocking enterprise at Zeebrugge. There were {a) 
the aerial patrol; {h) outlying submarines; (c) surface 
patrol vessels; {d) mines; {/) uncharted shoals; (/) 
lack of navigational aids; (g) coast defence batteries 
and illuminating apparatus; (A) the guns on the 
Mole; {i) the obstruction booms; (/) the harbour 
defence craft; {K) the shore batteries defending the 
canal; (/) the difficulties of seamanship in a tideway; 
and lastly (m) the vagaries of the weather. 

In connection with a blocking enterprise at Ost- 
ende the same obstacles applied with the exception of 
those resulting from the presence of the Mole. 

The list is undoubtedly formidable though not yet 
complete. The operation, on the face of it, did not 
seem to be altogether simple. 

In writing this book I may be taken to task for con- 
centrating on the operation at Zeebrugge and leaving 
the Ostende stories untold. 

The latter operations, there were two, would ne- 
cessitate a volume to themselves. And — this is the 
all-important point — I am not competent to render 
a first-hand account of them because I was not in the 
position of an eye-witness. Let us hope that the story 



42 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

will be written some day, so that the splendid work 
of poor GodsaV who afterwards lost his life at Ost- 
ende in my old ship, and of his gallant troop may be 
properly recorded. 

Owing to the fact that we were uncertain as to the 
extent to which Ostende could be utilised as an exit 
from Bruges, we naturally decided to assume its effi- 
ciency; i.e., to assume that blocking the craft in at 
Bruges would necessitate blocking both Zeebrugge 
and Ostende. 

The harbour entrance at Ostende was somewhat 
similar to the canal entrance at Zeebrugge. There 
were two piers flanking the entrance channel, the 
whole area being commanded by shore batteries. 
The only other comparison between the places which 
calls for mention here is as follows. Whereas the 
Mole at Zeebrugge provided additional obstacles 
against entry, it also acted as a landmark from which 
the canal entrance could be found. At Ostende the 
defence obstacles would be less compHcated, but the 
harbour entrance would be more difficult to locate, 

Now, the decision to block both exits naturally led 
to the conclusion that they should be blocked simul- 
taneously if practicable. Otherwise the operation at 
one place would serve as a warning to the other. For 
instance, it would have been rather absurd for us to 
block Zeebrugge one night with a view to coming 
along on the following night to block Ostende. The 
absurdity would have been only slightly less in degree 
if we blocked one exit at — say — midnight with the 
idea of blocking the other at 2 a.m. For the defence 
batteries at the two places would naturally be in tele- 

^ Commander A. E. Godsal. 



CONCERNING BOMBARDMENT 43 

phonic communication, and even half an hour's notice 
at the second exit would be sufficient to prepare a very- 
warm reception for us. Simuhaneous blocking was 
our aim; thus the whole operation was directed to that 
end, a fact which influenced the events to be related. 

It has been suggested that "blocking the exit" was 
not the best method of preventing the egress of Ger- 
man vessels from the Zeebrugge canal. An alternative 
method, that of destroying the lock-gate by gun-fire, 
was referred to. The idea sounds plausible enough at 
first. As a matter of fact, many attempts had been 
made, by means of long-range bombardments, to 
achieve that end. They had all failed. The lock-gate 
appeared to have a charmed life. Huge shell had 
burst in its vicinity and yet it still remained intact. 
The suggestion was then put forward that the lock- 
gate should be bombarded from close range under 
cover of smoke or gas. This suggestion was accom- 
panied by the opinion that an attempt at blocking 
the channel would be futile. I am much puzzled at 
this idea of close bombardment. For it was as ob- 
vious, as it was known to be a fact, that the Germans 
would withdraw the gate into its armoured recess im- 
mediately a bombardment was suspected. This would 
have been the work of a feW moments ; the outer lock- 
gate would have been rendered absolutely immune 
from destruction. 

The argument that there were two lock-gates, outer 
and inner, and that the Germans could not withdraw 
both, owing to the fear of the canal running dry, also 
sounds plausible until it is closely examined. Firstly, 
however, it is clear that the canal would only run dry 
if both lock-gates were opened at low tide; secondly, an 



44 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

inshore operation at low tide would preclude the use 
of any craft other than those of shallow draught; 
thirdly, owing to the presence of the outer wall of the 
Mole, whose height would be over forty feet at low 
tide, the bombarding vessels could only obtain a 
direct line of fire at the lock from a position inside the 
Mole where the extensive shoals would allow very 
little room for manoeuvring, to say nothing of the 
defences on the Mole itself; fourthly, the canal, even 
if emptied, would refill from the rising tide within a 
few hours, and there was no certainty that the tem- 
porary evacuation of the water would cause serious 
damage; and lastly, one may assume, if there was 
really any substance in the idea, that the Vice-Admi- 
ral whose many long-range bombardments had failed 
to achieve their purpose would have long since at- 
tempted a short-range attack. 

So, the decision to block the entrance at Zeebrugge 
having been reached, the best position for blocking 
had to be considered. It has already been shown that 
the narrowest portion of the channel to seaward of 
the lock was situated near the shore ends of the 
wooden piers. Another position even narrower in size 
was that of the lock-gateway itself. But the mere 
width of the position chosen was by no means the 
only consideration. 

The actual sinking of the blockships in position did 
not provide the final argument ; a point of great im- 
portance concerned the practicability of removing 
them out of the channel ; it is of little use to block a 
channel in such a manner that it can easily be un- 
blocked. This matter concerns the art of salvage. 

Salvage is a highly technical subject, but a few re- 



CONSIDERATIONS OF SALVAGE 45 

marks at this stage are necessary if the reader is to 
appreciate the extent to which considerations of sal- 
vage affected the problem under discussion. 

Salvage operations must vary according to the cir- 
cumstances of each particular case. The size of the 
vessel, the damage which she has sustained, the man- 
ner in which she is resting on the bottom of the 
sea, the nature of the ground, the tides, the depth of 
water, the degree of exposure to rough seas, the prox- 
imity of shelter for salvage craft, and the distance 
from the land are all factors of importance, but they 
by no means exhaust the list. 

One of our main purposes in considering salvage 
operations was that of ascertaining the chief obstacles 
to salvage, so that we could provide the enemy with 
as many of those identical obstacles as lay in our 
power. 

Another important object, concerning the imme- 
diate problem at Zeebrugge, was that of deciding the 
best type and size of vessel to be used in addition to 
the question of what particular damage each vessel 
should receive, and how she should be fitted to defy 
attempts at removal. 

There are three principal methods of removing a 
sunken ship. First, bodily removal with the aid of 
some lifting agent. Second, dispersion by explosive 
means. Third, piecemeal removal by cutting away. 

Regarding the first-mentioned method, a small 
vessel can be lifted by passing hawsers beneath her 
and securing the ends to salvage craft on the surface 
overhead. The hawsers being hauled taut at low tide, 
the vessel will lift off the bottom when the rise of 
tide lifts the salvage craft, and can then be trans- 



46 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

ported bodily elsewhere. Larger vessels can be lifted 
by the use of compressed air, or by pumping out the 
vessel after closing all holes under water. Provided 
the ship is upright the compressed air method can 
leave out of account the damage sustained below the 
vessel's normal waterhne, but the remainder of the 
hull must be rendered airtight. Air can then be 
pumped into the hull until the vessel is lifted, and she 
can be towed away as required. 

This method has been used successfully when re- 
moving large vessels, but the practicability of render- 
ing them airtight chiefly depends on the damage 
which they have sustained. The pumping-out method, 
comparatively speaking, is the most simple one 
to adopt, provided that the damage to the hull is 
small. The damaged portion must be repaired by 
divers unless the more elaborate method of building 
a coffer-dam — i.e., a sort of dock — ^ around the ship, is 
pursued. Divers cannot work in a strong tidal current 
or in rough weather. The repair of holes under water 
is rendered extremely difficult, if not actually impos- 
sible, when the bottom of the ship is badly holed with 
the ship resting on the damaged portion. The ship 
must be made watertight, or nearly so, below the sur- 
face of the sea before she can be lifted. The word 
"watertight" is qualified here because, as a matter of 
accuracy, the ship can be pumped out and lifted, pro- 
vided that the pumps can eject water at a greater rate 
than the latter is flowing in. Before passing on to 
consider the next method it may be as well to remark 
that special difficulty is experienced when moving 
sand — i.e., silt — has access to the holes in the ship. 

Dispersion by means of explosive charges may, un- 



METHODS OF SALVING SHIPS 47 

der certain circumstances, be a simple operation, but, 
on the other hand, there are certain conditions which 
put this method outside the pale of choice. For in- 
stance, in the case of a ship sunk in a narrow channel 
where much silt is experienced, the explosive method 
is almost worse than useless. For every explosion in 
a given section of a vessel will tend to shatter that 
portion into several pieces. Each piece falls to the 
bottom and forms a new obstruction. Silt then 
enormously aggravates the situation, for the sand 
will collect against the obstruction until it becomes a 
miniature sandbank. Such shoals are then difficult to 
remove. A bucket-dredger — i.e., a vessel fitted with 
an endless chain of buckets for scooping up the bot- 
tom — will break her buckets as soon as they en- 
counter the steel kernel of the shoal. On the other 
hand, a suction dredger — i.e., a vessel designed to 
suck up sand off the sea-bottom — cannot raise solid 
material. Neither type of dredger can remove the 
cause of the shoal; any removal of sand under such 
conditions is merely temporary; the sand will re- 
commence building up the shoal as soon as the dredger 
ceases work. Dredging against such obstacles is of 
little more use than dredging against rocks. 

There remains the third method, namely, piece- 
meal removal by means of "cutting away." Cutting 
away can be accomplished, in the ordinary course of 
events, by means of acetylene gas cutters or by 
pneumatic tools. Acetylene gas will cut through steel 
with little more effort than a knife cutting through 
india-rubber. But acetylene gas cannot be used under 
water and cannot cut through large thicknesses of 
cement. Pneumatic tools provide a very laborious and 



48 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

tedious means of cutting large quantities of steel. 
Work under water entails the use of divers. Thus, the 
removal of a ship by the piecemeal process is an ex- 
ceedingly prolonged undertaking, especially as each 
piece must be lifted out when cut away; for reasons 
already stated the pieces must on no account be al- 
lowed to fall to the sea-bottom. 

From the foregoing remarks we arrive at the fol- 
lowing conclusions. The blockships should be too 
large to lift off the bottom by the hawser method. 
They should be extensively damaged and sunk in such 
a manner that they would rest on the damaged por- 
tion of the hull. They should be fitted to counter 
"cutting away" tactics, and should be sunk in posi- 
tions where silt would render impracticable the ex- 
plosive method of dispersion; the damage should be 
so situated as to give the silting sand access to the 
hull through the holes in the latter. 

These general anti-salvage considerations, how- 
ever, did not furnish us with all the data required. 
They required to be dealt with in greater detail, and 
the matter of dimensions was another important factor. 

It was essential to render impossible the passage 
of the German naval craft out of the canal over the 
top of the sunken blockships. The tide at Zeebrugge 
rises fifteen feet between its low and high levels. Al- 
lowing six feet as the minimum depth required to 
float small naval craft, it will be seen that the upper 
portion of each blockship should reach to within six 
feet of high tide level, or, at least, nine feet above low 
tide level, when resting on the bottom. The height 
of the blockship's hull, therefore, would need to be 
equal to the depth of the sea at low tide level plus, at 



DIMENSIONS OF BLOCKSHIPS 49 

least, nine feet. Now, the choice of vessel is naturally 
limited. In the midst of war it is unlikely that a navy 
would possess many craft, if any, which were not 
already in use for other purposes. Thus, the dimen- 
sions just referred to would have to fall within certain 
limits, namely, those corresponding to the dimensions 
of the only vessels from which one is likely to be able 
to choose. That part of the total height due to the 
rise of tide was beyond control ; it would be the same 
an5^where in the same locality. Thus, the position 
chosen for the blocking must necessarily have a low 
tide depth of such an amount as would make the total 
depth at high water correspond to the total height of 
the available hulls. 

Then again the number of ships required would 
depend on the relation between their horizontal di- 
mensions and the breadth of the channel to be 
blocked. For instance, a single vessel whose beam di- 
mensions were approximately equal to the breadth 
of the lock gateway would be sufficient to block the 
latter, provided that the height of her hull also agreed 
with the conditions just mentioned above. 

Now, it had to be borne in mind that if a vessel was 
sunk in the lock gateway the "cutting-away" method 
would be greatly facilitated by the erection of cranes 
and machinery, within a few feet of the vessel, on 
dry land. This position, being so far removed from the 
tidal current which runs parallel with the Belgian 
coast, was unaffected by silt. Thus, although the lock 
gateway, by reason of its small breadth, could be 
completely blocked by any suitable vessel sunk 
therein, the work of salvage would be very much less 
difficult here than elsewhere. 



50 



THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 



Further out, between the wooden piers at the canal 
entrance, the navigable channel was approximately 
one hundred and twenty feet in breadth; i.e., slightly 



RAN 
of 
CABAl, ENTRANCE CHAIINEL 

drawn roughly to seal* 





A - Bloekehlp 120 feet long. 

B - Blookship TJO feet long. 

C - Blockahip JOO feet long. 

Note how far Blockahip must be turnedl 

according to her length. 




Vsstem 'P,Vt 



r^ 




/771 


'/// 


////y'-p// / / 

/ / / / / / S lnrfl<l«^«a cdami 


V// 


//. 


/////// »»CO,.r„i at 


low tUt / 
/ / / 



SECTION OF CHAiniEX 
through x-y in Plan 
Bote apparent width (JOO feet) of channel at high tide 
and. actual width (120 feet) available for navigation. 



over one-third of the whole distance between the piers. 
A vessel of one hundred and twenty feet in length, 
therefore, would require to be turned dead across the 
navigable channel before sinking if she was to block 



DIMENSIONS OF BLOCKSHIPS 



51 



every inch of it. Obviously, a vessel of three hundred 
feet in length would not require to turn herself to any- 
thing like the same extent. The maximum depth in 
this position was believed to be about thirty-six feet 
at high tide level. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion 
that a blockship sunk between the wooden piers 
would need to have a hull whose height was not less 



Direction of Channel 



■^ 



ULshest "Tcd-e. t-cvei, 
-711 — '■' 7S 7 




2>ottom oj Co.»*a-L 



.SECTIONAL SKETCH of SUNKBJ BLOCKSHIPS- 

A - resting on even keel' 
B -. resting on beam ernis 

(Shaded areas M indicate suitable positions for* 
placing 'antl-cutting-away' material. 

than thirty feet, and to have a length of at least 
one hundred and twenty feet. 

In this position the silt was known to be very ac- 
tive. That fact, taken in conjunction with the ex- 
posure to rough seas, the presence of the tidal current, 
and the impracticability of erecting salvage plant on 
the land within easy reach of the vessel, rendered it 
obvious that, all things considered, the position be- 
tween the wooden piers would be the ideal blocking 
position if suitable vessels were available for the 
purpose, and if such vessels were damaged and sunk 
with due regard to anti-salvage considerations. 



52 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

It is common knowledge that when vessels are 
fitted out as blockships they usually carry a goodly 
cargo of cement. The general notion, however, about 
the use of this material is that it is merely intended 
to make the ships heavier and thus less capable of 
being lifted. That is only partially correct. There is 
another and more important use for cement, namely, 
as a counter against the use of acetylene gas for cut- 
ting the ships to pieces. The general scheme is that of 
placing the cement in just those positions where cut- 
ting would be most necessary; in our case, in those 
portions of the ship which would be above the lowest 
level of the tide and up to within six feet of the highest 
tide level. The depth of our chosen position being 
twenty-one feet at low water and thirty-six feet at 
high water, this meant that the cement would need 
to be placed between the levels of twenty-one feet 
and thirty feet above the keel, provided that the ship 
was sunk in an upright position. With regard to the 
latter proviso, steps must be taken to guard against 
the eventuality of the ship resting on her beam ends 
on the sea-bottom as a result of capsizing when 
foundering. This cautionary measure necessitated 
placing the cement between the levels of twenty-one 
feet and thirty feet from her beam ends at either side 
of the vessel as well as between the same vertical 
distances from her keel. Nothing should be left to 
chance that can be provided for in advance. 

It was clear enough that the task of ever getting 
the ships into the desired positions for sinking would 
be far from simple; having attained that object it 
would be the height of stupidity to sink the ships in 
such a manner, and so fitted, that their removal 
would be comparatively easy. 



THE WONDERFUL GERMANS 53 

After the operation had been successfully com- 
pleted I could not help being rather amused at a cer- 
tain individual who expressed the opinion that " the 
Germans are so cute that they'll probably remove the 
blockships in a day or two." Why were some people 
always so ready to credit the Germans with every- 
thing that's wonderful? The reasons were not far to 
seek; such ideas arose partly from natural ignorance 
on technical matters and partly because the Germans 
never ceased to assure us how marvellous a nation 
they were. And some of us believed it! Verb. sap. 

With all the difficulties in the way of attainment, 
what counter considerations were there to make the 
attempt worth the undertaking? 




CHAPTER IV 

PAST EXPERIENCE. SMOKE SCREENS. THE CHANCES 
OF SUCCESS 

HAT were the chances of success .? 

The lessons of personal experience and of 
past history are the chief guides when cal- 
culating the probability of success in any operation. 
He who ignores history acts unwisely. He who studies 
history and proposes to attempt something which has 
always failed hitherto either may be excessively 
foolish or may be aware of a new factor affecting the 
situation. He may be merely flying in the face of 
Providence or basing new proposals on a well-con- 
sidered judgment of the new circumstances. 

Naval history contains a few examples of operations 
somewhat analogous to that under investigation. 
The more noted are the attacks on Martinique in 
1794, on Teneriffe in 1797, the attack on Ostende in 
1798, the cutting out of the Hermione from Puerto 
Cabello in 1799, the sinking of the American steamer 
Merrimac at Santiago de Cuba in 1898, the Japanese 
attempts to block the entrance to Port Arthur in 
1904, and, during the late war, the attempt to block 
the Rufigi River by a British collier in November, 
1914. 

In none of these cases were the conditions quite 
parallel to those at Zeebrugge and Ostende, but some 
features of each bore a certain similarity. 

The attacks on Martinique and Puerto Cabello 



ANALOGOUS OPERATIONS 55 

showed the great value of determination and initia- 
tive in the face of powerful shore defences. They also 
showed the disadvantage accruing to the defence 
force by reason of the latter's ignorance as to the true 
nature and object of an attack by sea forces. 

The attack on Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, was led by 
the immortal Nelson himself. It involved the storm- 
ing of the Mole which was defended by the enemy's 
batteries. Two attempts were made. The first was 
carried out in the face of adverse weather conditions 
which rendered "surprise" impossible; the attack 
was withdrawn soon after the landing parties had 
left their ships. The second attempt, made two days 
later, was also a failure, but a glorious failure indeed. 
Very few of the boats reached the Mole, which, how- 
ever, after a desperate encounter was captured by the 
storming parties. The latter were unable to advance 
owing to the fire from the hostile batteries. Nelson, 
who, it will be remembered, lost his right arm in this 
engagement, failed in his object. This failure pro- 
vided the outstanding interruption to the long list 
of victories .gained by our greatest naval hero of all 
time; Nelson himself expressed his feelings of disap- 
pointment and physical incapacity with the words 
"I go hence and am no more seen." ' 

The attack on Ostende in May, 1798, was directed 
against the lock gates for the purpose of interfering 
with the concentration of the flotillas destined for 
the invasion of England. This attack had originally 
included a blocking operation, but that idea was ap- 
parently abandoned. The attack, carried out in the 
face of a rather feeble defence, was completely suc- 
cessful, but a severe gale prevented the re-embarka- 



56 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

tion of the forces, with the result that over one hun- 
dred and sixty were killed or wounded and nearly 
eleven hundred and fifty were taken prisoners — an 
interesting point in view of the fact that only about 
half a dozen casualties occurred during the attack 
itself. The embodiment of the main principles of 
fighting led to success on that occasion as they will 
usually do under similar conditions. The moral effect 
in England, in spite of the heavy losses, is recorded as 
having been most beneficial. ' 

The blocking attempts at Santiago and Port Ar- 
thur, carried through with complete indifference to 
danger in each case, were failures. 

The main difficulties with which blockships must 
contend may be briefly stated as follows: 1 I 

ia) That of locating the destination in darkness, in- 
^ creased by the absence of the usual local navi- 
gational aids such as lighthouses, buoys, etc. ' \ 

(b) That of reaching the destination, when located, 
in the face of the enemy's opposition. 

(c) That of turning and sinking the vessel, after 
reaching the destination, so that the channel 
will be efficiently blocked. 

Dealing with these difficulties in detail, the reader 
is probably aware of the fact that navigation is by no 
means an exact science. On the open sea a captain is 
usually satisfied if he knows his position to within 
three or four miles. When approaching the coast this 
wide margin of safety must be considerably reduced 
— hence the need of lighthouses, buoys, fog signals, 
and so forth. The upkeep of such aids is naturally 
in the hands of the power which occupies the coast 



MAIN FACTORS OF DIFFICULTY 57 

concerned. Thus, under war conditions, one aims at 
removing all navigational aids, as far as one's own 
requirements will allow, which may assist the enemy. 
By this means, the enemy when approaching one's 
coast, must either trust to the rather inexact methods 
used in the open sea or they must establish their own 
navigational aids beforehand. The objection to the 
latter is manifest; craft sent ahead to lay down buoys, 
etc., are apt to give one's intentions away, and it is 
open to the enemy to remove such aids as soon as 
they are placed. 

With regard to the second main difficulty, namely, 
that of reaching the destination, when located, in the 
face of the enemy's opposition, the difficulty here is 
so obvious as to render detailed remarks unnecessary. 

With regard to the difficulty of turning and sink- 
ing the vessel satisfactorily, this is largely a matter 
of seamanship. With wind and tide both affecting 
a vessel it is seldom possible either to keep her sta- 
tionary over a particular position or to turn her 
through a large angle without such aids as tugs, 
hawsers, and anchors, etc. 

But a ship does not go down instantaneously, nor 
is it a simple matter to sink her in an upright position. 
One end of the ship is likely to sink before the other : 
most of us have seen photographs of a ship with her 
bows or stern standing vertically in the water just 
before the vessel makes her final plunge. Whilst the 
ship is actually sinking the local current is apt to 
move her considerably before she is resting on the 
bottom throughout her whole length. Thus the third 
difficulty can only be surmounted by a specially fine 
display of seamanship, and, in such cases as we are 



S8 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

reviewing, this display must be rendered under the 
most trying conditions imaginable. 

Now, in the case of the blocking attempt at San- 
tiago the MerrimaCy Lieutenant Hobson of United 
States Navy, failed to reach her desired destination 
after it had been located. The attempt could scarcely 
have been more gallantly made, but the difficulties, 
arising from insufficient opportunity to make com- 
plete preparations, almost foredoomed the operation 
to failure. 

At Port Arthur, the Japanese made three attempts 
to block the exit against the egress of the Russian 
Fleet. No less than eighteen blockships were used. 
In spite of great determination and splendid self- 
sacrifice on the part of all concerned no blockship 
managed to sink herself in the correct position. 

During the late war the difficulty of sinking the 
ship satisfactorily, after reaching the desired position, 
was made manifest both in the River Tigris and in 
the Cameroon River. In each case our enemies, the 
Turks and Germans respectively, endeavoured to block 
their own channels before we even arrived on the scene. 
In the absence of all opposition from an enemy, in 
brpad daylight, and at their own leisure, they sunk 
their ships and jailed to block the channels — two clear 
illustrations of seamanship difficulties. 

All the searchings into past history failed to dis- 
cover one single occasion in which a blocking enter- 
prise of any real similarity to that desired had suc- 
ceeded. That fact, taken into conjunction with the 
difficulties brought to light by a detailed considera- 
tion of the problem, was neither productive of en- 
couragement nor conducive to optimism. 



THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL FOGS 59 

The reader will probably admit, at this stage, that 
the difficulties of blocking the highly fortified canal 
entrances at Zeebrugge and Ostende appeared almost 
insuperable. 

But where there's a will there's often a way. A way 
had to be found. A way was found. 

The factors which combined to make "the game 
worth the candle" were as follows: firstly, the use of 
smoke screens; secondly, the element of surprise and 
the use of diversionary measures; thirdly, detailed 
preparation and determination combined with effi- 
ciency. 

The use of smoke screens provided a factor which 
had been absent in previous attempts in history. 

Mention has already been made of the great de- 
terrent afforded by the presence of hostile batteries 
and of the varying degrees of efficiency of gun-fire 
as a defence against attacks from the sea. If smoke 
could be utilised in such a manner as to hide the at- 
tacking force from the batteries without com,pletely 
blinding the former, and if at the same time the attack 
could be made under cover of darkness so as to pre- 
vent aircraft from assisting those batteries, a set of 
conditions less unfavourable to the attackers would 
then be forthcoming. Obviously, this necessitated the 
smoke drifting shorewards ahead of the approaching 
vessels; i.e., the assistance of a wind blowing more or 
less directly towards the shore. 

It is well here to caution the reader against a com- 
monly erroneous idea in this connection. It is often 
supposed that the use of smoke was a sort of panacea 
for all evils, that it provided a counter to all obstacles. 
This was very far from being the case, as will now be 



6o THE BLOCKNIG OF ZEEBRUGGE 

explained. Firstly, let us consider the navigational 
difficulties. Smoke could not possibly assist the ships 
to avoid shoals when approaching the coast. Smoke 
could not prevent the vessels from being seen and 
reported by surface patrol craft, submarines, or air- 
craft during the trip across the sea. The danger from 
mines could not be avoided by the use of smoke. It 
has already been pointed out that it is quite difficult 
enough to locate one's destination on a dark night 
when the lighthouses have been extinguished and 
other navigational aids withdrawn. Even a landsman 
will realise that if, as an addition to such inconvenient 
conditions, one places an artificial fog between the 
approaching vessels and their destination the prob- 
lem is not going to become any more easy to solve. 
The utmost that one could gain from the use of smoke 
was some measure of protection from the shore bat- 
teries, but, as just shown, such use provided a further 
obstacle to be surmounted. Then again there is noth- 
ing so fickle in the life of a sailor as the wind. If the 
wind died away or changed to an off-shore direction, 
smoke might be practically useless for covering one's 
approach. 

I have sometimes been asked why we made no use 
of poison gas clouds. There were two main reasons. 
The last thing we desired was to risk killing those 
downtrodden Belgians who were still allowed to re- 
side in their unhappy country. In addition to that, 
the fickleness of the wind might waft the poison gas 
in the direction of our own vessels. 

With regard to the element of surprise and the use 
of diversionary measures, one of the principles laid 
down by Stonewall Jackson is, "Always mystify, 



SURPRISE ESSENTIAL ' 6i 

mislead, and surprise the enemy." The meaning of 
surprise is apt to be misconstrued. In an operation of 
this kind one could not arrange for the blockships to 
arrive suddenly "as a bolt from the blue" at a mo- 
ment when the enemy have no suspicions whatever 
that any trouble is brewing. Thus, surprise and mys- 
tification had to go hand in hand. The only practical 
method in such cases, whether in trench warfare or in 
sea fighting, is to give the enemy as much to think 
about as one possibly can, to make him wonder what 
on earth is going to happen next, to mislead him into 
believing the eventuality is very different from that 
intended, and, then, as the late war expression so 
aptly puts it, "when the enemy has the wind up," 
surprise him by carrying out your main object in 
view. 

Diversionary measures in this particular case were 
not difficult to evolve. Many different reasons ob- 
tained for employing our sea forces off the Flanders 
coast. To mention a few, there were bombardments 
from the sea, landing operations on the shore, sup- 
porting the flank of the military in their land attacks, 
mining or mine-sweeping operations, laying subma- 
rine traps, supporting aerial attacks, and so on. 
The presence of our vessels might indicate any one 
of these objects and each would call for a different 
set of defensive measures. 

The full development of defensive measures cannot 
be attained until one can clearly ascertain the at- 
tacker's object. Even when the latter has been dis- 
covered, the time required to bring all your powers of 
defence into action must vary according to how far 
you have just previously been misled. Our best 



62 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

course, therefore, was to ensure that our object would 
be discovered so late in the proceedings that it would 
be attained before full advantage of the discovery 
could be utilised. Initiative usually pertains to the 
attacking force. Where the defence is open to several 
different forms of attack, the defending commander 
is apt to be so apprehensive beforehand, and so per- 
plexed at the time, that his position will be weakly 
defended at all points. As the attack develops and he 
receives an apparent indication of its object he will 
make haste to concentrate all his defence measures 
at the threatened position, and then, if the attackers 
have acted wisely, there is considerable likelihood of 
his being taken by surprise too late to guard effi- 
ciently against the real blow. Uneasy lies the head of 
the commander who is forced to adopt the defensive 
role in war. 

The diversionary measures actually undertaken 
will be described presently. ;; 

Determination and efficiency are not unknown in 
His Majesty's Navy. But efficiency of a particular 
description was required, and this would necessitate 
special training, which, if practicable, must be con- 
tinued until every officer and every man knew in- 
stinctively what to do and how to set about It, no 
matter what circumstances might arise, and until 
every piece of machinery and every device, however 
intricate, had been proved to be satisfactory for the 
purpose in hand. 

What then were the chances of success ? Who could 
say? Clearly enough, there must have been a diver- 
gence of opinion on this point. Difficulties loom large. 
Optimism, on the other hand, is a very pleasant en- 



ATTENTION TO DETAIL 63 

couragement. I believe, however, that even the most 
optimistic individual concerned in the enterprise was 
not entirely free from qualms as the event drew 
nearer. Complete success seemed at times to be so 
much to hope for. But Sir David Beatty and Sir 
Roger Keyes wouldn't hear of failure, and that alone 
did much to ensure success. They did not set them- 
selves up on pedestals as men who could not fail — 
they left no stone unturned to ensure success. It would 
be difficult to imagine anything more calculated to 
bring about failure than any sign of doubt, or hesita- 
tion, on the part of the leaders of an enterprise. There 
must be no failure — that was the long and short of 
it — it was the spirit which governed the actions of 
the great leaders of the past. 

But sentiment alone is insufficient to guarantee suc- 
cess. It is but a foundation stone on which to com- 
mence the building. Rotten timber erected on the 
firmest foundation will not provide adequate protec- 
tion against the lightest gale. Nobody realised this 
more fully than Vice-Admiral Keyes, who was de- 
termined that every link of the chain should be of 
maximum strength commensurate with elasticity and 
general handiness. Many were the hours given to the 
consideration of the smallest details; without such 
work an operation becomes a mere gamble. 



CHAPTER V 

PLANNING THE OPERATION. MATTERS AFFECTING 
THE PLAN. ATTACKS ON THE MOLE 

A WAR operation, such as this, passes through 
various stages before it can be put into execu- 
tion. It emanates originally from a sugges- 
tion. If the suggestion seems to bear further consider- 
ation certain individuals are ordered to appreciate 
the situation, that is, to thoroughly thrash out all the 
arguments for and against and to weigh the chances 
and effects of success and failure. Should the results 
of such an appreciation be favourable, the investiga- 
tion leads to the formation of a Plan. 

Plans are based, to a considerable extent, on the 
personnel and material believed to be available. In 
like manner the calculations as to future requirements 
of personnel and material are based on the types of 
operations which are likely to be carried out. But it 
is conceivable that a projected plan may be found to 
involve the unforeseen use of material to the detriment 
of other operations already in view. Thus the feasi- 
bility of putting a naval plan into operation cannot 
be judged unless fairly complete details are given as 
to the numbers and types of ships, men, and stores in- 
volved. The formulated results of such investigation, 
arising out of the original suggestion may be desig- 
nated the first edition of the Plan. 

The authorities then consider the Plan both from 
the view of general outlook and from that of detailed 



FORMATION OF A PLAN 65 

requirements. Let us suppose that the Plan is consid- 
ered to be of value, and that no objections hold good 
as to the practicability of execution provided the ships 
and men are available. This latter proviso then re- 
quires attention. Many questions have to be con- 
sidered. Can the ships be diverted from their present 
duties .f" What special alterations or additions are 
necessary.? Can the dockyard undertake the work.'' 
If so, to what extent will other work in hand be inter- 
rupted? Will the men require special training.? Are 
the necessary stores ready at hand \ How long will the 
preparations take.? And so on. A hundred and one 
points must be carefully enquired into. It is only 
after a great deal of investigation, correspondence 
with various departments, and conferences for co- 
ordinating the results of enquiries, that the details 
can be arranged. A plan served up in the form of a 
mosaic is of little more use than the works of a chro- 
nometer contained in half a dozen different boxes. 

In course of time decisions are arrived at and orders 
are issued for the preparatory work to be taken in 
hand. But it is unlikely that all the proposals con- 
tained in the first edition of the plan have been agreed 
to. Modifications are almost sure to be necessary. 
Perhaps the suggested vessels are required for other 
purposes and substitutes must be forthcoming. The 
technical experts may decide that different types of 
material would lead to improvement. Possibly the 
facilities for special training of the personnel are not 
available at the moment. The plan must, therefore, 
be re-drafted on the basis of the personnel and ma- 
terial available, and must take into consideration the 
dates by which the various phases of the preparatory 



66 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

work can be completed. All this takes time and serves 
as a reminder, indeed, that patience is a virtue. The 
second edition of the plan is evolved and the next 
stage is reached. 

But put aside, for a moment, the question of what 
material and personnel are available. When a plan, 
conveying a general idea, has come under the critical 
examination of the Higher Command to the extent 
of being "passed" for the commencement of detailed 
preparation, it has then to be gradually built up from 
the operational point of view. Additions will almost 
always be necessary as the investigation proceeds, and 
some time will elapse before the plan can be consid- 
ered as complete in every particular. 

A further duty then devolves upon the operational 
staff. They must produce the orders necessary to 
give effect to the plan as detailed in its final edition. 

This again is no small affair. The writing of orders 
is a high art in itself. Orders must not be too cen- 
tralized or too cut-and-dried. Ample allowance must 
be made for initiative, while realising that mere go- 
as-you-please methods are likely to lead to disaster. 
It is usually the unexpected that happens in war. A 
single set of orders cannot cover every eventuality. 
And even if it could, nobody would have either the 
time or inclination to wade through such a volumi- 
nous document. This is clearly enough exemplified in 
legal matters. Laws are framed to cover every pos- 
sible case, but as often as not they fail to attain such 
success. Even so, how many ordinary folk can be 
bothered to wade through a legal document? What 
with the alternatives, and saving clauses, such publi- 
cations are dull to a degree. The marriage laws are 



WRITING OF THE ORDERS e^ 

typical of this. A man may not marry his grand- 
mother. That clause was presumably inserted for the 
discomfiture of that unique individual who might 
contemplate such a peculiar alliance. 

The issue of orders needs careful training and much 
experience. Orders must be fool-proof — that is the 
guiding axiom. If an order is misunderstood it is ten 
chances to one that the fault lies with the man who 
gives the order. 

If I have sorely tried the patience of the reader it is 
because of my endeavour to emphasise the point that 
the order "carry on" is not sufficient to put a sugges- 
tion into execution in the matter of a few hours. New 
situations have to be met by fresh dispositions, and 
this fact has come very much to the fore in these days 
of strife. v. . , 

The operations on the Flanders coast were the out- 
come of some months of hard work — mental as well 
as manual. A few details of the plan may now be 
worthy of consideration. 

On December 3, 191 7, the plan had emanated from 
an Admiralty Department under the direction of 
Rear-Admiral Keyes, Director of Plans, to give him 
his titles at that time. The nature of the operation 
and the customary procedure, having regard to the 
locality concerned, would entail its execution coming 
under the command of the Vice-Admiral at Dover. 
The latter apparently desired to modify the plan and 
submitted his proposals on December i8th. He sug- 
gested the idea that an attack on the Mole, not previ- 
ously mentioned in the plan, should accompany the 
blocking operations. As a diversion (pardon the an- 
ticipation) this idea was eventually embodied after 



68 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

exhaustive consideration had shown it to be neces- 
sary. 

As already stated this particular type of diversion 
was somewhat similar to that included in a previous 
scheme, referred to on page 17 as having been for- 
warded in May, 1917, which at that time was con- 
sidered impracticable by the Vice-Admiral at Dover. 
The actual method proposed on December i8th by 
the latter for giving effect to his idea of a Mole attack 
was not followed, for it happened that Rear-Admiral 
Keyes took over the Dover Command, with the acting 
rank of Vice-Admiral, after his own plan had been 
submitted, and nearly four months before it could be 
carried out. The coincidence — if it was a coinci- 
dence — was extremely advantageous. An operation 
can be so much better worked up by an officer who 
has handled the plan from its inception. But in the 
ordinary course of events such an arrangement is 
impracticable. An admiral or general in active em- 
ployment in the face of the enemy, as a general rule, 
has not sufficient spare time for the formation of plans 
in every detail, nor has he a superabundance of staff 
officers for the purpose. No words of mine could ever 
do justice to Sir Roger Keyes, so I will not make the 
attempt. Suffice it to record that every soul in the 
enterprise possessed complete confidence in his leader- 
ship ; this fact was half the battle won before we even 
started. 

Admiral Keyes was given an absolutely free hand 
by Their Lordships ; all the details, from A to Z, were 
worked out under his direction. The "paper scheme" 
rapidly developed into practical shape; I will en- 
deavour to describe the data and arguments from 



VICE-ADMIRAL KEYES 69 

which its final shape was evolved. Before doing so, 
however, it may be as well to put on record a fact 
that might escape the notice of the reader. The 
responsibility of the Officer in Command of an opera- 
tion must necessarily be great, but the responsibility 
of the Higher Command, in this case the Board of 
Admiralty, which has to either sanction or disallow 
the execution of proposed operations, is by no means 
small. That they sanctioned it in this case and also 
chose the right man to carry it out must never be 
forgotten. 

Having reached a decision as to our object and con- 
sidered the obstacles in the way of attainment, let us 
now pass on to the manner in which it was proposed 
to overcome the various difficulties. We will com- 
mence with the most important phase of the opera- 
tion, namely, the actual blocking and the nature, re- 
quirements, and duties of the blockships. 

Reference to the previous description of the locality 
and to the principles governing the use of blockships 
serves to show that a single vessel of the light-cruiser 
class, or above, would suffice as far as dimensions were 
concerned. But nothing possesses such a large ele- 
ment of chance as war; for that reason it was con- 
sidered advisable to provide at least three blockships 
at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende. 

With regard to the requirements of each blockship, 
they may be briefly stated as follows. Firstly, she 
must have the ability to proceed under her own steam 
to her destination. The task of towing a blockship 
into position in the face of enemy opposition is quite 
impracticable. Secondly, her draught of water must 
not be excessive, having due regard to the depth of 



70 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the channel. Next, she would require a certain degree 
of defensive power; it would be rather heartrending, 
after all one's efforts at taking a blockship to within a 
short distance of her destination, if any small enemy- 
craft could approach without hindrance and sink the 
ship before her destination was actually reached. 

The blockships must also be handy vessels, so that 
they would be manageable up to the last moment, 
provided they escaped serious damage. It has been 
stated previously that these ships must be so fitted 
and sunk that their removal would be extremely 
difficult. Five old light cruisers which were available, 
or rather which could be replaced at their present 
duties, were chosen for the purpose. They were 
H.M.S. Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant^ and 
Sirius; the first three being destined for Zeebrugge 
and the others for Ostende. 

A few months previously a couple of steamers had 
been fitted out for some such operation under another 
Vice-Admiral, but it will be seen that, as a result of 
detailed investigation of all the obstacles and factors 
affecting the problem, the Plan described herein dif- 
fered from its predecessors in that respect; in fact the 
arguments against the use of merchant vessels were 
considered from the outset to be overwhelming. 

The work of surmounting such difficulties as escort- 
ing the blockships across the seas and locating their 
destinations would require the use of other units, and 
will, therefore, be described later. Speaking gener- 
ally, the actual tasks of reaching their destinations 
when located and of sinking themselves in position, 
difficult though they were, could best be left to the 
pilotage and seamanship of the blockship officers. 




THE BLOCKSHIPS FITTING OUT FOR THE ENTERPRISE 




Croii H riipyrtalit — Imperial ]] «; JY,,,,, ,«» 

H.M.S. VINDICTIVE BEFORE FITTING OUT 



HAZARDS OF THE BLOCKSHIPS 71 

Here again, the author is anxious to lay special em- 
phasis on the fact that successful results of the block- 
ing operation — such as had never been attained in 
history — were absolutely dependent upon the good 
work of the blockship personnel ; to them would the 
credit be due. 

At Ostende, the work of the blockships, with regard 
to reaching their destination, was confined to that of 
running the gantlet of the shore batteries when once 
the entrance had been located, but the latter — i.e., 
the location of the entrance — presented considerable 
difficulty. 

At Zeebrugge, there would be less difficulty in find- 
ing the entrance if the Mole extremity, three-quarters 
of a mile to seaward, could be located. But a serious 
factor existed here which was absent at Ostende. 

Blockships proceeding into Zeebrugge would have 
to risk the fire of the Mole batteries during the first 
part of the approach. They would then have to steam 
in behind those batteries and run the gantlet of the 
batteries ashore. Now this was a pretty big propo- 
sition. 

In the second chapter it was shown that the three- 
gun battery situated on the broad portion of the Mole 
at its northeastern extremity, taken in conjunction 
with the establishment of the barge boom and en- 
tanglement nets, rendered it extremely hazardous for 
the blockships to round the Mole en route to the canal 
entrance ; in fact it was almost a certainty that they 
would be sunk by the Mole guns. 

Nevertheless, the canal entrance was our objective. 
Somehow, by hook or crook, the blockships were in- 
tended to reach it. Thus, one of the first local prob- 



72 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

lems requiring solution was that of removing, 
temporarily or otherwise, the obstacle afforded by the 
three-gun Mole battery. Similarly, though perhaps 
in a lesser degree, we had also to take into account the 
battery of six smaller guns on the lighthouse extension 
of the Mole. 

Considered in a general manner, there were three 
lines of enquiry from which a solution of the problem 
might be forthcoming. Firstly, that concerning the 
destruction of the guns or their crews, or both, or di- 
verting their fire, by means of action from a distance. 
Secondly, that of attaining a similar result by action 
on the spot. Thirdly, that of rendering the blockships 
invisible during their passage. These may be dealt 
with briefly. The first method entailed the use of 
either gun-fire or poison gas. The outcome of a gun- 
fire duel between a ship and a battery has already 
been described sufficiently to show that the chances of 
destroying the battery guns are exceedingly small. 
The use of poison gas has been shown to be inadvis- 
able. The third method — that of rendering the 
blockships invisible to the battery — would have en- 
tailed the use of a smoke screen. If such a screen could 
have the effect mentioned it is obvious to the meanest 
intellect that it would also have the effect of hiding 
their destination from the blockships just at the criti- 
cal period when it would be absolutely essential to 
see exactly where they were going. 

And so no method would suffice, except the second 
mentioned above, namely, destroying the guns or their 
crews, or both, or diverting their fire, by means of 
action on the spot. This entailed an attack on the Mole 
itself, carried out by vessels actually berthed along- 




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PL4 



OBJECT OF ATTACKING MOLE 73 

side. The author, although well aware of the unpar- 
donable fault of repetition, desires at this stage to lay- 
great emphasis on the fact that an attack on the Mole 
itself could only be designed as a diversionary measure 
calculated to directly assist the blockships past one 
of the positions of danger. The reader is requested to 
pardon anticipation. Subsequent to the operation, 
many of the public appeared to have formed the idea 
that the attack on the Mole was the main attack, and 
that the use of the blockships was a sort of after- 
thought. I shall have more to say about this later. 

Just as the three-gun battery provided a serious 
obstacle to the passage of blockships round the Mole 
end, so also would it prevent the similar passage of 
other vessels endeavouring to secure alongside the 
berthing wharf on the inner side of the Mole prepara- 
tory to attacking the Mole batteries. Thus, if the 
Mole was to be stormed, the storming parties must land 
on the outer side of the Mole, remembering that the 
three-gun battery could not fire to the northward 
owing to being twenty feet below the top of the high 
outer wall. But the outer wall of the Mole was never 
intended for use as a berthing position for vessels, and 
probably never had been used by any vessel for such a 
purpose — hence the complete absence of all berthing 
facilities as described in an earlier chapter. The de- 
velopment of the argument concerning this projected 
attack had led us to the point where we needed to 
consider seriously the practicability of getting any 
vessel, or vessels, alongside the outer wall, of securing 
there, and of landing men thence for attacking the 
Mole batteries. 

The depth of water, the construction of the Mole, 



74 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the rate of the tidal current, aad many other matters 
required careful examination. The depth was a doubt- 
ful matter; but, the operation being timed to take 
place near high tide so that the blockships could enter 
the canal, there was every likelihood of its being suffi- 
cient. Breakwaters when also intended as wharfs are 
usually built with their inner sides — i.e., the sides pro- 
tected from bad weather — vertical like the face of an 
ordinary wall, but with their seaward sides formed of 
large blocks of material dropped more or less indis- 
criminately, one above the other, so that the wall will 
be jagged for the purpose of breaking up the waves in 
bad weather. In such cases a ship could not possibly 
secure to the seaward side without being severely 
damaged, and certainly could not remain there. At 
Zeebrugge, however, we had reason to believe that 
the seaward side of the Mole was nearly vertical and 
that no danger would accrue from jagged blocks of 
stone or concrete. 

At high tide the tidal current on the Belgian coast 
is flowing at its greatest speed — a phenomenon 
nearly always found in comparatively narrow waters 
— and its rate was expected to be about three and a 
half miles per hour, its direction of flow being to the 
eastward. So far, then, the matter of reaching a posi- 
tion alongside chiefly concerned the art of seaman- 
ship if we leave the enemy's opposition out of account. 
Next we had to consider the problem of securing 
alongside and of disembarking the storming parties. 
The most simple method of -berthing alongside a wall, 
in the case of a sizable vessel, is to place the vessel 
roughly in position and then to use tugs to push her 
bodily against the wall, afterwards securing the haw- 



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bl 




^e THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

sers in the usual manner. This led to the idea of hav- 
ing a second vessel to act as tug and of providing 
special means to take the place of the ordinary haw- 
ser-and-bollard method of securing. 

The wall on the outer side, as previously described, 
rose to a height of twenty-nine feet above the level of 
high water. This height was far above that of the 
deck of an average vessel. The fact that the landing 
would have to be made on a narrow parapet, high 
above the level of the Mole proper, was also hardly 
calculated to assist matters. The probable existence 
of guns on the parapet itself, so placed as to be able 
to rake the decks of a vessel alongside, and the pos- 
sible presence of obstructions placed by the Germans 
on the outer side of the Mole, had to be taken into 
account. It has also been mentioned above that the 
use of smoke screens necessitated a wind blowing 
towards the shore ; thus the Mole itself could afford no 
protection from the wind or sea. 

The Austrian military failure on the River Plave, 
during the late war, afforded a good example of the 
disabilities resulting from insufficient room to de- 
bouch a force which has crossed an obstacle into the 
enemy's territory. Clearly, it might be very awkward 
if the storming parties were unable to descend from 
the parapet rapidly enough to forestall any enemy 
attempts at concentration near the storming point. 

All these considerations led to the choice of H.M.S. 
Vindictive for carrying the main portion of the storm- 
ing parties. 

The attack on the Mole might also provide an op- 
portunity for destroying material thereon. Although 
this was obviously a secondary consideration it was 



PLANS FOR DEMOLITION 77 

an opportunity not to be missed. The amount of de- 
structive work which could be done would depend 
upon the circumstances of the moment, but it was 
decided to have a special demolition party, provided 
with the necessary gear, to accompany the primary 
attacking forces. 

Clearly enough, it would be somewhat futile if one 
only began to consider the work of demolition as soon 
as the moment arrived for such work to commence. 
With the object of being prepared in all respects care- 
ful consideration, therefore, was given to the different 
methods of demolition which would be most suitable 
under varying circumstances. Following such con- 
sideration it would be necessary to train one's demo- 
lition parties in this technical pursuit and to provide 
a sufficiency of suitable destructive material. 

When making preparations for an operation of this, 
or similar type, one is apt to allow secondary objects 
to loom too large unless great caution is taken to 
prevent it. In this particular case, however correct 
it might be to fully prepare, down to the smallest 
detail, for everything in advance, it was necessary to 
bear in mind that deniolition on the Mole could 
hardly assist the blockships to seal the canal exit and, 
even if successful, could not bring us very great bene- 
fit. Thus it was clear that demolition should only be 
prepared for and undertaken provided that it did not 
hinder the attainment of our main object in the 
smallest particular. 

H.M.S. Vindictive had to be fitted with a special 
deck from which gangways could be extended to 
bridge the gulf between the ship and the top of the 
twenty-nine-foot wall. For this purpose she was given 



78 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

a large number of gangways poised at an angle of 
about forty-five degrees from the ship's side. The 
idea was that on arriving alongside the Mole, the 
gangways would be lowered till they rested on the 
top of the wall. The storming parties, at a pre- 
arranged signal, should run out along the gangways 
and jump down to the parapet pathway four feet 
below the wall top. They should then get across the 
pathway, over the iron handrails on its inner side, 
down to the floor level of the Mole, sixteen feet below, 
and then start the work. Now, one cannot expect 
men carrying all their accoutrements and parapher- 
nalia, such as rifles, machine-guns, flame-throwers, 
bombs and grenades, rifle and gun ammunition, and 
such-like to jump down a drop of sixteen feet on to a 
stone surface. So it was arranged that the advanced 
storming parties should carry long storming ladders 
to place against the wall on its inner side and thus 
facilitate access to the floor level. Seamen were to 
land first, both for the purpose just stated and for 
securing the ship to the Mole after the Vindictive had 
been pushed alongside the Mole by another vessel. 

Owing to the absence of bollards for securing haw- 
sers, special grappling irons, fitted with double 
pronged hooks, with hawsers attached to them and 
the ship, were designed for the purpose of hooking on 
top of the wall. In reality we proposed using the 
methods of the good old days when vessels grappled 
each other and indulged in hand-to-hand fighting 
between their respective storming parties. The weight 
of these grappling irons necessitated the use of special 
davits for suspending them in a similar manner to that 
used for the gangways. Special weapons, such as 




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FITTINGS IN VINDICTIVE 79 

bomb-mortars and flame-throwers, to be worked 
from the ship, were provided for clearing the Mole 
immediately abreast the ship prior to sending the 
storming parties over the top. The Vindictive also 
carried most of her original gun armament for en- 
gaging enemy vessels en route, for shelling the six-gun 
battery on the lighthouse extension of the Mole, and 
for defending herself against attacks, when at the 
Mole, from enemy vessels in a seaward direction. 
Special howitzers were carried for engaging the shore 
batteries after the ship was secured, and rapid-firing 
guns were placed in the fighting-top of the foremast 
for engaging the batteries on the Mole. The wall 
being at least twenty-nine feet above the water, no 
gun at a less height could fire over it in a downward 
direction. Much other special material — peculiar to 
the operation in hand — was required, but space does 
not admit of describing it all in detail. 

The reader will already have realised that the Vin- 
dictive was to be a weird craft indeed — something 
very different from the usual run of warships even in 
these days. 

Now, as regards the storming of the Mole, it would 
have been a dangerous policy to put all "our eggs in 
one basket." There was no small chance of the Vin- 
dictive being mined en route, owing to her heavy 
draught, or of being sunk by gun-fire, owing to the 
large target which she would present, before reaching 
the Mole. It was, therefore, decided to use two other 
vessels in addition to the Vindictive. 

The ferry steamers Iris and Daffodil were chosen 
for carrying a portion of the storming parties to the 
attack. There was considerable difficulty in finding 



8o THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

two vessels suitable to our purpose ; time did not per- 
mit of constructing special craft before the projected 
date of the operation. It must be remembered that 
we could not write round to all the naval and mer- 
cantile ports explaining our requirements. An officer, 
sent on a tour for the purpose, unostentatiously- 
visited the likely places until he found these two 
vessels. I often wonder what imaginary yarns he con- 
jured up for the purpose of stifling curiosity. 

The Iris and Daffodil were both well known to 
Liverpool folk, being used for conveying passengers 
across the River Mersey many times daily. They 
were extremely handy craft, could each carry fifteen 
hundred men if required, and drew very little water, 
but they possessed two serious disadvantages. Firstly, 
their decks were so low as to necessitate the use of 
long storming ladders for reaching the parapet. 
Secondly, their steaming qualities were compara- 
tively poor, judged from the point of view of the 
operation for which they were required. Just picture 
their ordinary daily employment for a moment. 
Waiting alongside one of the piers at Liverpool till 
their usual quota of passengers had embarked, they 
would make the short trip across the river to the 
Birkenhead shore and then wait once more. During 
this second period of waiting the steam pressure would 
be increased in the boilers in readiness for the next 
short voyage across the river. Compare that employ- 
ment with a trip of nearly one hundred miles across 
the open sea. It will then be evident that the task 
allotted to these two ferry vessels was by no means 
simple from the engineering point of view alone. 

All this, however, was carefully thought out, and 



IRIS AND DAFFODIL 8i 

it was decided that their advantages outweighed their 
disadvantages. Both craft, by nature of tbsir work, 
were designed to stand heavy bumping alongside 
piers ; their draught was small, and, as already stated, 
they were easy to handle. After minor alterations 
they proceeded to the port of assembly in charge of 
their naval crews and adopted the title H.M.S., much 
to the amusement of those of us who made their ac- 
quaintance for the first time. It is rumoured that one 
of these two vessels arrived at her destination with 
her anti-submarine escort in tozv, which thus early 
showed that proud spirit to which she so justly proved 
her right on St. George's Day, 191 8. 

The first duty of the Daffodil on arrival at the Mole 
was to be that of pushing the Vindictive bodily along- 
side. The former vessel was to place herself at right 
angles to the latter, bows against the latter's side, and 
to continue pushing until Vindictive, which would 
previously have anchored, was secured by means of 
the grapnels. Daffodil was then to drop alongside 
Vindictive and her parties were to climb over the latter 
and up to the Mole. The Iris was to go alongside the 
Mole ahead of Vindictive, to anchor, to grapnel the 
parapet, and to land her storming parties by means 
of ladders against the wall, her decks being too low 
to allow the use of large gangways as carried in 
Vindictive. 

In the event of Vindictive being sunk. Iris and Daf- 
fodil were to storm the Mole as best they could and 
do everything possible to knock out the three-gun 
battery or divert its fire from the blockshlps. 

It was believed that the Mole garrison consisted 
of about one thousand men. But what of reenforce- 



82 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

ments arriving from the shore? Access to the Mole 
would entail the crossing of the viaduct by such rein- 
forcements. Therefore the viaduct must be destroyed. 
Consideration on this point led to a decision to utilise 
one or more submarines filled with explosives and to 
blow them up under the viaduct, so as to cut the 
latter in twain. 

This particular phase of the operation had not been 
included in the original Plan evolved at the Ad- 
miralty. As previously stated the first edition could 
not be expected to cover every single investigation of 
every point in the problem. The attack on the via- 
duct, after a large amount of experimental work or- 
dered by Vice-Admiral Keyes, took the following 
shape. 

Two submarines, each carrying several tons of high 
explosive, were to accompany the expedition. They 
were each to carry a crew of two oflficers and four men, 
who, after securing their craft underneath the via- 
duct, were to light the time fuses and then to take to 
the boats. Each submarine carried a small motor- 
driven dinghey for this latter purpose. 

So much, then, for the blockships, storming vessels, 
and submarines at present. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE VESSELS INVOLVED: THEIR DUTIES. THE 
RESCUE WORK 

IN addition to the special vessels mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, many other vessels and craft 
were required to assist in the operation. One can 
imagine the amateur reckoning up the probable num- 
ber as follows. Three blockships at Zeebrugge and 
two at Ostende, three storming ships and two sub- 
marines at the former place. That makes ten vessels 
of sorts. Allow a few more for other purposes — say, 
fifteen altogether. As a matter of fact, there were 
one hundred and sixty-two. Let us see why so many 
were required. 

Take the requirements necessitated by the use of 
smoke screens. It has already been stated that the 
section of coast on which the Germans had established 
heavy gun batteries was twenty-one miles in length. 
Smoke screens were required to mask those guns so 
that the approach of the blockships and storming ves- 
sels should remain undiscovered until the latest pos- 
sible moment. This meant that a large number of 
craft were necessary for smoke screening alone. 
Again, if the smoke screens were to be efficient the 
smoke would have to be emitted within a short dis- 
tance of the coast; i.e., in comparatively shallow 
water. Thus shallow-draught vessels were necessary. 
Shallow draught goes hand-in-hand with small di- 
mensions. The carrying capacity of small craft is very 



'84 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

limited ; this constituted an additional reason for em- 
ploying large numbers. 

Further craft were required for assisting to locate 
the destination, for dealing with enemy vessels put- 
ting to sea during the attack, for defending our ships 
against other enemy vessels already at sea, for as- 
sisting to tow some of the smaller units across the 
seas, for rescuing the crews of the blockships, and for 
various diversionary measures. The latter included 
long-range bombardments from the sea and subsidiary 
attacks on the Mole, the units required being monitors 
and their attendant craft and fast motor boats. Other 
diversionary measures, not requiring naval vessels 
for their accomplishment, were bombing attacks by 
aircraft and bombardments from our shore guns. 

The aircraft were intended to attract the attention 
of those on duty in an overhead direction, whilst en- 
couraging the remainder to keep under cover. The 
long-range bombardments would tend to keep the 
enemy's larger batteries occupied in expending am- 
munition in their endeavour to locate and silence our 
guns. Si^bsidiary attacks, carried out by fast motor 
craft against the Mole, and against German vessels 
berthed at its inner side, were calculated to confuse 
the situation as far as the enemy were concerned. It 
was arranged that the R.M.A. siege guns on the 
northern flank of the Allied army should bombard for 
the purpose of simulating a prelude to a land attack. 

The reason for the employment of one hundred and 
sixty-two vessels, not including aircraft, will now be 
somewhat more clear. The various classes comprised 
cruisers, submarines, ferry-boats, monitors, destroy- 
ers, motor launches, small motor boats of a fast type, 




Ci-'jirn roiijjrvjht ~ Imperial War Museum 

ONE OF THE MONITORS 




H.M. SHIPS IRIS (right) AND DAFFODIL 



PRECAUTIONS AGAINST FATIGUE 85 

and one ordinary ship's steamboat; the latter was to 
be used in connection with rescuing the crews of the 
submarines. 

With the exception of the blockships, storming 
vessels, and submarines, the majority of the craft 
were drawn from the forces attached to the Dover 
Command; these latter, being in full commission al- 
ready, did not require new officers and men to be 
specially appointed for our purposes. Seven French 
torpedo craft and four French motor launches were 
included in the operation. The aircraft were drawn 
from the 6ist and 65 th Wings of the Royal Air Force. 

Space does not admit of describing the work of all 
these units in detail, but it may be of interest to men- 
tion one or two. 

Whenever an operation of this description is afoot, 
it is extremely advisable that the personnel destined 
to take part in the more hectic part of the fighting 
should not only be trained to the last ounce, but 
quite fresh on arrival. The individual cannot give of 
his best when fatigued — a truism exemplified again 
and again during the late war. But ships do not cross 
the ocean without any effort on the part of their per- 
sonnel. It is not a case of merely turning on a tap, 
saying, "hey presto," and going to bed. Far from it. 
Engines do not revolve merely for the asking. Large 
vessels carry large engineering complements, but al- 
ways require about half on duty at a time when at sea. 
Small craft may have small engines, but their com- 
plements are also small. So, whether the vessel be 
large or small, the work below calls for strenuous 
duties from the engineering personnel — only those 
who have undertaken such duties can realise the im- 



86 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

mense effort and the accompanying fatigue which falls 
to their lot. Then again the ship cannot navigate her- 
self. The steering and the lookout duties both call for 
great concentration of attention, especially at night 
when steaming without lights in the close company of 
other vessels, in the vicinity of shoals, and in enemy 
waters. Guns' crews must stand by the guns so as to 
be ready at a moment's notice. 

Now, this expedition would have to steam many 
miles across the seas. How then could the crews be 
fresh on arrival? This particular problem was solved 
as follows. Arrangements were made to provide each 
blockship with a number of men, over and above the 
minimum required at the climax of the operation, for 
the purpose of handling the vessel and its engines 
during the passage overseas whilst those men required 
for the "final run" would be resting. Extra officers 
could not be spared for this purpose. 

The Vindictive^ Irisy and Daffodil were differently 
situated in this respect. It was intended — as I shall 
explain presently — to bring these three vessels back 
on completion of the operation; the total number of 
personnel on board need not be kept down to the 
barest minimum. In fact, they were each to carry 
two complete sets of personnel, namely, those re- 
maining in the ship throughout and those landing on 
the Mole. 

The submarines, motor launches, and fast motor 
boats, owing to lack of accommodation, could not 
be given extra personnel for the trip across; it was, 
therefore, decided to tow all such craft throughout 
the greater portion of the passage across the seas. 
Even that decision did not relieve the crews of all 



RESCUE WORK 87 

duty, but gave them some respite, and, what was 
equally important, helped to ensure their arrival in 
the vicinity of their place of duty. 

The rescue work required much thought. Bearing 
in mind the main object which had to be attained, it 
will be understood that all such questions as rescue 
work and retirement, however important from the 
point of view of humanity, must be relegated to a 
comparatively secondary consideration. 

One cannot wage war without " breaking eggs." He 
who attempts to do so will seldom accomplish any- 
thing worth while. The lives of men are, indeed, a 
precious responsibility on the shoulders of their leader, 
but his primary duty in action is to obtain the utmost 
value from his men rather than to adopt the negative 
attitude of merely preventing their lives from being 
lost. This does not signify that lives should be thrown 
away without a thought. Not one life should be sac- 
rificed in the execution of superior order unless the 
order is absolutely essential to the success of the work 
in hand, or, putting it in another way, unless the life 
is given so that others may live. The leader, there- 
fore, has a difficult problem to solve. How far is he 
justified in risking failure through the natural desire 
to preserve life? The armchair critic, who has never 
been faced with such responsibility, who can have no 
conception of the diff^erent situations which arise in 
war, may sneer at the leader who places too great a 
store on the lives of his subordinates, or may hurl 
accusations of callous indifference at the superior 
whose successful operation is accompanied by a long 
casualty list. But we can leave any such critic to his 
sneers and accusations, knowing, as we do, that he is 



88 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

least dangerous to the community in war-time if he 
remains in his chair. 

Each blockship, as already stated, was to carry the 
minimum number of personnel which could bring 
success. But the minimum number was large. 

During the "final run" to their destinations they 
would require the engineering and stokehold parties, 
lookouts, guns' crews for self-defence, the navigation 
party conning and steering the ship, and complete 
spare navigation parties for taking over command in 
an emergency. These with a few others, such as sig- 
nalmen, brought the total in each ship up to no less 
than fifty-three. 

In the case of the Merrimac at Santiago, during the 
Spanish-American war, Lieutenant Hobson was ac- 
companied by only about half a dozen men. At Port 
Arthur the Japanese blockships, at each of their at- 
tempts, also carried very small crews. But it must not 
be forgotten that all those attempts failed. 

Now, it was decided to give each blockship a large 
lifeboat and some life-saving rafts, and also to arrange 
for other craft to proceed to the rescue. The chances 
of recovering any of the personnel certainly appeared 
to be very remote, especially when one realised that 
the rescue would have to be effected practically 
underneath the enemy's guns, and even behind their 
trench defence system on the coast-line. 

The chances of rescue must bear some relation to 
the numbers to be rescued. For this reason it was 
decided to disembark the oversea passage crews from 
each blockship before arriving within the danger 
zone. 

When the question arose as to which of the motor 



MOTOR LAUNCHES FOR RESCUE WORK 89 

launches should be used for effecting the rescue of the 
crews from the blockships, volunteers were asked for. 
In spite of the almost incredible difficulties and tre- 
mendous risk involved the number of applications for 
this dangerous task was most embarrassing. Event- 
ually lots were drawn and the winners were greatly 
envied by their less fortunate confreres. 

The organisation necessary to ensure efficient co- 
operation, and co-ordination of effort, was no small 
matter. Every vessel, however small, had important 
duties to fulfil. At any moment during the operation 
success might depend on the action of a single unit : 
it would be difficult to conceive any circumstances 
where the value of initiative would be more pro- 
nounced. Nothing could be left to chance — any 
suggestion of possible failure was unthinkable. 



CHAPTER VII 

MATTERS AFFECTING THE PASSAGE. THE SUPPORTING 
FORCES. THE GERMAN SEA-FORCES. THE .PREPAR- 
ATORY WORK 

SAFE passage across the seas, especially from the 
navigational point of view, provided much food 
for thought. The liability of new shoals to form 
and of old shoals to move their position, the conse- 
quent lack of dependence on the charts, and the ab- 
sence of the usual navigational aids have already been 
mentioned. 

These navigational difficulties, increased by the 
low visibility which obtains at night, combined to 
form the first of the three main obstacles to be en- 
countered in blocking operations of this nature, 
namely, the difficulty of locating the destination. 

Considerable amusement was caused in naval cir- 
cles, subsequent to the operation, when a certain 
individual, from another country, published a special 
piece of "inside information," to wit, that the method 
(Whereby Vindictive reached Zeebrugge Mole was a 
great secret, known only to Captain Carpenter and 
one other, involving intricate calculations in connec- 
tion with astronomical phenomena. I was extremely 
interested in this suggestion for it was the first that I 
had heard of it. As a matter of fact the safe naviga- 
tion was largely the outcome of a very fine piece of 
work by two officers specially lent from the Hydro- 
graphic Department of the Admiralty.^ 

^ Captain H. P. Douglas and Lieutenant-Commander F. E. B. 
Haselfoot. 



OBJECT OF SPECIAL SURVEY 91 

The major portion of the area through which the 
various forces were to pass was surveyed under great 
difficuhies. 

The surveying vessels were often forced to remain 
within the danger zone of the German batteries, and, 
owing to shortness of time, had to utilise every pos- 
sible opportunity for fixing positions of buoys, taking 
soundings, examining areas where new shoals were 
suspected, marking the limits of old shoals, laying 
down special marks to assist the passage of the expe- 
dition, and to enable the bombarding vessels to take 
up their positions with accuracy. Old obstructions 
had to be removed and wrecks had to be correctly 
charted. The vagaries of the weather rendered the 
task all the more difficult, and interference from the 
enemy was experienced on more than one occasion. 
Incidentally both these officers were on board H.M.S. 
Botha when she rammed and sank the German tor- 
pedo-boat A-19, which was out with a few others on 
one of their very infrequent tip-and-run escapades off 
Dunkirk; this was a pleasant interlude for these hard- 
worked officers. No country in the world can boast 
of such an efficient Hydrographic Department as our 
own. Their work in the war passed almost unre- 
corded, but none the less appreciated by those of us 
"who went down to the sea in ships." No praise 
could be too great for the work of the surveyors 
employed on our behalf. 

It will be readily understood that little reliance 
could be placed on large conspicuous buoys laid by 
us near the enemy's coast. On discovering such navi- 
gational marks the enemy would presumably either 
move them a mile or so, for the purpose of interfering 



92 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

with our navigation, or else remove them ahogether. 
Buoys, to be of any practical use, must be conspicu- 
ous, hence the likelihood of their being seen by the 
enemy unless placed in position at the last possible 
moment. This alternative was actually followed; it 
does not require much imagination to realise the diffi- 
culties and dangers in placing them in readiness for 
the operation and in removing them again on each 
occasion when the operation was postponed. 

The strong tidal stream in the southern portion of 
the North Sea renders navigation rather anxious work 
in misty weather, or in darkness, especially as the 
normal rate of the current is much influenced by 
weather. Naturally, there is less danger of hitting a 
shoal which one is endeavouring to avoid, if the ship 
is steaming either directly with or against the current ; 
the error in such cases is confined to the time at which 
any particular position will be reached. But when 
steaming across the current a small eccentricity on the 
part of the latter may make all the difference between 
reaching the desired position and missing it altogether. 
The current running parallel to the Belgian coast 
attains a speed of about three knots under normal 
conditions. Should a three-knot allowance be made 
when steaming across the tide there would be a 
serious error of position at the end of an hour's run 
if the tidal stream happened to be running at the rate 
of two and three-quarters or three and one-quarter 
knots; it must be realised that a ship cannot discover 
the rate of the tidal stream in a given area until she 
has completed her passage through it; i.e., until she 
has already suffered from its eccentricities. 

For the purposes of the particular case under review 



CLEARING THE MINES 93 

it was necessary for the expedition to arrive at an 
exact position, thus tidal calculations and naviga- 
tional aids assumed great importance. But they alone 
were insufficient to ensure accurate navigation. Com- 
passes must be correct, or their errors known, and the 
speed of the ship due to its own engines requires to 
be carefully gauged. For a given speed of engine the 
speed of a ship varies according to her draught and 
the state of the ship's hull under water. All these con- 
siderations will serve to show the extreme necessity 
for working out courses, speeds, and times beforehand 
with the utmost accuracy, for repeatedly checking 
them to ensure the absence of clerical error, for re- 
considering allowances for the vagaries of the ele- 
ments, and for correcting the results from day to day 
according to the tidal differences due to the ever- 
changing phases of the moon. The careful navigator 
always follows a similar procedure, but, in ordinary 
cases, he knows that a fault in position can probably 
be remedied in time to avoid untoward incident. In 
our movements, however, there would be small 
chance of remedy if the blockships failed to find the 
canal entrance, or if the submarines were unable to 
locate the viaduct, or if the storming vessels missed 
the Mole. 

Preparation for the passage across the seas in- 
volved yet another matter of considerable impor- 
tance. Vast numbers of mines had been laid, both by 
ourselves and by the enemy, during the previous three 
and a half years, in the areas through which the ex- 
pedition must pass before reaching the permanent 
German defence mine-fields near the Flanders coast. 
Doubtless other mines had dragged with the tide 



94 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

across our desired route. Special mine-sweeping work 
was, therefore, necessary to render the major portion 
of the passage even tolerably safe from mines. The 
reader can probably appreciate the difficult nature 
of that task with its attendant risks and necessity for 
thoroughness. 

In addition to the one hundred and sixty-two ves- 
sels whose duties have been mentioned, other sup- 
porting squadrons were necessary far out at sea. The 
possibility of our intentions having become known to 
the enemy had to be borne in mind. In such an event 
the enemy would, of course, adopt special measures 
to ensure giving the expedition a warm reception on 
arrival, but a most important eventuality for us to 
guard against was that of meeting a superior con- 
centrated enemy force already at sea waiting to inter- 
cept lis en route. Scouting craft, both aerial and 
naval, were therefore required; it was also advisable 
that our fighting fleet should be conveniently situated 
in case the chance arose of defeating any such counter 
to our expedition. 

Whenever we employed our small craft to operate 
in enemy waters we had to bear in mind a certain 
possibility. The enemy on becoming aware of our 
movements, or intentions, and perhaps feeling un- 
usually courageous, might say, "Here are a number 
of small enemy vessels close to our harbours, let us 
engage them with the whole strength of our fleet and 
thereby achieve a great victory for the Fatherland." 
And so, in case the German Fleet left their harbours, 
unlikely though it might be, our Grand Fleet was 
always "in the ofling" at such times ready to meet 
the so-called High Seas Fleet and send them down 
to the place where they ought to go. 



GERMAN mCH SEAS FLEET 95 

The man-in-the-street must have wondered what 
the Grand Fleet was doing at sea so often in view 
of the fact that the enemy hid themselves almost 
throughout the war. The difficulty lay in the fact that 
we could not be perfectly certain that the constitution 
of German naval valour would continue to include 
ninety-nine per cent of discretion. Time after time 
the Grand Fleet hoped against hope that they might 
meet the enemy. The operations off the Belgian coast 
seemed to hold out yet another slender hope; this, 
pardon the anticipation, proved to be as forlorn as 
usual. The history of the High Seas Fleet, with re- 
spect to their oft-repeated desire to try conclusions 
with the Grand Fleet, can be briefly narrated. In the 
four and a quarter years following the outbreak of 
war the High Seas Fleet came out once, and once 
only, with the express intention of meeting the Grand 
Fleet — and that was to surrender! On the one other 
occasion when they met our fleet, incidentally by 
accident, they concentrated all their efforts at escape 
and then claimed the victory. The German Navy 
never had any traditions — now they have one less ! 

The reader may well ask what connection these 
remarks have with the subject of the blocking opera- 
tion. A very close connection indeed. 

Napoleon — perhaps the greatest student of war 
and certainly one of the greatest generals that the 
world has seen — remarked, and repeated again and 
again, that in war *'the moral is to the physical as 
three is to one." Every great leader understands the 
value of morale and every man who has served his 
country in war has at least a subconscious realisation 
of the moral factor. 



96 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Just consider the moral effect of the German in- 
activity. In our men the uppermost feelings towards 
the enemy were those of contempt. There is small 
need to consider the morale of the High Seas Fleet, 
for is it not recorded by their own Admiral, von 
Scheer, that the men mutinied at the last because 
they believed they were being sent out to fight our 
fleet? Take the case of our Dover Patrol force. They 
knew that the enemy could choose their own time for 
dashing out of the Belgian ports to attack our cross- 
channel communications. They knew that the chances 
of intercepting such enemy under adverse conditions, 
such as during darkness or fog, were very small. Yet 
month after month passed by and the enemy surface 
craft did next to nothing. Sometimes our advanced 
patrols came into touch with enemy patrols. On each 
occasion, I believe almost without exception, the 
enemy craft turned and ran at utmost speed for home. 
In the case of our small motor boats there had been 
meetings with those of the enemy within a mile or 
two of the latter's bases: here again, there is no re- 
corded instance of one, or even two, of their craft 
standing up to one of ours. The reader will under- 
stand the resultant moral effect. Some day perhaps 
we shall hear the romantic story of these adventurous 
small craft working from the Dover area — how one of 
them coolly steamed in underneath Ostende Pier one 
night to repair her engine whilst the German sentries 
paraded up and down just overhead, how another 
ran in behind Zeebrugge Mole in broad daylight and 
fired her torpedoes at German vessels berthed along- 
side, and so on. Is it difficult to imagine the feeling of 
superiority and confidence possessed by our personnel ? 



GERMAN MORALE 97 

The morale of the German naval forces in Flanders 
concerned us much more closely than that of the 
High Seas Fleet. Under ordinary circumstances we 
should have been exceedingly apprehensive of any 
German torpedo craft at Zeebrugge or in the vicinity, 
especially those at Blankenberghe, but experience had 
served to show that they were none too ready to 
further the "iiber" portion of "Deutschland iiber 
Alles." Thus we were all the more ready to take 
risks which may have seemed to be uncommonly close 
to the border-line between "justifiable" and the 
reverse. 

In recounting the preparations which followed nat- 
urally upon the main considerations connected with 
the problem in hand there has been a certain amount 
of unavoidable anticipation. 

It has already been explained that the conduct of 
the operation fell to the Vice-Admiral commanding 
the Dover Patrol, and that a very large number of 
vessels of various classes and many specially trained 
personnel were required. Thus the fitting out of the 
vessels, the preparation of material, and the training 
of the personnel also came under the direction of the 
Vice-Admiral. 

It must not be forgotten that the ordinary work of 
the Dover Patrol could not be interrupted even for 
one day at this period. The lines of communication 
across the Channel, important as they had already 
been throughout the war, were now of such vital im- 
portance that the Allied situation on the main battle 
front depended on the work of the Dover Patrol more 
than ever before. During February and March, 191 8, 
when the preparations for our enterprise were in full 



98 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

swing, and especially during the latter month, the 
Germans were concentrating every possible effort to 
break down the Allied resistance. Their final great 
"push" was in full swing and the Allied troops were 
being hard pressed almost to the point of giving way. 
British, Colonial, and American re enforcements were 
being poured into France by every available route; 
guns, ammunition, and stores were passing across the 
Channel in an endless stream of shipping. The situa- 
tion was critical to a degree. If the Dover Patrol force 
had failed at such a time the war might have had a 
very different ending. And in the midst of this ter- 
ribly anxious period we were forced to request great 
additional effort for the purposes which the author is 
endeavouring to describe. 

One may be pardoned for thinking that the block- 
ing operation, with all its complicated requirements, 
should have received undivided attention, but such a 
thing was impossible. Those were busy days at Dover. 
Special material, such as artificial fog apparatus, had 
to be constructed and fitted in the craft concerned. 
The use of the apparatus had to be practised with a 
view to discovering the conditions under which the 
best results could be obtained. Neighbouring com- 
mands, such as at Portsmouth and The Nore, were 
exceedingly helpful in this latter respect. The use of 
howitzers, flame projectors, bomb-mortars, grappling 
irons, scaling ladders, and many other fighting appli- 
ances not usually found in men-o'-war had to be 
investigated. 

A special factory was established at Dover under 
Wing-Commander Brock — of whom I shall have 
much to tell — mainly in connection with the devel- 



PRODUCTION OF SMOKE 99 

opments and use of artificial fog, but also to further 
the design and production of other material. Sixty 
men worked at this factory. Their output, both in 
quality and quantity, was most satisfactory in spite 
of the many handicaps with which such innovations 
have to contend. The difficulty of obtaining special 
material, when the output of every large firm in the 
country was already earmarked for other purposes, 
was not lessened by the fact that our urgent demands 
could seldom be supported, owing to the necessity for 
secrecy, by explanations as to the purposes in view. 
The use of artificial fog in war was by no means 
an entirely new idea. The device had already been 
utilised by our naval forces off the Belgian coast, and 
a quantity of data on the subject was available as a 
result of its use in fighting on land. But all forms of 
fog screens — and there were many — had hitherto 
possessed disadvantages which would militate against 
satisfactory results in an enterprise such as we contem- 
plated. The main difficulty attached to the smoke 
apparatus at Dover was that a very visible flame was 
emitted; this would have completely given our pres- 
ence away as the smoke was intended to hide our 
presence and cover our advance. Some attempts had 
been made to surmount this difficulty, but experi- 
ments proved the apparatus to be hopelessly unsuited 
to our requirements. The reader, however, will not 
desire to be introduced to a highly technical treatise 
on this subject. Suffice it to say that, as a result of 
prolonged experimental work, a new type of fog was 
evolved which satisfied all requirements. The trials 
were not altogether devoid of humour. It is rumoured 
that on one occasion a fog produced in the Dover 



loo THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Straits refused to dissipate itself for three days, with 
the result that mercantile captains said some very 
hard things about the clerk of the weather. 

The blockships and Vindictive were fitted out at 
Chatham. That dockyard was already being taxed 
to its utmost. The situation demanded that every 
man should strive to exceed his previous utmost ef- 
forts — one of the few points on which our enemies 
may congratulate themselves. Secrecy was, of course, 
essential. Yet in the case of the ships fitting out at 
Chatham the number of men who played an indirect 
part in the operation ran Into four figures. The same 
thing applied at Portsmouth where the Iris, the Daffo- 
dil, and the submarines destined to attack the railway 
viaduct at Zeebrugge were fitted out. The director 
of Naval Construction, Sir Tennyson D'Eyncourt, 
and the Director of Dockyards, Rear-Admiral L. E. 
Power, brought all their valuable knowledge, and that 
of their respective staffs, to bear on the problem. 
Much of the usual formality governing inter-depart- 
mental procedure was waived. Paper work was re- 
duced to a minimum. The real nature of the opera- 
tion was made known to few at that period. The war 
had taught men not to ask questions unless the in- 
formation was an absolute necessity. Nevertheless 
many must have wondered what was afoot; special 
steps had to be taken, therefore, to prevent leakage of 
information, of which more anon. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE PERSONNEL. SECRECY. TRAINING. SOME 
PERSONALITIES 

NO naval or military training is necessary to 
realise that the success of any war operation 
is mainly dependent upon the personnel. 

In these days of machinery and munitions, how- 
ever, we are apt to become ultra-materialistic in our 
imagination. We read of so many million rounds of 
ammunition, so many thousand tons of merchant 
shipping, such and such new-fangled weapons. But 
the necessity for efficient personnel is, after all, the 
crux of the whole matter. What use a ship without 
a crew or an aeroplane without a pilot? Truly the 
question of personnel is paramount. No belligerent 
state ever suffered from a surplus of fighting men in 
the midst of a war. How strange it seemed to us in 
those critical days that we had ever been content to 
rely on an overseas expeditionary force of only 150,000 
men. 

The ordinary use of warships against the enemy 
involves no special requirements of personnel beyond 
those which can be foreseen when the ships are origi- 
nally designed. Design naturally results from pro- 
jected employment whether the design be construc- 
tional or instructional. But for the purposes of this 
unusual kind of operation special types of officers and 
men were required and special training had to be 
arranged for. The operation itself — in official par- 



I02 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

lance — was considered to be hazardous. Success 
would depend upon the work of the personnel to an 
unusual degree. This fact was early recognised. 

It is difficult to define the type of men required. 
They should be volunteers as far as that was practi- 
cable. They must be "all out for business." In view 
of the hazardous nature of their enterprise it was ad- 
visable that they should be unmarried. 

In the Grand Fleet alone there were many thou- 
sands of men spoiling for a fight. Nor was this sur- 
prising. During nearly four years of waiting, tuned 
up to the last note of efficiency, there had been only 
one action in which the major portion of the main 
fleet was engaged, and only a few smaller actions in 
which opportunities were available for the crews of 
our large ships to show their worth. But how many 
of the public realised the vastness of its work.? — the 
incessant patrolling, the continual sweeps up and 
down and across the North Sea, with only a glimpse 
of an enemy vessel on the rarest occasions, and that 
but a momentary vision of her stern disappearing at 
the utmost speed as the vessel fled to her nearest port 
of refuge. As a blue-jacket was heard to remark, "It's 
always tip and run with devilish little of the tip." 

The everlasting practices, manoeuvring, and drills, 
designed towards the attainment and upkeep of 
efficiency, may have been novel enough for the first 
few months, but the novelty soon wore off. Not that 
the men ever showed any sign of weariness. It was 
more a case of hope deferred. 

I was in that fleet for three years and three months 
and can speak from experience. One marvelled at the 
spirit of the men. They were always ready for "the 



GRAND FLEET PERSONNEL 103 

day" — hungry for it, praying for it. Even the 
theatrical entertainments, which they organised in 
their spare time, were brimful of topical allusions to 
the absent enemy. 

The personnel of the Grand Fleet — I especially 
allude to those who had served in the Fleet from the 
outbreak of war — were, indeed, spoiling for a fight. 
They had read from time to time of the splendid ac- 
tions fought by their contemporaries in other theatres 
of the war; it was only human that they should feel 
extremely envious of these others. 

It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of our 
main fleet at the outbreak of war was mainly due to 
the untiring efforts of its personnel. The work of the 
fleet in the years immediately preceding the war had 
been exceedingly strenuous; very different from the 
sea life of a decade earlier. The days of "hurrah" 
cruises, when gunnery practices took second place to 
festivities, had long since passed. Manoeuvres, firing 
exercises with guns and torpedoes, night attacks and 
steam trials at sea were alternated with "rests" in 
harbour, where evolutions, drills, and instructions of 
all sorts, conferences and war games had kept us 
pretty well occupied. Admittedly, then, service in 
the main fleet required a high state of efficiency; an 
individual who fell short of this requirement was not 
wanted. Thus, speaking generally, the personnel of 
the main fleet at the outbreak of war were only there 
because they were considered to be deserving of a 
place on the efficiency roll. Yet many of these very 
officers and men had not seen an enemy ship since the 
outbreak of war. It is not difficult, therefore, to 
imagine their envy of those others to whom oppor- 



104 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

tunities had been vouchsafed to prove their worth in 
action. 

The choice of the personnel for our particular enter- 
prise had to be governed, to a certain extent, by those 
most readily available. The question thus arose as to 
whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, 
Sir David Beatty, would consent to lend any of his 
officers and men for the operation. The Vice-Admiral 
was anxious that the Grand Fleet should be given a 
share in this affair. The Commanders-in-Chief of 
the three southern dockyard ports and the Com- 
mandants of the Royal Marine Artillery and Light 
Infantry were also consulted; many personnel at 
these latter establishments would be awaiting draft 
in the ordinary course of events and might, therefore, 
be more easily spared than those from the Grand 
Fleet. 

If the German High Seas Fleet had shown any ac- 
tivity it is a doubtful matter whether Sir David 
Beatty would have allowed his officers and men to 
leave the fleet. It must be understood that it was not 
merely a case of borrowing these men for a day or 
two, but for a period of several weeks, so that they 
could be specially trained for their somewhat unusual 
duties. Sir David Beatty, however, considered that 
the risk of rendering his ships temporarily short- 
handed was justified in view of the importance of our 
expedition. His chief difficulty lay in the matter of 
selection. Owing to the necessity of secrecy he could 
not issue an ordinary memorandum to all and sundry 
stating our object and asking for volunteers. So each 
Flag Officer was requested to produce a certain num- 
ber of officers and men from his own particular squad- 



SELECTING THE MEN 105 

ron. Likely individuals were to be asked if they were 
prepared to undertake something "hazardous"; no 
further intimation as to the nature of the enterprise 
was to be promulgated. Similar methods of selection 
were adopted at the naval and marine depots. It is 
not difficult to imagine the buzz of excitement which 
passed through each ship when rumour suggested that 
there was something afoot. 

If the nature of the operation had been divulged 
and volunteers requested, there would have been 
twenty thousand names sent in. That was the Com- 
mander-in-Chief's own opinion. But the secret must 
be safeguarded. So the selection was made by the 
officers — so many men from each ship, seamen, 
stokers, and marines. At that stage the selected men 
knew nothing except that they were required for 
something "hazardous." 

Life in the fleet was not altogether free from hazard 
in the ordinary course of events. With one's living 
space surrounded by the most destructive of high ex- 
plosives in close proximity, perhaps a matter of 
inches, with the seas either mine-strewn or, in the ab- 
sence of mines, containing lurking submarines, with 
the ever-present danger of collision between vessels 
steaming at high speed without lights on the darkest 
night, it cannot be said that naval life in war-time 
carries an insignificant insurance premium. 

But the coming operation was something different. 
It was declared to be "hazardous." If the usual life 
at sea as described above carried no such descriptive 
title, the word "hazardous" meant much. 

Though little enough was known as to the business 
ahead, it was sufficient to raise the envy of the great 



io6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

majority of men who were not fortunate enough to 
be selected. One could well imagine the little knots 
of men who gathered together in the evening and dis- 
coursed on the injustice of being left behind. The in- 
tense interest with which the special training of the 
chosen few was watched could almost be felt. For 
boat-pulling, physical drill, and route marching, com- 
menced immediately, were the order of the day, just 
to prepare the men for the more intensive training to 
follow. 

A good deal of consideration had to be given to the 
choice of officers. The question of seniority of the 
blockship commanders gave food for thought. Each 
of these vessels would also require at least three exec- 
utive officers. The chance of the captain being bowled 
over early in the proceedings was none too small. So 
the conning and steering arrangements and the whole 
system of command in each ship was to be triplicated. 
Thus each officer must be ready to take over the re- 
sponsibility of command at a moment's notice. Simi- 
lar considerations affected the choice of officers for the 
storming vessels. Still further executive officers were 
required for charge of the storming parties. Engineer 
officers must be forthcoming for these special vessels. 
At first all these officers, just as in the case of the men, 
knew nothing of the circumstances under which they 
were required, except that it was for a hazardous 
business. 

The majority of the officers and men for the block- 
ships and storming vessels were drawn from the Grand 
Fleet ; most of the remainder were obtained from the 
naval depots. 

When visiting the United States of America at the 



' THE AMERICAN BATTLE SQUADRON 107 

end of 191 8 I was often asked to explain why Amer- 
ican naval personnel were not included in the enter- 
prise. On more than one occasion there were strong 
evidences of disagreeable insinuations having been 
circulated through pro-German influences. It was 
suggested that relations between the British and 
American squadrons in the Grand Fleet left much to 
be desired, and that feelings of jealousy had caused 
us to decline American assistance for the purposes of 
our enterprise. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. The American battle squadron was never 
referred to as such. They formed the "sixth" battle 
squadron of the Grand Fleet. Their ships and ours 
constituted one fleet, working for a single end and 
guided by common sentiment. For the furtherance 
of successful co-operation the Americans had literally 
"thrown overboard" everything that could weaken 
the combination. Their signalling arrangements, tac- 
tical manoeuvring, and special gunnery methods had 
all been brought into line with ours. The unselfish- 
ness and sacrifice involved can only be fully appreci- 
ated by members of our own sea service. 

From the day of their arrival the Americans had 
been actuated with but one purpose, namely, that of 
leaving no stone unturned to enhance their value as 
a reenforcement. Admiral Rodman, who commanded 
the Sixth Battle Squadron, was ever in close touch 
with Admiral Beatty. The genuine friendship be- 
tween his squadron and the rest of the fleet will never 
be forgotten in our service. There was but one fleet. 
But the question of utiHsing their personnel for our 
immediate affair was governed by something more 
than cordiality and co-operation. Secrecy had to be 



io8 THE BLOCKING 01^' ZEEBRUGGE 

maintained. If we had transferred a few score Amer- 
ican officers and men to Chatham, where there were 
no American ships, for special training with our own, 
curiosity would have been aroused at once, comment 
would have followed and, in a very short while, the 
secret might have been public property. 

Admiral Beatty and Admiral Rodman had dis- 
cussed the whole subject and decided that American 
assistance was inadvisable for the reason given. I 
was also asked if it was true that an American officer 
had come over to Zeebrugge in Vindictive as a stow- 
away. It was not true. 

Admiral Rodman had previously held an important 
post in connection with the Panama Canal, and he 
let us have the benefit of his experiences with regard 
to questions of salvage. Nearly a year later he was 
kind enough to attend a large meeting with the author 
in New York, where, in no uncertain language, he 
nailed the pro-German insinuations to the board. 

Amongst the first officers to leave the Grand Fleet 
were those destined to command the blockships; the 
fitting out of the latter had already commenced. 
The usual custom concerning seniority for command 
of light cruisers was waived, these officers, whose 
ranks varied from a Commander to a Lieutenant of 
less than three years' standing, being selected from 
those available mainly by virtue of their character and 
capability. Those selected to command Iris and 
Daffodil were also sent south as early as practicable. 
On arrival at Dover they were told the "secret." It 
was probably self-control combined with the some- 
what artificial reserve arising from good discipline 
which enabled them to refrain from giving vent to 



CAPTAINS OF BLOCKSHIPS 109 

their feelings of elation. One of them told me that he 
had the sensation of being released from prison ; the 
opportunity of being able to show his worth had come 
at last. Each officer read through the "plan" so as 
to make himself acquainted with the broad outlines 
of the whole enterprise. One of the blockship com- 
manders expressed the opinion that the blocking of 
Ostende would be "easy meat" compared to the 
undertaking at Zeebrugge, and he earnestly requested 
that he might command a blockship destined for the 
latter place. This request was granted. Incidentally 
his opinion was wrong. Subsequently, thanks to his 
own splendid efforts, he caused his comparison be- 
tween the two places to appear all the more erroneous 
by assisting to make the blocking of Zeebrugge seem 
relatively simple. 

The main ideas governing the preparatory work, as 
already stated, had been evolved under the direction 
of Admiral Keyes. Many questions, however, of a 
more local description remained to be decided on the 
spot. The blockship officers, therefore, thoroughly 
investigated every detail which bore on their duties 
and devised many local improvements, especially in 
connection with the handling of the vessels. 

They left nothing undone to ensure a successful 
issue of their efforts. No other subject held any in- 
terest for them in those days. Just how to take their 
ships to their allotted positions — that was their one 
consideration. The question of being rescued after 
their work was completed held a very secondary 
place. Perhaps the rescue vessels might be able to do 
something towards it. Perhaps not. Anyway, that 
mattered nothing in comparison with the crucial 



no THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

point. And so they schemed and discussed and or- 
ganised and tested. And what a grand reward they 
obtained for their labours ! 

I should like to mention in passing that the first 
blockship officer to come south was Lieutenant Ivor 
B. Franks, in whose hands much of the early work 
connected with fitting out the blockships was placed, 
with splendid results which reflected great credit on 
him. He commanded Iphigenia during the first two 
attempts made against Zeebrugge, but, most un- 
luckily for him, he developed appendicitis just before 
the final attempt. It was largely due to his earnest 
entreaties that Admiral Keyes gave the command 
to the previous second-in-command, who was a 
Lieutenant of only one year standing. Once again 
Lieutenant Franks, for whom we all felt the greatest 
sympathy, had shown the value of his judgment. 

During this period the constructive work on the 
ships proceeded apace. 

The Vindictive rapidly changed her appearance. 
Every unessential fitting that could be removed in 
the time at our disposal was wafted away. The fore- 
mast was cut off just above the fighting-top. The 
mainmast was removed altogether and a large portion 
of it was fitted horizontally across the deck, extending 
several feet over the port side of the ship, as a bump- 
kin designed to prevent the port propeller from bump- 
ing against the Mole at Zeebrugge. 

Special fenders were fitted on the ship's side to 
prevent damage to the latter when secured to the 
Mole, and a fender of colossal proportions was added 
to the port side of the forecastle for the express pur- 
pose of bumping the Mole on arrival. 



INFORMING THE OFFICERS in 

Other alterations and additions have been described 
in Chapter V. 

H.M.S. Hindustan^ Captain A. P. Davidson, 
D.S.O., was lent as a depot vessel for our officers and 
men who had been concentrated at Chatham. There 
was then no living accommodation on board Vindic- 
tive or in the blockships. 

The Vice-Admiral took an early opportunity of as- 
sembling all the officers and making the whole plan 
known to them collectively. The secret was to be 
kept from the men until later, in accordance with the 
principle of never divulging a secret to anybody ex- 
cept those to whom the information is indispensable. 

The personnel specially required for storming the 
Mole at Zeebrugge were divided into three main par- 
ties, viz. , Seamen storming parties under the command 
of Captain Henry C. Halahan, D.S.O., R.N., Marine 
storming parties (drawn from the 4th Battalion) un- 
der the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N. 
Elliot, D.S.O., R. M.L.I. , and a demolition party con- 
sisting of both Seamen and Marines under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant-Commander Cecil C. Dickin- 
son, R.N. 

The Marine Infantrymen were put through in- 
tensive training at one of the southern depots; this 
training was arranged and personally supervised by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, whose powers of imagina- 
tion and organisation were of a high order and whose 
optimism was very encouraging. He was tremen- 
dously enthusiastic from the first moment when he 
was let into the secret. As second-in-command of the 
Naval Forces in Servia he had previously rendered 
splendid service and had been awarded the D.S.O. 



112 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

After the fall of Belgrade I believe that he had tra- 
versed the entire country on foot in his endeavour to 
help his force to safety. I remember a lady telling me 
that she and her friends had been much interested on 
recent nights in watching a large party of Marines 
indulging in peculiar antics on a hill opposite her 
house ; also that the hill was partly covered with strips 
of canvas in a seemingly aimless fashion. I expressed 
my astonishment at the strange proceeding. Inci- 
dentally the canvas strips were laid out to represent 
different portions of Zeebrugge Mole, though, at that 
period, the men believed they represented some 
enemy position elsewhere. 

The Marine Artillerymen, destined to man the 
howitzers and some other guns in Vindictive, were 
trained at another depot. 

The seamen were largely trained at Chatham under 
military supervision and advice ; the excellence of this 
training received a well-deserved tribute in the official 
despatch. The demolition parties were also trained at 
Chatham. 

Training in night fighting was the main idea. In- 
struction in bombing, bayonet fighting, and all types 
of trench raiding was given. The men believed that 
they were required for some special service in France ; 
their enthusiasm was unbounded. 

Taking everything into consideration and looking 
at the operation of attacking the Mole from a general 
point of view, it was not dissimilar to a trench raid 
on a large scale. The preparatory bombardment, the 
rush "over the top," the probability of encountering 
barbed wire, the descent to the main level of the 
Mole, the hand-to-hand fighting in the dark, and 





LIEUT. -COL. BERTRAM N. 
ELLIOT, D.S.O., R.M.L.I. 



LIEUT. -COM. ARTHUR L. 
HARRISON, R.N. 





WING-COM. FRANK A. 
BROCK, R.N.A.S. 



CAPTAIN HENRY C. 
HALAHAN, D.S.O., R.N. 



INTENSIVE TRAINING 113 

finally the clearing of dug-outs, all combined to liken 
that phase of the operation to one of the many night 
raids with which the military were so well acquainted 
on the western front. The senior officers of the Sea- 
men and Marine storming parties had both gained 
much experience of such fighting ashore. It was to 
be a raid of the first water, a super-raid. The military 
officers were most enthusiastic about our men. They 
declared that these men could carry any position. 
For they were all picked men; and even so some of 
them were weeded out as not quite reaching high- 
water mark at the game. It was generally conceded 
that the Hun, wherever he was to come to close quar- 
ters with such antagonists, would have an uncom- 
fortable evening. 

It has been mentioned above that special personnel 
were not required for the large majority of vessels 
which were already in full commission and employed 
on active duty in the Dover Command. The person- 
nel required for the blockships and storming vessels 
and for other special purposes amounted to eighty-six 
officers and sixteen hundred and ninety-eight men; of 
these, seven hundred and fifty, in the aggregate, were 
drawn from the Royal Marines. 

Having been working in the Plans Department of 
the Admiralty when the operation was originally 
thought out under Admiral Keyes, my further services 
had been lent to him, after he took over the Command 
at Dover, in connection with the operational staff 
work. Very much to my delight I had then been 
offered the billet of navigator of the expedition, and 
my duties were to include those of placing Vindictive 
alongside the Mole. The Vice-Admiral originally pro- 



114 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

posed to direct the operation from on board Vindictive, 
but was forced to the conclusion that he could do so 
more satisfactorily from a destroyer, thus avoiding 
the possibility of being confined to any single position 
in the area of the attack. In the Vice-Admiral's ab- 
sence Captain Halahan, appointed in command of the 
seamen storming parties, became the Senior Execu- 
tive Officer in the ship. It was pointed out that that 
fact would result in the unusual case of the Senior 
Officer on board not being responsible for the handUng 
of the ship. Captain Halahan would not even listen 
to any suggestion of difficulty arising from such a 
situation, and, I am anxious to record this fact, he 
proposed that his acting rank of Captain should be 
transferred from himself to me, so that the officer 
responsible for handling the vessel should also be the 
Senior Executive Officer on board in accordance with 
the usual service custom; in other words that he 
should be made junior to myself. This proposal was 
typical of Halahan, who, in my opinion, was one of 
the finest fellows that our Service ever knew. His 
death brought an irreparable loss to the Navy. 
Throughout the greater part of the war he had been 
in command of the naval guns on the northern front 
and within field-gun range of the enemy for no less 
than three years. He had fought in most of the great 
battles on that part of the Allied lines. A more effi- 
cient, earnest, upright, and altogether large-minded 
officer never fought for his country or paid the su- 
preme sacrifice more readily. The days which we 
spent together working at the details of the enter- 
prise, his wonderful enthusiasm, and his certainty of 
success are unforgettable. I feel that I could not con- 



WING-COMMANDER BROCK 115 

tinue this story without recording my unqualified 
admiration for this splendid officer. 

Needless to say, it was unnecessary to carry his 
proposal into effect, for his unselfishness had served 
to guarantee that all questions of rank were imma- 
terial where the only thing that really mattered was 
the attainment of our object. 

I regret that my lack of literary ability prevents 
my doing justice to such men. 

It would be difficult for anybody to speak too 
highly of Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock. He was 
a rare personality. An inventive genius, than whom 
the country had no better, it was his brain that differ- 
entiated this blocking enterprise from all previous 
attempts in history in one most important particu- 
lar. The difficulty of reaching the destination in the 
face of a strenuous opposition had hitherto brought 
failure, but he provided an antidote in the form of 
a satisfactory artificial fog designed to protect the 
blockships from the enemy's guns during the critical 
period of approach. That in itself was a wonderful 
achievement, but his inventive mind was not satisfied 
therewith. To him we owed the special flares intended 
for turning darkness into light. 

A special buoy was wanted — one that would auto- 
matically provide its own light on being thrown into 
the water. Brock made so little of the problem that 
he produced such a buoy, designed, constructed, and 
ready for use in less than twenty-four hours. Special 
signal lights were required. Brock produced them. 
Flame projectors, far exceeding anything hitherto 
known, were mooted. Brock produced them also. 
No matter what our requirements were Brock was 



ii6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

undefeated. With a highly scientific brain he pos- 
sessed extraordinary knowledge of almost any sub- 
ject. He had travelled much and could tell you all 
that was worth knowing of any country from Pata- 
gonia to Spitzbergen. He was no mean authority on 
old prints and books, was also a keen philatelist, and 
was blessed with a remarkable memory. Wherever he 
went he carried with him a pocket edition of the New 
Testament, which was his favourite possession; his 
knowledge of the contents was quite unique. And 
with it all he was a great shot and an all-round sports- 
man. His fine physique was well remembered by 
many a Rugby footballer from the days when he 
played in the pack of one of the leading club fifteens. 
His geniality and humour were hard to beat. But of 
all his qualities, optimism perhaps held first place. 
At times we, who were far from being pessimistic, 
thought his optimism excessive, but it was justified 
absolutely with regard to the success of the enterprise. 

Sad to relate, the only occasion on which I can re- 
member his optimism failing to carry him through 
was connected with his own personal safety. He had 
telephoned up to Halahan in our oflftce and men- 
tioned having broken a looking-glass. "That means 
seven years bad luck," said Halahan, in a jocular 
spirit. "Never mind," came the instant reply, "it 
shows that I'm going to live for another seven years, 
anyway." 

Both Brock and Halahan had done so much to en- 
sure our success, it was indeed sad that they did not 
survive long enough to see the results. 

My readers will excuse me, I feel sure, for bringing 
such personalities to their notice. It is very diflScult 



WING-COMMANDER BROCK 117 

to continue the story without writing of many others 
to whom we owed so much in the preparatory work. 
But there will be a chance of mentioning some of 
them later on, when we come to the actual description 
of the fight. 




CHAPTER IX 

THE WAITING PERIOD. THE VOLUNTEERING SPIRIT 

T last all constructive preparations were 
completed; the various ships and small craft 
were commissioned and concentrated at their 
respective starting-points. The blockships and Vin- 
dictive steamed out to the loneliest of anchorages in the 
Swin Deep, situated about eight miles south of Clac- 
ton, Essex. It was a curious looking squadron that 
steamed down the Medway that day, the blockships 
with their funnels looming extra large in the absence 
of masts and the Vindictive with her gangways pro- 
truding into mid-air like almonds in the side of a tipsy 
cake. The Hindustan looked respectable enough. She 
was mother to us all and her captain was a very toler- 
ant and helpful father. 

The Iris and Dafodil joined us almost immedi- 
ately. The Marines embarked a few days later. They 
had been sent to a southern port on the understanding 
that they were off to France ; the officers alone knew 
the truth. They duly boarded the waiting transport 
with stores, ammunition, and baggage, the latter 
labelled to a French port. They must have wondered 
where they would sleep that night. The transport 
duly left harbour and headed for the French coast, 
but presently altered course in a most unusual man- 
ner. Word was passed round that the course was 
peculiar; all crowded on deck in their endeavour to 
solve the problem. It was a misty day with the rain 



EMBARKATION OF MARINES 119 

coming down in torrents ; the land was soon obscured. 
The officers chuckled at the general bewilderment, 
but held their peace. At last the transport eased 
down and finally stopped engines. Out of the mist 
loomed the Iris and Daffodily into which vessels the 
Marines were transferred. 

A second voyage was then commenced, but it was 
not of long duration. Other ships presently hove in 
sight, and strange craft they appeared. Cruisers with- 
out masts and another looking like a home for lost 
coal-tips. These were the blockships and Vindictive. 
Then appeared a recognisable vessel — the Hindu- 
stan. Some of the Marines went to the latter, the 
remainder to Vindictive. I can well remember the 
astonished look on their faces as these men boarded 
my ship. Even the heavy downpour of rain seemed 
to be unnoticed. One man remarked as he came on 
board, "Well, it's darned good to be aboard a blessed 
something, but I'm blowed if I know what she is." 

That day and the next were spent in settling down. 
On the evening of the second day the men were told 
the secret. In Vindictive they all mustered on the 
quarter-deck and after bridge. Sunset had long since 
been heralded by the time-honoured bugle call. The 
evening twilight was fading rapidly. There was a 
stillness in the air which seemed to be reflected from 
the tense attitude of the assembled men. One could 
have heard the proverbial pin drop. It was my duty 
to take them into our confidence. After the nature of 
the enterprise had been outlined a few sentences were 
sufficient to illustrate the task allotted to the Vindic- 
tive. It seemed advisable to point out that many 
other operations of a hectic nature, besides those of 



I20 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the blockships and storming vessels, were to be at- 
tempted. I emphasised this by mentioning that if, 
during our visit to Zeebrugge Mole, they heard a 
thunderous explosion they could say to themselves, 
"That's one of them." These words came back to me 
afterwards, as I shall relate in due course. 

As soon as the business in hand had been promul- 
gated it was considered advisable to exert a very rigid 
censorship on outgoing mails. Correspondence was 
permitted, but strictly on the understanding that the 
letters would be retained at one of the mail offices 
until the operation had been completed. This regula- 
tion was modified later owing to the waiting period 
being unexpectedly prolonged. Field post-cards were 
then issued and could be posted in the ordinary man- 
ner. There were the usual sentences, such as "I am 
quite well," "I am not quite well," "I have received 
your letter," "I have not received your letter," etc., 
in the style of the French exercise books of one's 
youth. Such post-cards were familiar enough amongst 
the military, but were a novelty to most of us; they 
caused a good deal of amusement, especially when the 
sender omitted to delete the sentences which misrep- 
resented his feelings towards the intended recipient. 

All shore leave was stopped; even cases of serious 
illness or accident would have to go to Hindustan, 
and remain there, instead of to a shore hospital. 

Secrecy was absolutely essential, but not always 
easy to ensure. At our anchorage it was compara- 
tively simple, but elsewhere we had to depend more 
upon trust in our fellow men than rigid regulation. 
The secret was well kept, and fortunately so. Surprise 
is mainly dependent upon secrecy. For if information 



CONCERNING SECRECY 121 

of an impending attack becomes known there can be 
no hope of taking the enemy unawares. 

I wonder how many people reaUse the necessity for 
keeping rumours to themselves during war. Rumours 
must be either true or untrue. If untrue they are not 
worth passing on. If true, then untold harm may 
result from repetition. Suppose for a moment that 
the impending operation at Zeebrugge had become a 
topic of general conversation. In due course the in- 
formation would have reached our enemies and the 
expedition would almost certainly have met with 
complete disaster. The lives of many picked officers 
and men would have been lost, and the whole affair 
would have gone down to history as a fiasco. Under 
such circumstances each person who had repeated the 
rumour on its way to the enemy would have been 
morally guilty of manslaughter — surely that is not 
an exaggerated deduction. 

Alas, human nature is often weak. There is some 
modicum of satisfaction in showing superior knowl- 
edge to one's neighbour. 

The Japanese, in their war with Russia, set the 
world a wonderful example of silence. After losing 
a high percentage of their battleship strength not 
a word was spoken and the world remained in igno- 
rance for many months. 

A writer — I think it was Chesterton — once sug- 
gested that memorials should be erected in recognition 
of negative qualities. If that idea were adopted I 
wonder how many tablets would be found to state 
that ^^Here Mr. So-and-so heard a rumour and did not 
repeat it to his friends." 

When dealing, in Chapter VIII, with the question 



122 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

of the type of personnel required for an enterprise 
of this description, I mentioned that they should be 
volunteers as far as that was practicable. The reader 
may perhaps consider that the meaning of the word 
"volunteer" was being unduly "stretched" if the 
men were to be unaware of the real nature of the oper- 
ation until they were already trained and actually 
standing by to go across. Nevertheless, the men were 
volunteers in the true meaning of the word. Let me 
explain. It was of great importance that no officer or 
man should take part in the enterprise unless he was 
"for it," heart and soul. So, as soon as the secret had 
been made known and the men were thoroughly 
aware of all the difficulties and risks involved, it was 
given out that any officers or men who wished to with- 
draw could do so. It was fully recognised that they 
might have private reasons for wishing to avoid risks 
of an unusually high degree. We were not concerned 
with the nature of such private reasons and we wished 
to make certain that no pressure was brought to bear 
for the sake of influencing their decision. They were, 
therefore, informed that any individual who desired 
to withdraw should merely give in his name and re- 
main behind. They were further told that no reasons 
would be asked and, to make doubly certain, that no 
reasons or explanations of any description would be 
allowed under any circumstances whatever. That was 
fair enough. Not a single officer or man withdrew. 

In Vindictive there were several men, of non-com- 
batant rating, who, in the ordinary course of events, 
were destined to be left behind when the expedition 
started. They comprised cooks, stewards, canteen- 
servers, and the like. Some of them were not even 



VOLUNTEERING SPIRIT 123 

naval men, but merely there as representatives of, or 
workers for, the firm which provided the canteen. 
They naturally knew the secret and they openly ex- 
pressed their desire to remain in the ship so as not to 
miss the fun. We decided to consider such requests. 
Extra men would come in handy for dealing with the 
wounded as well as for assisting with the commissa- 
riat. Eventually it was decreed that those who volun- 
teered to come over with us should give in their names. 
As far as I can remember every one of them volun- 
teered. It must be realised that these were not fight- 
ing men; their sole training had been that of the camp 
follower. Small chance of meeting the enemy in hand- 
to-hand combat would come their way. The work of 
tending wounded between decks — we already had 
our full quota of stretcher bearers for working in more 
exposed positions — and that of providing the neces- 
sary sustenance carries little glory or excitement. 
Nevertheless, these men volunteered and they after- 
wards rendered splendid service. 

^Take another case. When the Vindictive was fitting 
out at Chatham there was an officer on board, remain- 
ing from the previous commission, for temporary 
duty. He knew nothing definite of the coming opera- 
tion, but evidently thought a good deal. His method 
of volunteering was to remark: "I don't know, sir, 
what the old ship is going to do, but it looks like dirty 
work and I should like to be there." It was vulgar, 
but expressive. That officer remained with us, and 
afterwards covered himself with glory. 

In the blockships there were also incidents which 
served to illustrate this thirst for dangerous employ- 
ment. 



124 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Owing to the difficulties of rescue work, as has al- 
ready been explained, it was decided to send each 
blockship to her final destination with the smallest 
possible number of crew; the number in each case 
amounted to fifty-three. Thirty-four extra men, 
however, were required for getting each ship to the 
edge of the danger zone, whilst the fifty-three on 
whom the final run depended were resting. That 
meant that in each ship thirty-four men, who knew 
all about the coming event, who had experienced 
much hard work and considerable discomfort, were to 
be disembarked just when the fight was about to 
begin. One can imagine their feelings, but questions 
of individual disappointment could not be allowed to 
affect the plan of action. The disembarkation of these 
"surplus" crews was to be carried out with the aid 
of small craft specially detailed for the purpose. In 
the Intrepid one day there was a minor edition of a 
mutiny. Several men demanded to see their captain. 
The latter ordered them to state their business. 
"Well, sir," said the spokesman, "me and my mates 
understands as how some of the crew have got to 
leave the ship on the way across to Zeebruggy. The 
'jaunty'^ says it's us lot and we ain't a-goin' to 
leave." 

Their captain explained the situation. He pointed 
out that there would be too many for one rescue boat 
and that overloading might lead to the loss of every- 
body. But the men were inclined to be adamant. 
Finally their captain decided to take a spare gun's 
crew and ordered the "mutineers " to draw lots for the 
honour. The sequel is worth recording even if it 

^ Master-at-arms. 



FIRST WAITING PERIOD 125 

necessitates anticipating the main story. When this 
particular blockship stopped during the oversea voy- 
age, the craft detailed to take off her surplus crew 
failed to appear alongside — she had broken down. 
So the whole crew went to Zeebrugge and, extraor- 
dinary to relate, every soul of them was rescued. 

This voluntary spirit was very heartening to all 
concerned. I have only mentioned a few specific 
cases, but there were many others of a similar descrip- 
tion. It is no exaggeration to say that once the men 
knew the secret they were more than mere volunteers 
— they were determined to come across with us. 

It must not be assumed that all was in readiness as 
soon as the ships, having been duly fitted out, had 
assembled at the Swin and embarked their person- 
nel. Much remained to be done. Steam trials, gun- 
nery practices, adjustment of compasses, and tests 
of all the special material were indulged in. Handling 
the ships from both the main and auxiliary conning 
positions, testing communications, manipulating the 
grappling irons and Mole gangways, drilling the guns' 
crews and ammunition parties, training the stretcher 
parties, and giving instruction in first-aid also helped 
to keep us fully occupied. 1 

Of course it was impossible to practise sinking 
blockships or taking storming vessels alongside break- 
waters. Breakwaters are only to be found in such 
public places as Dover, Portland, etc. ; it would have 
been inadvisable to publish our intentions in such a 
manner. Thus, as far as these special vessels were 
concerned, the seamanship difficulties could not be 
lessened by proper realistic practice. The suggestion 
that we might use Hindustan as the Mole did not 



126 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

appeal to us much, especially as the Vindictive was 
originally built for ramming and consequently had a 
very large ram; we had no desire to start badly by 
sinking one of our own battleships. t '■. 

The life on board Vindictive^ uncomfortable as it 
was owing to our numbers greatly exceeding the 
normal complement, was not altogether devoid of 
humour. As one walked round the ship there would 
be a blood-curdling yell and a party of men with fixed 
bayonets would charge round a corner and hurl them- 
selves upon an imaginary foe. The steel helmets, gas 
masks, and respirators gave these men a weird ap- 
pearance, such as one is unaccustomed to see on board 
ship. Some carried knob-kerries — loaded ash sticks; 
others grenades, flame projectors, or machine-guns. 
There was no half-heartedness about the men. 
Clearly enough they meant business ; we had no mis- 
givings about the result. Those days were busy in- 
deed. When work had finished for the day oppor- 
tunities for sports arose, and there were occasional 
concerts in the evenings. The tugs-of-war evoked 
much friendly rivalry between the various sea regi- 
ments — the seamen, stokers. Marine Light Infantry, 
and Marine Artillery. One afternoon a boxing tourna- 
ment took place and the fighting augured well for the 
near future. \ r 

One day, two oflBcers from a blockship paid a call 
on the Vindictive. Visiting cards were not required; 
we were obviously At Home. But we were quite 
mystified when one of the ofl[icers produced a small 
chunk of iron and remarked that he had brought it 
on board in case we ran short of ammunition. He 
then explained that, during the passage from his 



FIRST WAITING PERIOD 127 

vessel, some description of explosive missile had burst 
within a few yards of his dinghey, and the piece pro- 
duced had fallen into the boat. Incidentally he ac- 
cused Vindictive of firing the missile, but we pleaded 
not guilty or alternatively, as the lawyers say, as- 
serted that he had no right to cross the firing line! 
Apparently it was a portion of a bomb of sorts fired 
from one of the ships, fortunately without any other 
result than to cause considerable merriment to the 
occupants of the dinghey. Such an incident in the 
ordinary course of events would have led to very per- 
tinent enquiries, but we were too much preoccupied 
with the business in hand to worry about such trifles. 

The thoughts uppermost in our minds concerned 
the chances of favourable weather conditions. The 
barometers came in for an amount of tapping which 
was not calculated to improve the instruments. We 
all became weather prophets those days. Many and 
varied were the daily forecasts. 

One night we rolled unpleasantly in a heavy gale 
and soon after midnight a small vessel was seen firing 
distress signals. This provided an excellent oppor- 
tunity for testing our illuminating rockets, by the 
aid of which we observed a tug struggling to grapple 
a lighter which was dragging its anchors. The worst 
aspect of heavy weather was the consequent expend- 
iture of fuel which we could ill spare. Thanks to the 
Captain of Hindustan our period of waiting was made 
as comfortable as we could have hoped. He was inde- 
fatigable in arranging diversions for our amusement 
and in keeping us informed of the latest war news. 
Each day brought more serious reports from the bat- 
tle front in France and made us all the more anxious 



128 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

to give the enemy a nasty shock whilst cheering up 
our own troops. During the late evenings most of us 
sought for quiet corners where we could write letters, 
I think we all found those letters were very difficult, 
but one's feelings at such a time are of too private 
a nature to bear analysis. 

Captain Halahan used to discuss every point of 
the coming enterprise with me; his insight and keen- 
ness were most marked. We often talked far on into 
the night and always came to the conclusion that 
however difficult the operation might be for our 
forces we would not be in the German's shoes for any- 
thing. We had a plasticine model of the Mole chiefly 
constructed from the data obtainable from aerial 
photographs. Colonel Elliot, commanding the Ma- 
rine storming parties, and his officers often joined us. 
We all reaUsed the difficulty of berthing the storming 
vessels at exactly the desired position alongside the 
Mole and endeavoured to make the storming plan as 
elastic as possible. The primary consideration — as 
far as that phase of the operation was concerned — 
appeared to be that the ships should secure to the 
Mole somewhere. The mere presence of the ships, com- 
bined with all the attendant noise and fireworks, 
would create a diversion of no mean order. The 
actual landing on the Mole and the occurrences that 
followed would increase the diversion which had al- 
ready commenced. With regard to Vindictive we 
originally aimed at securing her alongside the Mole, 
heading to the westward, with her stern seventy 
yards westward of the three-gun battery. It was 
realised that there might be considerable difficulty in 
recognising one's exact position alongside the outer 



THE COMING EVENT 129 

wall relative to objects on the Mole itself. Eventu- 
ally, as will be described later, the ship secured to 
the westward of the designed position, but, though 
the actual fighting on the Mole was affected, the main 
object of the diversion was attained. 

The blockship officers paid us many visits and we 
were all very cheery. No less than four old shipmates 
had come down from my late ship in the Grand 
Fleet — H.M.S. Emperor of India. It was a curious 
fact that all five of us were in the thick of the affair 
and all survived. One commanded the Intrepid with 
another as one of his officers. One commanded the 
Daffodil. One was on board Iris. Their services will 
be mentioned later. 

One night we had an Emperor of India dinner on 
board the Intrepid. A storeroom of sorts did duty for 
a mess and I think the sub-lieutenant cooked the 
dinner. There was no serious talk that evening and 
I don't think we forgot to drink confusion to the 
enemy. When we broke up the party we little knew 
that we should be conveying that confusion within 
twenty-four hours. 

I have described our life at the Swin in some detail, 
but what of the other one hundred and fifty-four craft 
which were not with us .? They were busily preparing 
too, but, for the most part, were actively engaged in 
their ordinary Dover Patrol duties at the same time. 
Little peace can have come their way. The aircraft, 
too, were very actively employed. Day after day 
they brought us back photographs of Ostende and 
Zeebrugge, taken at great risk with a fine contempt 
for danger. If we wanted the details of any portion 
of the Mole it was forthcoming, in the shape of an 



130 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

aerial photograph, in a few hours. This work was 
carried out by the 6ist Wing of the Royal Air Force, 
Special cameras were used for this purpose ; I believe 
that they had been designed by the previous Vice- 
Admiral at Dover. We studied those photographs 
with the aid of stereoscopes and magnifying glasses 
by the hour. But photography was not the only thing 
required of the aircraft. They had to prepare for the 
bombing attacks which would provide further diver- 
sions; preparation required much observational work 
both by day and by night. The aircraft detailed for 
the bombing attacks were drawn from the 65th Wing 
of the Royal Air Force. These flyers were fine fellows 
and no less determined to make the affair successful 
than the rest of us. 

Many of the smaller craft were commanded by 
officers of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve. I have mentioned elsewhere that 
the whole success of the operation might, at a critical 
period, depend upon the action of a single unit. In- 
structions leaving a high degree of initiative to the 
recipient were, therefore, necessary. Clear apprecia- 
tions followed by rapid decisions were required. The 
Vice-Admiral emphasised that point most strongly. 
He trusted his men, whether Reserve or Volunteer or 
otherwise. His trust was not misplaced; all these 
officers commanding the small craft behaved most 
admirably, exactly as was expected by those who 
knew their worth. 



1 



CHAPTER X 

METEOROLOGICAL AND TIDAL CONDITIONS. 
VISIBILITY 

"^HE periods during which the conditions 
would be favourable for our enterprise de- 
pended upon various factors. The extent to 
which we could make use of any particular date dur- 
ing one of those periods depended, in turn, upon 
meteorological conditions. 

It has been shown elsewhere that, for the purpose 
of utilising the artificial fog, we required a wind blow- 
ing more or less toward the Belgian coast from sea- 
ward. It was also necessary for the wind to be light 
so that the small craft would not be hampered by 
rough seas. Light winds are often accompanied by 
fog, especially in the North Sea, and fog would be a 
serious obstacle. Rain would be detrimental to the 
use of aircraft. 

The depths in the entrances to the canals at Zee- 
brugge and Ostende were such that the blockships 
could only navigate during the period around high 
water. It was, therefore, necessary for the vessels to 
arrive at about that state of the tide. 

Again, it was essential to carry out the operation 
during the night for reasons already mentioned. In 
this respect, however, the word operation must not 
be used too loosely; the periods of approach to the 
objectives and of retirement therefrom must both 
be included in that term. The approach had to be 



132 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

undiscovered till the latest possible moment. That 
necessitated darkness throughout the approach, which 
latter may be considered as comprising the passage 
during the last twenty miles of the oversea voyage. 
Obviously the greater part of the whole passage con- 
ducted during darkness the less would be the chance 
of losing the element of surprise. 

Likewise the retirement must be made before day- 
light if the concentration of the shore batteries was 
to be avoided. I have already stated that the German 
guns could make things very uncomfortable for ships 
up to a maximum distance of fifteen to twenty miles, 
provided that the ships could be seen. The retiring 
forces should, therefore, be outside that range before 
there was sufficient daylight to see so far; the latter 
state of visibihty would obtain at least half an hour 
before sunrise. Allowing a speed of about ten knots 
for retirement, this meant that the ships must leave 
the coast about two and a half hours before sunrise 
after completing the operation. The attack itself was 
expected to continue for about one and a half hours. 
The reader does not require to be an advanced math- 
ematician to realise that the attack must commence 
not later than about four hours before sunrise, that is, 
during the middle portion of the night. Of course, the 
attack was the all-important matter; any question 
of safe retirement must be a secondary consideration. 
Nevertheless, the question of retirement, similarly to 
that of rescuing the blockships' crews, had to be taken 
into account. 

From the foregoing it will be seen that the attack 
should be preceded and followed by a considerable 
period of darkness, and should more or less coincide 



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134 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

with the time of high tide. The latter only occurs 
about every twelve hours and takes place roughly 
fifty minutes later each day. The number of consecu- 
tive days on which high tide would occur in the mid- 
dle portion of the night was, therefore, very limited. 

With regard to visibility, as far as naval operations 
are concerned, strong moonlight is almost as disad- 
vantageous as daylight. Half the nights per month 
may be termed moonlight nights in that respect. 
The state of the moon on any particular night is 
known beforehand, the state of the clouds affecting 
moonlight may change from hour to hour. 

Just one more calculation. In mid-April the period 
sunset to sunrise is about eleven hours in length. 
Allowing two hours for the approach-passage through 
the danger zone, one and a half hours for the attack, 
and two hours for the retirement (to be completed 
half an hour before sunrise), it follows that the maxi- 
mum number of after-sunset hours available for the 
open sea passage would amount to five. That was the 
best possible condition for us, but could only be uti- 
lised if high water occurred about four hours before 
sunrise. If high tide occurred any later our time of 
arrival would necessarily be later and our retirement 
could not be completed before daylight. If high tide 
occurred any earlier our time of arrival must be 
earlier, in which case there would be less dark hours 
available for our open sea passage on the way across. 
The length of the open sea passage would be approxi- 
mately six hours. Thus even on the most favourable 
date, some of the open sea passage would have to be 
made in broad daylight. Six days before that (the 
tide being five hours earlier) the whole of the open sea 



KEENNESS OF THE MEN 135 

passage would have to be made in daylight, only the 
approach-passage, i.e., the last two hours of the whole 
trip, taking place after sunset. 

A rather complicated set of conditions, astronom- 
ical, tidal, and meteorological, was thus required. 

It was almost too much to expect that everything 
would be favourable during the possible period; it is 
practically certain that a commander who refused to 
move until all conditions were exactly as desired 
would never accomplish anything. Nevertheless we 
sincerely hoped that fortune would be kind to us. 

The men were kept informed of the chances as 
forecast from the current weather conditions; their 
eagerness for favourable predictions was manifest. 
There is much advantage to be gained by a com- 
mander taking his men into his confidence. In this 
particular case the men realised that leakage of in- 
formation would entail disaster; that was sufficient 
to ensure that the confidence would be respected ; the 
rigorous censorship was there to make doubly certain. 
It is always more irksome for those who wait in ig- 
norance than for those who know the reasons for 
delay. So after prayers each morning the latest fore- 
cast was divulged, other items of interest were made 
known, and the keenness of the men was maintained. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS. THE TIME FACTOR 

THE work of drafting, reproducing, and dis- 
tributing the necessary orders and instruc- 
tions to the large number of craft concerned 
was not so simple as it may sound. The amount of 
instructions required in an operation of this sort can 
only be appreciated by those who have had experience 
of staff work during war. The command to "carry 
on" is only applicable when the means have been 
provided and the manner of its use has been made 
known. 

To mention a few of the items: Separate orders 
for the oversea voyage were required for each squad- 
ron destined to make the passage independently of 
the remainder. Others were needed for the voyage 
of the main force, others to cover the aerial attacks 
and the long-range bombardments. The supporting 
squadrons must have their instructions. Still further 
orders were designed to deal with the period of "ap- 
proach." Then there were those for the main attack 
on the Mole, for the demolition work, for the destruc- 
tion of the railway viaduct, and for the proceedings 
of the artificial-fog craft ; also those for the blockships 
and the rescue work. The retirement required its own 
share. Even now we have not mentioned those de- 
signed to meet possible eventualities, such as en- 
countering enemy vessels en route, or returning to 
harbour if postponement of the enterprise was nee- 
essary. 



SYNCHRONISING THE EVENTS 137 

Having decided where and how things should be 
done, the remaining question was when they should 
take place. The operation with its various phases and 
diversions could not be carried out on the go-as-you- 
please principle. Every item needed to be carefully 
fitted in to suit the remainder. The timing of each 
event was of paramount importance. A long-range 
bombardment or an aerial attack, if delayed, might 
destroy our own vessels. The blowing up of the via- 
duct was calculated to render hors de combat all human 
beings within a certain distance — our own men on 
the Mole must not be endangered by it. It would be 
useless for the blockships to arrive before the fire of 
the Mole batteries had been suitably diverted. Aerial 
bombers flying at a hundred miles per hour could not 
accompany the ships steaming at about one-tenth of 
that speed. The line of fire from the bombarding 
vessels could not very well coincide with our approach 
course, hence the necessity for the monitors to take 
up independent positions. And so on. How could a 
satisfactory synchronisation of events be arranged? 
— that was the problem. 

There were only two methods to consider: firstly, 
that of centralised command by signal ; secondly, that 
of working in accordance with a prearranged time 
table. 

The former method was obviously impracticable. 
Signals passed by either the wireless or visual method, 
during the approach, would make our presence known 
to the enemy and thus preclude all chance of taking 
the latter by surprise. After the attack had com- 
menced signals would be impracticable for obvious 
reasons, chief amongst them being the deafening noise 



138 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

and the presence of artificial fog. So direction by 
signal could be ruled out. 

Recourse was had to the time-table method. A 
table was made out showing the exact times (by 
clock) that the main force was to pass through various 
positions and to arrive at the several destinations. 
All other movements were to synchronise according 
to plan. The time table naturally varied for each day 
according to the projected time of arrival of the block- 
ships, this, in turn, depending on the time of high tide. 
But that was not all. It was necessary to guard 
against unexpected delays due to accident, and 
against vagaries of the tidal stream. Every unit 
should know, at a late stage of the oversea trip, if the 
blockships were likely to be late or early, and the 
probable difference between actual and projected 
time involved. 

We would not be satisfied with the degree of punc- 
tuality usually associated with certain railways. A 
few minutes out, one way or the other, might be 
serious; an error of half an hour would probably be 
disastrous. But the oversea passage involved a jour- 
ney of approximately a hundred miles for the block- 
ships and storming vessels, though rather less for the 
Dover contingents. That fact, combined with the 
usual unwieldiness of a fleet comprising over one 
hundred and fifty vessels, was not likely to render 
punctuality very easy of attainment. The disadvan- 
tages of daylight made it inadvisable to leave our 
bases extra early for the sake of having plenty of time 
to spare. Careful calculations were necessary and the 
resulting time table was circulated to all concerned. 

Before leaving this consideration of the timing 



THE TIMING QUESTION 139 

question it may be of interest to mention that the 
storming vessels were to be twenty minutes ahead of 
the Zeebrugge blockships on arrival in the vicinity of 
the Mole. In that twenty minutes we were to get 
alongside and land the storming parties; the latter 
were to take the necessary steps to put the batteries 
out of action as far as the safety of the blockships was 
concerned. At the expiration of the twenty minutes 
the blockships were to pass round the end of the Mole 
and make their dash for the canal entrance. The 
reader may wonder why twenty minutes was the 
chosen interval. Too long a time might allow the 
German defences to recover from the initial surprise ; 
too short a time might not enable the storming ves- 
sels to complete their work before the blockships were 
seen by the enemy. Twenty minutes, short though it 
was, was chosen as a compromise. 

All this operational staff work was carried out at 
Dover under the direction of the Vice-Admiral, who, 
as previously stated, was already overloaded with 
duties and responsibilities arising from the work of 
the Dover Patrol. 

The office accommodation was hardly palatial; the 
building might certainly have been satisfactory as a 
small apartment house in pre-war days, but, as the 
Admiral's office of our busiest naval command outside 
the Grand Fleet, it was not quite up to standard. 
The small staff were pretty busy for a few weeks. 
Meals were either bolted down or missed. The night 
hours did not bring over-much sleep. 

Visits to the Grand Fleet were also necessary; one 
grudged the hours spent in the train. Conferences 
and discussions, visits to the ships fitting out at the 



140 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

dockyards, inspection of special material, trials of the 
artificial fog, and the above-mentioned expenditure 
of stationery helped to keep one occupied. Occa- 
sional aerial trips assisted to clear away the cobwebs 
from one's brain; they constituted a first-class tonic. 

We had no printing-press. All orders had to be 
typed and reproduced by a duplicating machine. 
Secrecy was as essential in this work as elsewhere; 
information had to be confined to the minimum num- 
ber of persons. The ordinary office staff had all the 
Dover Patrol work to attend to; that was as heavy as 
it was unceasing. It was a new experience to turn the 
handle of the duplicator, and, in shirt-sleeve garb, to 
chp up the pages. We obtained the assistance of a 
civilian clerk from the Admiralty, and I vow that in- 
dividual discovered the real meaning of "overtime"; 
incidentally he was a very rapid and accurate worker 
and helped us enormously. 

At last the office work was more or less completed. 
Improvements were thought out from time to time 
and had to be embodied, even up to the eleventh 
hour. That was natural enough, seeing that we had 
very little previous experience to guide us in the de- 
tailed planning of the Mole attack and blockship 
work. It was a great relief when the paper work was 
finished; those of us who had other business in hand 
could then turn our attention to preparations of a 
more material nature, much of which has already 
been described. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE FIRST ATTEMPT. THE RETURN TO HARBOUR 

THE first period, during which the tidal and 
astronomical conditions would be favourable, 
approached. The period was limited to about 
half a dozen days for the reasons stated in a previous 
chapter. The weather looked ominous; none of us 
were very hopeful of an early start. Those last few 
days of waiting were rather trying. So many things 
might happen to prevent the operation from taking 
place. Some of us were inclined to be apprehensive, 
not of the result if we once came to grips with the 
enemy, but of the operation being cancelled, or of its 
being indefinitely postponed, which generally means 
the same thing. Another great attack on the Belgian 
coast had previously been planned and prepared, but 
had never come off. I hesitate to think of the effect 
on the general morale of the personnel if our enter- 
prise had suffered the same fate. Disappointment 
is hard enough to bear at any time, but on such an 
occasion as this it would have just about broken one's 
heart. 

On the eve of the first day of the first period our 
anxiety about the weather was tremendous. The 
wind blew hard that night. The morning had nearly 
dawned before some of us could make ourselves realise 
that looking at the weather would not do any good. 
We endeavoured not to offend it by saying unkind 
words. We touched wood many times when we gave 



142 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

vent to our hopes bred of optimism. Patience is a 
virtue indeed. But the first day was obviously un- 
favourable, so we commenced to wait for the second. 

At last there was a decided improvement. A state 
of readiness was ordered. The wind had fallen very 
light and we were as hopeful as we were anxious to be 
"up and doing." The order to raise steam was next 
received and followed shortly after by the order to 
"carry on" as previously laid down in the time table. 
All was bustle then. Unnecessary baggage was tran- 
shipped to a harbour vessel against the day when some 
of us might require it. In due course the final arrange- 
ments were made and we shortened in our cables. 
Then we weighed anchors and started off. The offi- 
cers and men of Hindustan cheered us vigorously; 
answering cheers were given as we steamed close past 
her. Vindictive and the blockships all cheered each 
other, enthusiasm was in the air. Thank goodness we 
were off at last. Thank goodness, also, that nothing 
had occurred to prevent our showing what we could 
do. Those were the thoughts uppermost in our minds. 

Iris and Dafodil were sent on ahead so that Vin- 
dictive could take them in tow when we were clear 
of the shoals. It will be remembered that Iris and 
Daffodil did not possess a high degree of steaming 
power, either in the way of speed or reliability. 

It had, therefore, been decided that Vindictive 
should tow both these vessels across the sea until in 
the near vicinity of Zeebrugge Mole ; that would help 
to ensure their arrival. I read afterwards in one ac- 
count of this affair that Iris and Daffodil towed 
Vindictive into action! 

The squadron formed into " line ahead " in the order 



CARRY ON 143 

Vindictive, Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant, and 
Sirius. The wind was blowing rather weakly, but 
from a favourable direction. The sea was very calm 
and, altogether, conditions appeared to be most prom- 
ising. There were no glum faces in our little commu- 
nity just then. As soon as we had cleared the shoals 
we all stopped for a few minutes while Vindictive took 
Iris and Daffodil in tow; that accomplished, we set 
course for Rendezvous A, where we had to meet the 
Vice-Admiral and the remaining vessels from Dover. 
During our passage through the various channels 
between sandbanks we passed a large number of 
homeward-bound merchant ships. The contrast be- 
tween them and our vessels was not merely confined 
to the matter of appearance. 

Each of these merchant ships was just completing 
a successful operation, namely, that of bringing neces- 
sities of life to this country after running the gantlet 
of the enemy submarines and mines. On the other 
hand, we were just setting out for the purpose of re- 
ducing such risks in the future. One could not help 
realising the fact that these mercantile mariners had 
risked their lives over and over again without osten- 
tation, with small hope of glory, with practically no 
reward. Fine fellows indeed ! What a debt of grati- 
tude we all owed them ! Some of them, doubtless, had 
been torpedoed three and four times, losing all their 
effects each time, but here they were again with yet 
another voyage to their credit. We overtook a few 
vessels outward bound with their troubles to come. 
Some of these ships were neutrals. We wondered 
what they thought of us and how they would describe 
us when they arrived at their destinations. We could 



144 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

reckon on the enemy having agents at all the neutral 
ports with their "ears well trimmed to the wind" 
when in the presence of neutral mariners from British 
ports. We also wondered if these neutrals could fail 
to recognise the difference between British and Ger- 
man treatment of merchantmen at sea, and whether 
such recognition would not make them chary of talk- 
ing too much. 

Presently we sighted a large number of small craft. 
They seemed to be dashing up from every direction, 
at first in an apparently aimless fashion, but presently 
one recognised the method in their madness. At 
schedule time we stopped, heading towards our goal. 
The crowd soon sorted themselves out. 

The Vice-Admiral with his flag flying in the de- 
stroyer Warwick took up a position of advantage. 
Destroyers and blockships took small motor craft 
in tow. Other vessels acted as tugs for the submarines. 
Motor launches, puffing for all the world as if they 
lacked training, thus acting an untruth, assembled 
according to their ultimate duties. Somebody re- 
marked that we resembled a sea-circus, there were so 
many turns taking place simultaneously. One hardly 
knew which to admire most. The destroyers throb- 
bing with latent energy, some of them shouting 
through their safety valves that they were in a hurry 
to get to business. The motor launches, pretending 
the sea was rough and often rolling heavily in their 
pretence, producing a similar impression to that of a 
certain famous automobile which, though cheap, 
always "gets there" even if some parts are missing 
at the end of the journey. The C.M.B.'s (which, be- 
ing interpreted, signifies Coastal Motor Boats, though 



THE SIGNAL TO PROCEED 145 

the word "coastal" hardly seems appropriate) were 
tearing through the water and almost leaping into 
the other element as if to emulate the flying-fish. 
Perhaps the word "crowd" was most suited to the 
appearance of this heterogeneous collection of craft, 
but they were very different from a crowd in their 
behaviour. 

Punctually at the scheduled hour the signal was 
hoisted to proceed. The expedition, making its debut 
as such, set course for the eastward. Enthusiasm was 
at its highest pitch. Final preparations were then the 
order of the day. In Vindictive emergency rations and 
field dressings were distributed. Small arms were 
inspected, ammunition was stowed ready for use. 
Demolition charges were placed in a handy position 
for rapid removal to the Mole, gangways were triced 
up, bombs were fused, howitzers and flame-throwers 
were prepared. Hoses were flaked down for fire bri- 
gade uses, fire extinguishers were provided in spe- 
cially dangerous corners, duplicate charts were 
placed in the conning tower. To guard against the 
eventuality of all the navigating personnel being 
rendered hors de combat during the fight or the charts 
being destroyed, the retirement courses were painted 
up on the armour inside the conning tower. A year 
later I found this painting untouched, although the 
ship had been in the Germans' hands (after being sunk 
by us at Ostende in May, 191 8) for many months — 
I wondered if they understood its signification. All 
the other craft in company were equally busy. 

We passed through further rendezvous, B and C 
and D, etc., carefully checking our progress at each 
so as to ensure working to the time table. 



146 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

The bombarding and supporting squadrons had 
proceeded independently. We were accompanied by 
aircraft during the dayhght hours of our passage; 
their special duty was that of scouting for German 
aircraft and preventing those that might have seen 
us from giving any warning of our approach. 

The wind gradually became very fitful and made us 
rather apprehensive of its changing to an unsuitable 
direction. Surely we were not to be robbed of our 
long-awaited opportunity at the eleventh hour. Day- 
light faded into twilight and the latter gave way to 
darkness. It was a clear night, but as black as india 
ink. Presently a distant flash of light was seen away 
to starboard. Then another and another. A compass 
bearing laid from our charted position gave evidence 
of something happening at Ostende. Then searchlight 
beams were seen searching the heavens in an uneasy 
manner. What could it mean? A hurried glance at 
the time table explained everything. 

Our aircraft had opened the ball. The booming of 
guns was heard quite plainly and the glare of the 
flashes was distinctly visible. Zeebrugge then joined 
in the game. In a little while we could make out the 
trail of the "flaming onions," rushing heavenwards, 
hanging stationary for a few seconds, and then slowly 
falling in their curiously serpentine manner, for all 
the world like colossal snakes writhing in their death 
agony. The firing became more intense and we were 
more anxious than ever to get to work. It was obvious 
enough that our aircraft — the 65th Wing of the Royal 
Air Force from Dunkerque — were setting about 
the enemy in determined fashion. Our turn was to 
come shortly, according to plan. Alas, "the best laid 



A DIFFICULT DECISION 147 

schemes of mice and men gang aft agley." We had 
stopped to disembark the surplus blockship crews — 
if they could be found, and to slip the small craft from 
their towing hawsers in readiness to penetrate the 
danger zone. The wind seemed to have died away for 
a moment and then commenced to blow from a 
southerly direction. 

Seldom has an admiral been faced with such a dif- 
ficult situation. A decision had to be given, and 
quickly. The nature of the operation admitted of no 
delay. The wind at the moment was hopelessly un- 
favourable for our use of artificial fog. The latter was 
essential. It would mean sheer slaughter if there were 
no cover from the shore batteries during the approach. 
On the other hand, the wind might change again. 
Here was the whole expedition within a short distance 
of our objectives. The major part of the passage had 
been completed in spite of all the difficulties and prac- 
tically without incident. The aerial attack had com- 
menced. The monitors were shortly to send their 
messages of destruction hurtling on their way to the 
enemy. We had been seen by all sorts of neutral ves- 
sels. Most of the conditions were favourable — the 
wind alone was seriously against us. Another chance 
might never come. He who risks nothing attains noth- 
ing. Discretion is the better part of valour. What 
was it to be? 

In all the pages of naval history I cannot remember 
having come across any occasion where a more diffi- 
cult decision had to be made. After Teneriffe Nelson 
had reahsed his mistake of allowing impetuosity to 
influence sound reasoning to the extent of attacking 
when the conditions were unfavourable. Not only 



148 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

was that first attack a failure, but it had foredoomed 
the second attempt to failure also. The Vice-Admiral 
avoided the same mistake — he ordered the operation 
to be cancelled for that night. Much has been writ- 
ten of the attack which eventually took place. Refer- 
ences to the Nelson touch have not been unknown. 
But this latter comparison, as I have shown, was 
curiously inapt if intended to cover the whole direc- 
tion of the enterprise. 

There was no time for feelings of disappointment. 
We had to return at utmost speed so as to be ready 
to start again next day if the conditions allowed. Our 
bases lay many miles to the westward, but we were 
heading in an easterly direction. "Course West" was 
signalled immediately. Vindictive held the honoured 
post of "Guide of the Fleet." Complete instructions 
had been laid down for turning round at night. It 
must be remembered that we had seventy-seven craft 
in close, very close, company. We duly turned round, 
hoping that all craft had received the signal. Our 
hopes were not entirely realised. In a few moments 
the close company became too close for comfort. 
Small craft shaved across our bows so narrowly that 
they left the impression of having gone through us. 
Shouts were heard, mingled with the puffing and 
spluttering of internal-combustion engines. We won- 
dered which particular vessel we should sink first. 
But out of chaos came some semblance of order and 
presently we were homeward bound without any very 
serious casualties. 

Away in the distance there were occasional gun and 
searchlight flashes, but the monitors had received the 
cancellation news in time to preserve their silence. 



VALUE OF THE ATTEMPT 149 

During the turn to the westward one of the small 
craft, in imminent danger of collision, had momen- 
tarily switched on her navigation lights. Others fol- 
lowed suit until our force resembled Brighton Es- 
planade indulging in a Venetian fete as viewed from 
the sea. "Out Lights" was immediately ordered and 
passed from one craft to another by megaphone or 
flash-lamp; darkness reigned once more as we sped 
homeward. Although we had shown a blaze of lights, 
the enemy patrols, we heard afterwards, failed to see 
us ; this was scarcely a token of their efficiency. 

So it was a case of " if at first you don't succeed, 
try, try again." This abortive attempt was by no 
means without value. We had rehearsed the concen- 
tration and the oversea passage of the main force ; 
the other vessels had practised reaching their various 
destinations; the aircraft had carried out their at- 
tack; the routes and navigational aids had been 
severely tested. Naturally enough much valuable ex- 
perience had been gained and, after all, no harm had 
resulted provided that the enemy remained ignorant 
of our efforts and intentions. But certain incidents 
had occurred to increase our reliance on the small 
craft. During the turn to the westward disentangle- 
ment without serious accident was only achieved as a 
result of fine seamanship and initiative on the part of 
those in command ; these qualities had thus been evi- 
denced under most realistic and difficult conditions. 
We felt that, if they could deal successfully with such 
a situation as thaty they could be relied upon to tackle 
any situation, however difficult or unexpected. 

A couple of incidents that occurred may illustrate 
the point. During the turning manoeuvre one of the 



I50 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

coastal motor boats received a heavy blow In the 
bows from another craft. A hole resulted and the 
water commenced to pour through it. She would 
probably have sunk in a minute or two but for the 
resource of her commanding officer. He ordered one 
of the men to sit in the hole. This reduced the inflow 
of water, but can hardly have been a comfortable pro- 
ceeding for the individual concerned. The boat was 
then worked up to high speed. The reader probably 
knows that the bow of one of these fast motor boats 
gradually raises itself as speed is increased until the 
fore part of the boat is completely clear of the water. 
In this case the hole was above the sea when twenty- 
seven knots had been attained. The man who had 
found a new use for his anatomy then withdrew him- 
self. Whether the commanding officer of the boat 
desired to remain with the guide of the fleet out of 
sheer friendship or whether he was uncertain of his 
geographical position, I know not. But he evidently 
decided to remain in company. Vindictive was steam- 
ing at a modest ten knots or so; the motor boat could 
not afford to proceed at less than twenty-seven knots ; 
so he steamed round and round the remaining 
seventy-six vessels until daylight, when he was de- 
tached to his base. 

Another coastal motor boat, soon after leaving 
Dover on the outward trip, developed some defect 
which put the engines out of action. The young officer 
in command obtained the services of a trawler to tow 
him back to Dover, where, on arrival, he had the mat- 
ter put right. All that took time. He started off again 
about five hours late. Now, the occupants of this boat 
had no intention of missing the affair for which they 



A BELATED MOTOR BOAT 151 

had prepared so long. They decided to get to Zee- 
brugge as soon as possible — at full speed they might 
yet be in time. So at full speed they went, straight 
as a die for their goal, right across nets, mines, and 
shoals. The sixty miles were covered in less than two 
hours. The aerial attack was in full swing. Search- 
light beams were passing dangerously near them, the 
heavens were filled with bursting shell and flaming 
onions. Suddenly out of the darkness loomed some 
black shapes — "Houses ahead!" shouted somebody. 
"Hard-a-starboard and stop her!" As she turned 
round to seaward they made out the town of Blanken- 
berghe ; they had escaped running ashore by the nar- 
rowest of margins. 

On they went again for Zeebrugge Mole. Things 
were quieter now. That was strange in itself. What 
had happened to the long-range bombardment .? Where 
were the smoke screens and why was nothing happen- 
ing at the Mole? Our ships must be much overdue. 
Whatever could it mean? Presently some strange 
craft were seen and a moment later the motor boat 
was under fire. So she sheered off and the command- 
ing officer did some hard thinking. There was only one 
possible explanation — the operation must have been 
postponed. So the next item on her programme was 
to return to Dover. It wouldn't do to be late getting 
back, so away they went — hell for leather — straight 
across everything once more. And they arrived back 
at Dover, after having completed the whole voyage 
both ways, before their confreres who were with the 
main force ! 

At dawn we had completed most of the open-sea 
passage on the return journey. The force split up — 
the various units deconcentrated. 



152 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Vindictive and her old friends returned to her home 
of the last few weeks. The Hindustanis enthusiasm 
of the day before gave place to curiosity. The former 
positions in the anchorage were reoccupied. Coaling 
was then the order of the day; not a moment was to 
be wasted; with luck we might start again before 
nightfall. 

But it was not to be. The conditions were hopeless 
and perhaps that was all for the best. We needed 
some rest. As soon as everything was in readiness for 
the second attempt, we piped down and then, for the 
first time, we had a chance to talk things over. 

It would be untrue to say that we were not dis- 
appointed. The fear of indefinite postponement was 
now much stronger. But everybody realised to the 
full that the chances of success under adverse condi- 
tions were practically nil. Discussion paved the way 
to many suggestions of improvement — at any rate, 
we intended to derive what benefit we could from the 
abortive attempt. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE SECOND ATTEMPT AND RETURN. PREPARING FOR 
THE THIRD ATTEMPT. REWRITING THE ORDERS. 
GERMAN OPTIMISM 

I WILL not weary the reader with a repetition of 
our life at the Swin — the second edition differed 
little from the first. There were still chances of a 
new start during the present period. The weather, 
however, was most unkind. We summoned up all the 
patience that we could muster. The news from the 
battle front in France was becoming increasingly 
serious. We felt that somehow or other, we didn't 
quite know how, a successful operation on our part 
might help to stem the German advance. If only we 
could get started ! 

At last our second chance came. The wind had 
changed back to a northerly direction. The "stand- 
by" order was received. "Carry on" followed. Once 
again we started off, as enthusiastic as ever; if our 
previous determination had not increased it was be- 
cause no increase was possible. 

Hindustan cheered us out again, and, in our inmost 
thoughts, we thanked them. Soon after we had cleared 
the Swin anchorage a destroyer hove in sight and 
signalled that she had a letter for Vindictive. We or- 
dered her to stop a couple of miles ahead of us and 
transfer the letter by boat. Commander Brock came 
on board with it ; we had thought he had been pre- 
vented from joining us. "We must push in to-night," 



154 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

that was the tenor of the letter. The message was 
passed round the ship and down the Hne of blockships. 
It reflected our own feelings — "We must push in 
to-night." Once again we passed many merchant 
vessels with their crews crowded on deck to view the 
unusual spectacle which we made. The wind had 
gradually increased in strength, an uncomfortable sea 
was rising. The prospects appeared none too rosy for 
the small craft. Some twenty miles had been covered 
when the almost inevitable became a certainty — the 
operation was once more postponed. 

The open sea had become so rough as to render the 
use of small craft quite impracticable. There was 
nothing for it, back we had to go once more. 

Little enough was said on the subject this time; 
we were learning to hide disappointment. The reac- 
tion from all our hopeful optimism caused us to won- 
der if any other chance would be offered us. Surely 
this enterprise was not to be stillborn after all the 
signs of life that it had shown. It is advisable, per- 
haps, not to analyse our thoughts too fully, but they 
tended to breed fatalism. We tried to look upon the 
turn of events as a "rub of the green"; we endeav- 
oured to appear unruffled. 

The men were wonderful; their behaviour was be- 
yond praise. If there was any discontent it was care- 
fully hidden. The Vice-Admiral visited us at the 
earliest opportunity and explained the situation to 
the officers and men. That gracious act was enor- 
mously appreciated ; we all felt, more than ever, that 
if he could not bring off this operation nobody would 
ever do so. 

The first period of favourable tides was over. The 



LESSONS OF FIRST ATTEMPT 155 

next period would not commence yet awhile. Drills 
and practices were restarted. A second battleship 
was sent to the Swin to relieve the congestion in the 
Hindustan. Vindictive, Iris, and Dafodil had no ac- 
commodation for the Marine storming parties, which 
had to be transferred to the Hindustan and her sister 
depot. The waiting period was not wasted. 

Opportunity now offered for embodying in the in- 
structions the various suggestions for improvements. 
Each was fully discussed and considered from all 
points of view. Even further experiments with the 
artificial fog were carried out. It was then decided to 
rewrite all the previous instructions which required 
modification as a result of the experience gained dur- 
ing the two attempts. This was a welcome change 
from the confined life on board. The Admiralty clerk 
reappeared at the Admiral's office. 

A most important discussion was held concerning 
the chances of the secret having leaked out. At first 
sight one might have thought that the operation ought 
to be cancelled altogether, for had we not been seen, 
and almost certainly reported, by a large number of 
neutral vessels ? Such an eventuality was by no means 
outside the pale of probability, and we also had to 
reckon with the chances of having been seen by 
German aircraft and submarines. Nevertheless, this 
obstacle to our future success was imaginary rather 
than real. To begin with, what value would have been 
placed on such reports.? It would naturally depend 
upon the source of the information. 

Submarines or aircraft might have been mistaken; 
anyhow, their reports could hardly provide conclusive 
evidence of our intentions. Information received by 



iS6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the Germans from neutral sources might have been 
specially intended to mislead. The probable effect of 
such latter "intelligence" depends to a certain extent 
on the psychology of the recipient. The Germans 
were past-masters at chicanery; the first inclination 
of such individuals is to disbelieve others ; a prevari- 
cator always labours under that disadvantage. 

There could, therefore, be no certainty that our two 
abortive attempts had given birth to a new obstacle. 
History relates many failures resulting from the 
imagination of difficulties which had no real existence 
in fact. One of the best examples, curiously enough, 
was connected with the Walcheren expedition, where 
the imaginary difficulties had loomed large, only a few 
miles to the eastward of Zeebrugge. It is no exaggera- 
tion to state that if we had allowed our imagination 
to create half the obstacles which might have existed 
we should never have decided upon the enterprise at 
all. 

The drafting, typing, duplication, and distribution 
of the new editions of instructions were completed in 
two or three days. The dates of the next period were 
worked out and a new time table issued. 

It has already been shown that the chances of being 
discovered en route largely depended upon the number 
of daylight hours which would be involved in the 
passage of the expedition. Daylight, in itself, does 
not necessarily imply a high degree of visibility. If 
the weather were sufficiently misty to reduce visi- 
bility, without militating against safe navigation, 
daylight would not be so disadvantageous. In making 
out the period, therefore, we included an extra day at 
its commencement for use if misty weather obtained ; 



THEIR LORDSHIPS' VISIT 157 

should that day be clear it would be inadvisable to 
attempt the enterprise. That decision was strictly 
in accordance with the principles on which the enter- 
prise was based. But principles are intended as 
guides; it is a false idea that they may never be de- 
parted from. In an operation of this description, de- 
pending upon a rather delicate combination of cir- 
cumstances and conditions, it was necessary to con- 
sider just how far we should be justified in ignoring 
one unsuitable condition if all others were favourable. 

Once more we sunmioned up all the patience that 
we could muster. 

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, 
accompanied by Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, who had re-, 
lieved Lord Jellicoe as First Sea Lord, paid a visit to 
Vindictive and some of the blockships ; it is probable 
that they were exceedingly struck at the optimism of 
all concerned. 

An incident, illustrating the spirit of the men, may 
be worth recording. It came to my ears that certain 
of the engine-room personnel did not propose to re- 
main below whilst the ship was alongside the Mole; 
as they put it "they intended to land on the Mole for 
a run round." Of course, that would never do, so the 
ship's company were informed that, however much 
their spirits might actuate their intentions, any man 
who left his post during the action would be summa- 
rily dealt with. They knew what that meant. Shortly 
afterwards some stokers requested to interview their 
officer. The interview was somewhat as follows: 
"Me and my mates, sir, understand that we ain't 
allowed to leave the stokehold and have a go at the 
Hun," said their spokesman. "Of course not," inter- 



158 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

posed the officer; "you would be deserting your post 
in action." "Well, sir," continued the stoker, "we 
wants to know if we may guard the prisoners in the 
stokehold." The request was not granted; it spelt too 
much discomfort for the prisoners. 

Soon the first possible date drew near. 

In view of the eventual results it may be of interest 
to recall the fact that on April 19th (three days before 
we actually started) Admiral von Capelle, Secre- 
tary for the German Navy, made a speech in which he 
said: "Even the greatest pessimist must say that the 
position of our opponents is deteriorating rapidly, 
and that any doubt regarding the final success of the 
U-boat war is unjustified." 

I wonder if von Capelle remained an optimist much 
longer. 

Another German of high culture and position had 
previously said, "Questions of right or wrong, justi- 
fication or no justification, do not concern us. The 
chief thing is that we are the stronger, and that if 
anyone questions this fact we should smite him on the 
mouth till he grows wiser." 

Well, we did question the fact, and not only ques- 
tioned it, but we put it to the test. 



PART 11 



*'Oiie crowded hour of glorious life 
is worth an age without a name'* 



FOREWORD 

A BRIEF introduction to Part II of this book 
may assist the reader. The previous chapters 
have dealt with the general idea of the 
operation, the more important details of the plan, and 
the preparatory work involved. 

We are now approaching the actual events which 
occurred during the operation itself as carried out at 
the third attempt. 

For reasons stated in Part I, Chapter III, I do not 
propose to deal further with the enterprise at Ostende; 
the preparatory work for the blocking of that place 
has been fairly well covered in the foregoing pages. 
As a matter of historical interest a list of all vessels 
employed in the simultaneous operations at Zee- 
brugge and Ostende is given in the Appendix. Doubt- 
less the Ostende story will be told in due course by 
one of those who took part in the operations at that 
place. 

Unless the reader's mind has clearly grasped our 
intentions as portrayed in the Zeebrugge plan it may 
be difficult to understand the connection between the 
actual events which occurred. The more important 
details of the plan have already been described, but 
chiefly under the consideration of each separate phase 
of the enterprise, or of the duties of each class of ves- 
sel, rather than as related items of one complete 
operation. It may be advisable, therefore, to describe 
briefly the various phases, in their proper sequence. 



i62 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

showing the relation between them, even if this in- 
volves some repetition ; thus the way will be paved to 
a detailed narrative of the several events which oc- 
curred, and the reader, whilst following any particular 
item, will be enabled to keep the whole picture in 
view. 

Briefly, then, the main points of the plan for the 
blocking of Zeebrugge were as follows : 

The expedition was to cross the seas during the 
afternoon and evening, stopping for a few minutes 
about twenty miles from its destination for the pur- 
pose of disembarking the surplus crews of the block- 
ships. At about this time the first of the diversions, 
in the form of aerial attacks, were to commence, to be 
shortly followed by the opening of the long-range 
bombardments. Meanwhile the expedition, working 
to a prearranged time table, was to approach the 
coast. 

At given intervals during the approach small craft 
were to be detached to carry out the duties of smoke 
screening, of diversionary attacks, of locating the 
destination, and of dealing with enemy vessels which 
might emerge from their harbours or which were 
already at sea. 

Immediately following the long-range bombard- 
ment, the storming vessels, having located the Mole, 
were to proceed alongside the high outer wall and 
land their storming parties over it to attack the Mole 
batteries — this constituting the main diversion of 
the enterprise. A few minutes later, the submarines, 
having steamed into place beneath the railway via- 
duct, were to blow up the railway. Twenty minutes 
after the storming vessels were due to arrive along- 



FOREWORD 163 

side, the blockshlps were to pass round the end of the 
Mole and were to make their dash for the canal en- 
trance, running the gantlet of the shore batteries, 
whilst the Mole attack was in full swing. On arriving 
in the canal the blockers were to turn and sink their 
ships across the navigable channel. Rescue craft 
were to follow the blockships for the purpose of rescu- 
ing the crews of the latter. Meanwhile, the various 
diversions, the smoke screening, and the work of the 
inshore supports, were to be continued sufficiently 
long to enhance the chances of the rescue. After an 
hour or so from the commencement of the attack on 
the Mole all forces were to withdraw. 

The foregoing brief summary serves to indicate 
that at any given moment after the approach had 
once commenced there would be many different events 
taking place simultaneously. 

For instance, early in the proceedings there would 
be a combined aerial attack and long-range bom- 
bardment whilst the main expedition, under cover 
of darkness, was silently approaching over the mine- 
fields, momentarily expectant of discovery by the 
enemy's patrol vessels. 

Later — say, ten minutes after the storming ves- 
sels had arrived at the Mole — the storming parties 
from Vindictive y Iris, and Daffodil would be attacking 
the northeastern end of the Mole; Vindictive^ s how- 
itzers would be bombarding the shore batteries; 
small craft would be bombing the central part of the 
Mole; submarines would be blowing up the railway 
viaduct ; the submarine's crews would be pulling away 
for dear life; other small craft would be laying their 
smoke screens close off the enemy's batteries and 



i64 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

attacking German vessels on the inner side of the 
Mole; the blockships would be nearing the Mole in 
preparation for their final dash; patrol vessels, in 
support, would be guarding the attackers from enemy- 
craft; star shell and search-lights would be illuminat- 
ing the darkness; the booming of heavy guns, the 
yapping of quick-firers, and the crashing of shell 
would provide a fitting accompaniment. 

The enterprise was to be decidedly intensive. If 
all went well the defence should certainly be mysti- 
fied and not a little worried by the time the blockships 
arrived in the picture. 

Thus, and thus only, should we be following out 
the maxim of Stonewall Jackson, "Always mystify, 
mislead, and surprise the enemy." 

The enterprise divides itself naturally into three 
main phases, namely, the Approach, the Attack, and 
the Retirement; as far as practicable Part II will de- 
scribe each of these phases in turn, whilst dealing 
more or less separately with the work of each class 
of vessel. 



CHAPTER I 

THE START. THE OVERSEA PASSAGE 

THE break of dawn on April 22, 191 8, the 
first of the seven days of our tabulated period, 
found many anxious individuals on deck 
discussing the chances. There was an almost entire 
absence of wind ; the sea was consequently as smooth 
as the proverbial mill-pond. The general feeling 
amongst us was that of straining-at-the-leash. We 
had suffered two major disappointments during the 
previous period, but we instinctively felt that we had 
now arrived at a period of maximum anxiety — we 
knew that the coming week would settle the matter 
once and for all. Presently light airs from the north- 
ward began to catspaw the glassy surface and to in- 
crease in frequency and strength until they settled 
down to a real northerly breeze. Our hopes ran high, 
but the matter of visibility still claimed our atten- 
tion. There was the usual early morning mist; this 
was quickly dispelled when the sun rose above the 
horizon. It soon became evident that our hopes for 
misty weather were to be denied us. By 8 a.m. the 
visibility was extreme, as they say in meteorological 
circles; one's horizontal range of vision from ship- 
board was only limited by one's height of eye above 
the level of the sea. This condition, to say the least 
of it, was disconcerting. 

It would be high tide at Zeebrugge and Ostende 
soon after midnight. Arrival at such an hour would 



i66 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

entail making much of the oversea passage in broad 
daylight, and this, as previously mentioned, would in 
turn lead to grave risk of being seen by the German 
patrols, whether the latter were in the air, on the sea 
surface, or submerged keeping periscope watch. Al- 
though this disadvantage might even lose us the ele- 
ment of surprise on which we had concentrated so 
much effort, any postponement of our departure until 
the morrow would entail a reduction of our avail- 
able perixDd by one-seventh. The armchair critic who 
knows nought of such matters cannot easily conceive 
either the difficulty of arriving at such decisions, or 
the weight of responsibility which lies on the shoulders 
of the man by whom the decision must be given. 

Early in the forenoon it was evident that all con- 
ditions except visibility were in favour of starting our 
third attempt. Our hopes ran high in spite of the 
fact that previous experience had shown us how 
fickle the weather could be. Somehow we felt that 
our chance had come at last. 

We were in telephonic communication with Dover 
via a lighthouse in the vicinity of our anchorage. 
Perhaps the word "communication" rather exag- 
gerates the actual facts of the case. The line appar- 
ently passed through a certain holiday resort whose 
telephone exchange was below par and whose opera- 
tive, in the kindness of her heart, generally managed 
to connect at least four persons simultaneously on 
our particular line. The resulting cross talk, further 
confused by the eternal argument between the tidal 
stream and the telephone cable, and our impatience 
at any and every interruption, with its resultant 
increase of knowledge of the vernacular to the light- 



ORDER TO START 167 

house crew, were hardly conducive to easy conversa- 
tion on important matters. "Harold" was particularly 
exasperating that morning. Having fixed "Mabel" 
for lunch in a couple of hours, he apparently thought 
it necessary to 'phone her details of his past. 

To the Vice-Admiral at Dover fell the responsibility 
of deciding whether we should start or not. After a 
discussion on the telephone the die was cast — we 
were ordered to "proceed in execution of previous 
orders." The order was passed to the ships and the 
requisite preparations were put in hand immediately. 
We raised steam without delay. Baggage, final let- 
ters, and all unnecessary paraphernalia were disem- 
barked. Once again determination and expectancy 
had expanded into enthusiasm. The time for "ac- 
tion" had arrived. 

I do not think we had any feelings of anxiety now 
except with regard to the weather. Surely nothing 
would prevent the culmination of all our hopes at 
this eleventh hour. No suggestion of failure ever 
occurred to us. Our confidence in the face of the many 
obstacles, when considered in cold blood months after- 
wards, may have seemed to be almost an imperti- 
nence. Everybody knew exactly what was expected 
of him. There was no actual excitement except 
that inseparable from intense enthusiasm. Last- 
minute orders or signals were not required, everything 
worked just as smoothly as if we had been merely 
starting off on a picnic. 

Engines were reported "ready" shortly after lunch. 
Just before weighing anchor I had gone below to don 
my sea-boots and other appropriate "togs"; on re- 
appearing on deck I found several ofiicers grouped for 



i68 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

a final snapshot and was requested to join them. 
Alas, that was indeed the last photograph for several 
of them. The cheering which had taken place on 
both the previous attempts was indulged in once 
again as the ships proceeded to sea and was only 
eclipsed by the cheers which welcomed the survivors 
to Dover on the following day. 

Of the earlier part of the oversea trip little need be 
written. Vindictive took Iris and Daffodil in tow and 
was closely followed by the blockships. In due course 
the Dover forces were sighted; the combined force, 
accompanied by aeroplanes, formed on Vindictive, 
which was "Guide of the Fleet." 

The fast motor boats and the two submarines were 
taken in tow, and the Vice-Admiral, with his flag 
flying in the Destroyer Warwick, directed the whole 
movements and gave the signal to proceed as soon as 
all were formed up. The visibility had already de- 
creased and sufficient clouds were massing overhead 
to revive our anxieties about the weather. Light 
squadrons which had preceded us for the various 
duties of "supporting" or "bombarding," etc., had 
not reported any enemy patrol craft. 

On board each ship eleventh-hour preparations 
were being made — such as rigging stations for at- 
tending the wounded, distributing first-aid packages, 
passing hoses along in case of fire, fusing bombs and 
shell, testing electric circuits, providing candle lamps 
in case of electrical failures, grouping ammunition 
round the guns, donning clean underclothing as a 
guard against septic wounds, darkening ship to pre- 
vent any warning of our approach, placing spare 
charts in alternative positions, testing smoke-screen 




VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROGER J. B. KEYES 
K.C.B., K.C.V.O.. D.S.O., R.N. 



ST. GEORGE FOR ENGLAND 169 

apparatus and flame-throwers, and many other such 
things . 

Before darkness set in a signal was received from 
the Vice-Admiral reading "St. George for England." 
It was reported to me as being a personal signal to 
myself, but I subsequently ascertained that it was in- 
tended as a general signal to be passed down the line 
of ships. It was made in the semaphore code from 
Warwick and has often been misquoted as a signal 
hoisted with alphabetical flags. 

One garbled version described the signal as having 
been "flashed to all ships just before reaching the 
Mole." This story of a flash-light having been used 
just when the ships were endeavouring to take the 
enemy by surprise under cover of darkness is really 
too fantastic to pass uncontradicted. Believing it to 
be a private signal, a reply was determined upon. 
The reply ^ to the Admiral's signal, judged by the 
ordinary standards, was somewhat impertinent, but 
impertinence was in the air that afternoon. Inciden- 
tally my signalman substituted the word "darned" 
for "damned" and, when corrected, spelt the word 
"dammed" as a compromise. 

Our prearranged time table had laid down the exact 
minute at which we were to pass through certain let- 
tered positions, the latter being marked by buoys 
placed by the surveying oflScers mentioned previously. 
Position G was to be the parting of the ways, namely 
the position at which the forces destined for the 
inshore attacks on Zeebrugge and Ostende should 
separate en route for their respective destinations. 
That position was so chosen that the forces should 

* May we give the Dragon's tail a damned good twist. 



170 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

arrive at their destinations simultaneously, making 
due allowance for direction and strength of the tidal 
stream and for actual ship-speed through the water. 
This idea of simultaneous operations at the two places 
was not the only important factor for consideration; 
it was also necessary that all other phases of the at- 
tack, such as long-range bombardments and aerial 
attacks, should synchronise with the movements of 
the blockships. It was, therefore, necessary to either 
work exactly to schedule as laid down in the time 
table or else inform all units of any change in the zero 
time ; the latter being the minute at which Vindictive 
should pass through position G. This in turn neces- 
sitated forecasting the zero time as a result of the 
observed times of passing the previous positions. We 
had left position A a few minutes ahead of time and 
passed through position D with barely a minute in 
hand. "No alteration of zero time" was therefore 
communicated to all units. 

After passing position D the whole assembly of 
vessels stopped for a few minutes for the triple pur- 
pose of disembarking surplus blockship crews, as- 
certaining the exact direction of wind (this informa- 
tion being required for the use of the smoke screens), 
and reforming into "approach order" after casting 
off the tow of the submarines and small craft. It was 
then pitch dark, the moon being entirely obscured 
by clouds. It has been stated elsewhere that the 
Intrepid did not disembark any of her surplus crews. 
The small vessel detailed to take these men failed to 
appear owing to a breakdown ; this must have pleased 
the Intrepid^s surplus crew who, it will be remem- 
bered, had shown a strong disinclination to leave their 



RAIN AND ITS RESULTS 171 

ship. To some extent Thetis and Iphigenia were 
similarly placed; history relates that when the small 
vessels arrived alongside many members of the surplus 
crews could not be found, so anxious were they to 
complete the operation which they had begun so well. 

No time was lost in reforming the squadron and 
we started off again for position G. At about this time 
all conditions of wind and sea were still favourable, 
but slight rain had begun to fall and to reduce the 
already very limited visibility. The rain thus pro- 
vided the first of the incidents which could not be 
foreseen. 

The result of the rain was twofold. Firstly, it 
somewhat delayed the commencement of the long- 
range bombardment on Zeebrugge owing to the re- 
duction in visibility rendering the monitor's position 
doubtful. Secondly, and far more important, it acted 
very adversely against the use of aircraft. The diffi- 
culty and danger of flying in wet weather is too well 
known to need enlargement here, but the difficulty 
of locating the positions which were to be bombed 
was enormously increased. As related elsewhere our 
aerial bombers had made a magnificent attack on the 
occasion of our first attempt and they had become 
none the less determined to render a good account of 
themselves when the operation finally took place. 
Imagine their intense disappointment. It was not 
difficult for those who knew the splendid work of our 
Air Force to realise that they would stop at nothing 
to achieve their object. In spite of all the difficulties 
it is impossible to conceive of greater determination 
than was shown, but the rain rendered the attack 
impossible. The losses amongst these very gallant 



172 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

airmen amounted to a high percentage of those who 
started on their errand. 

At position G the Ostende blockships parted com- 
pany; inwardly we wished them the best of luck. 

The main portion of the oversea passage having 
been completed, the "Approach" now commenced. 



CHAPTER II 

THE APPROACH 

AFTER zero time the remaining units kept in 
close company until such times as each, ac- 
cording to their respective instructions, was 
deputed to proceed independently to carry out its 
particular duty. 

The force was preceded by the Vice-Admiral in 
Warwick with some half a dozen other craft in com- 
pany ready to fall upon and destroy any enemy patrol 
vessels which might be encountered. We were now 
steaming through the German mined areas and were 
hoping against hope that no mines would be touched 
to the main detriment of the element of surprise. If 
any mine had exploded the enemy could not have 
failed to have their suspicions aroused. The rain 
gradually increased and the wind became more fitful. 

Hot soup was distributed to the men in Vindictive 
2it about 10.30 P.M. and a "tot" of rum was served 
out about an hour later to those who desired it. 

About fifty minutes before midnight the hawser 
with which Vindictive was towing Iris and Daffodil 
suddenly parted. It was then too late to retake these 
vessels in tow and, indeed, it would have been a diffi- 
cult and dangerous task in the rain and inky darkness 
with so many vessels in close company, to say nothing 
of the loss of time and the obstacle to accurate navi- 
gation. Speed had to be somewhat eased temporarily 
to allow Vindictive to drop back to her original posi- 



174 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

tion relative to the other vessels. In accordance with 
the plan the blockships eased speed for the purpose 
of arriving at the Mole some twenty minutes after 
Vindictive. 

We were momentarily expecting to meet the Ger- 
man patrol vessels and to be discovered from the 
shore. Suddenly a light-buoy was seen. A hurried 
bearing laid down on the chart agreed exactly with 
the reported position of a buoy off Blankenberghe. 
Incidentally a captured prisoner had recently stated 
that this buoy had been withdrawn or moved else- 
where, but we had promulgated its original position 
to all concerned because we suspected that this par- 
ticular individual was a disciple of Ananias. This 
agreement between our position by "dead-reckoning" 
and that of the buoy was decidedly heartening, for 
we had obtained no "fix" for several miles and were 
running through a cross tidal stream of doubtful 
strength. 

The difficulties attached to forecasting the move- 
ments of tidal streams were borne out in the case of 
the bombarding monitors, H.M.S. Erebus and Terror. 
In addition to being somewhat hampered by the low 
visibility resulting from the rain, these vessels, on 
arrival at their firing positions, discovered that the 
tidal stream was flowing in exactly the opposite direc- 
tion to that anticipated; this, in turn, caused some 
delay in opening fire, but, as events subsequently 
showed, the delay was of no great consequence. The 
bombardment was carried out without any further 
hitch. The Germans do not appear to have been able 
to locate the monitors until the firing was nearly com- 
pleted. The few German shell which burst in the 



IN TOUCH WITH THE ENEMY 175 

vicinity of the firing ships were doubtless directed by 
some means of sound- ranging and direction-finding. 
On finishing the bombardment the monitors took up 
their positions for covering the subsequent retirement 
of the attacking forces. 

It may be stated here that, barring the impossl- 
bihty of aerial attack, the delay in commencing the 
long-range bombardment, and the parting of the 
towing hawser, there was no hitch of any kind suffi- 
cient to alter the general idea of the enterprise. 
Everything was carried out to schedule time. 

Soon after passing the Blankenberghe light-buoy 
the enemy appeared to suspect that something more 
than a bombardment was afoot. Star shell were fired 
to seaward and searchlights were switched on. That 
was exactly what we had hoped for. If only they 
would continue to illuminate the atmosphere our 
navigational diflficulties would be enormously reduced. 
The star shell were extraordinary. They burst with a 
loud report just overhead and lit up our surroundings 
to the maximum of the then visibility. Much to our 
surprise no enemy vessels were encountered or even 
seen; presumably the enemy set the greater depend- 
ence on their mines. 

To the southward, that is, between us and the 
shore, our smoke-screeners had laid down a "pea- 
soup " fog. Nothing was to be seen in that direction 
except the glare of searchlights and of gun flashes, 
the latter being presumably directed against the fast 
motor boats which had run into the anchorage behind 
the Mole for the purpose of torpedoing vessels secured 
alongside. At this stage the wind died away com- 
pletely and the rain was heavier than ever. 



176 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

In Vindictive we took up our action stations. Our 
battery guns had been instructed not to open fire 
until it was certain that our individual presence had 
been discovered. The guns in the fighting-top on our 
foremast were in readiness to engage. Rocket men 
had been stationed to fire illuminating flares for the 
purpose of locating the Mole. The storming parties 
were under cover awaiting the order to storm the 
Mole. The cable party were in the forecastle standing 
by to drop anchor at the foot of the high wall. Other 
parties with wire hawsers were stationed to assist the 
Daffodil in her important task of pushing Vindictive 
bodily alongside. Crews were standing by the bomb- 
mortars and flame-throwers for clearing the Mole 
before sending the stormers over the wall. The En- 
gineering and Stokehold personnel were at their sta- 
tions below for giving immediate response to all re- 
quirements from the conning positions. The first 
lieutenant — Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Roso- 
man, R.N. — was in the conning tower, from where 
the ship was being steered by the quartermaster, in 
readiness to take over the handling of the ship im- 
mediately I was rendered hors de combat. It was a de- 
cidedly tense period, but there were others to follow. 

At a given moment by watch-time Vindictive al- 
tered course towards the Mole — or rather towards 
the position where it was hoped to find the Mole. 
Almost immediately we ran into the smoke screen. 
The wind had now changed to an off-shore direction, 
diametrically opposite to that on which the screening 
plans had been based. I thought at the time that this 
smoke screen was the thickest on record — that 
opinion was changed later. 



NEARING THE GOAL 177 

The visibility at this time can hardly have amounted 
to a yard — the forecastle was invisible from the 
bridge. The firing of star shells and guns, and the 
flashing of searchlights became more frequent. Vin- 
dictive was being conned from the flame-thrower hut 
on the port end of the conning-tower platform. This 
position was especially suitable in that it plumbed 
over the ship's side and thus provided a very good 
outlook for berthing at the Mole. There was a curi- 
ous absence of excitement. Even the continued repe- 
tition of the question, "Are you all right, sir.^"' from 
my first lieutenant — a prearranged idea to ensure 
a quick change over of command — became monot- 
onous. Nothing had yet been seen of the Mole from 
Vindictive. This comparatively quiet period was not 
of long duration. 



CHAPTER III 

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATTACK 

A FEW seconds before the schedule time for 
the last alteration of course — designed to 
take us alongside the outer wall — the smoke 
screen, which had been drifting northwards before the 
new wind, suddenly cleared. Barely three hundred 
yards distant, dead ahead of us, appeared a long low 
dark object which was immediately recognised as the 
Mole itself with the lighthouse at its extremity. We 
had turned up heading direct for the six-gun battery 
exactly as arranged in the plan. Those who know 
aught of navigation will realise how far this was a 
fluke — probably the various errors in compass di- 
rection, allowance for tide, etc., had exactly cancelled 
one another. Course was altered immediately to the 
southwestward and speed was increased to the ut- 
most. 

The Mole battery opened fire at once; our own 
guns, under the direction of Commander E. O. B. S. 
Osborne, replied with the utmost promptitude. The 
estimated distance at which we passed the Mole 
battery was two hundred and fifty yards off the 
eastern gun, gradually lessening to fifty yards off the 
western gun. It was truly a wonderful sight. The 
noise was terrific and the flashes of the Mole guns 
seemed to be within arm's length. Of course it was, 
to all intents and purposes, impossible for the M-ole 
guns to miss their target. They literally poured pro- 




\ 



Drawn by CfkarZes Ve Zacy from detaiJf supplieii by the Author 

DIAGRAMMATIC SKETCH OF THE ATTACK 



A— H.M.S. Vindictive 
B— H.M.S. Daffodil 
C— H.M.S. Iris 
D— Coastal Motor Boats 
E— Steam pinnace 
F— Motor dinghey 



G— Submarine S 

H— S.S. BrusselB 

I — German destroyers 

J— To Blankenberghe 

K— Motor launches 

Ij — Entanglement net boom 

M— H.M.S- Phoebe 



N-H.M.S. North Star 

O— Position of approach channel 

P— Rescue craft 

Q— Rescue craft 

R— H.M.S. Iphigenia 

S-H.M S. Intrepid 

T— H.M.S. Thetis 



U— Trenches on Mole 
V— Trenches ashore 
W-H.M.S. Warwick 
X — The barge boom 
Y— The Cannl 
Z— German batteries 



RUNNING THE GANTLET 179 

jectiles into us. In about five minutes we had reached 
the Mole, but not before the ship had suffered a great 
amount of damage to both materiel and personnel. 

Looked at from the view of a naval officer it was 
little short of criminal, on the part of the Mole bat- 
tery, that the ship was allowed to reach her destina- 
tion. Everything was in favour of the defence as soon 
as we had been sighted. Owing to the change of wind 
our special arrangements for covering the battery 
with smoke had failed in spite of the magnificent work 
of our small smoke vessels which, unsupported and 
regardless of risk, had laid the screen close to the foot 
of the wall, that is to say, right under the muzzles of 
the guns. From the moment when we were first 
sighted until arriving alongside the Mole the battery 
guns had a clear target, illuminated by star shell, of a 
size equal to half the length of the lighthouse exten- 
sion itself. 

To my mind the chief reasons for our successful 
running of the gantlet were twofold, firstly, the fact 
that we were so close, and secondly, the splendid 
manner in which our guns' crews stuck to their work. 
With regard to the former, a longer range would have 
entailed more deliberate firing, and this in turn would 
have given time for more deliberate choice of point of 
aim. A few projectiles penetrating the engine or boiler 
rooms, or holing us at the water-line, would have 
settled the matter. The range being so short one can 
conjecture that the German gunners, realising that 
they could not miss, pumped ammunition into us at 
the utmost speed of which their guns were capable 
without regard to the particular damage which they 
were likely to cause. Their loss of serenity, due in the 



i8o THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

first place to the novel circumstances of the case, 
must have been considerably augmented by the fact 
that our own projectiles were hitting the wall near the 
gun muzzles — it was too much to hope that we 
should actually obtain any hits on the guns them- 
selves. 

The petty officer at one of our six-inch guns, when 
asked afterwards what ranges he fired at, said that 
he reckoned he opened fire at about two hundred 
yards and he continued till close to the Mole. "How 
close.?" he was asked. "Reckoning from the gun 
muzzle," he replied, " I should say it was about three 
feet!" 

One can picture the situation as seen from the Mole 
itself. A hostile vessel suddenly looming out of the 
fog at point-blank range, the intense excitement 
which resulted, the commencement of fire, the burst- 
ing of shell on the wall, the ardent desire to hit some- 
thing as rapidly and as often as possible, the natural 
inclination to fire at the nearest object, namely, that 
part of the vessel on their own level, and the realisa- 
tion that in a few moments the guns would no longer 
bear on the target. One can imagine the thoughts that 
were uppermost in their minds, "Hit her, smash her, 
pump it in, curse those guns of hers, don't lose a 
second of time, blow her to bits!" One cannot blame 
those gunners. To use a war-time expression, "They 
had the wind up." We had counted on that, we had 
concentrated all our efforts at "putting the wind up." 
Yet if anybody had seriously suggested that a ship 
could steam close past a shore battery in these modem 
days of gunnery he would have been laughed to scorn. 
Yet it was easy. The reason is not far to seek. 



GUN-FIRE FROM THE MOLE i8i 

Those who worship materiel have followed a false 
god. The crux of all fighting lies with the personnel — 
a fact borne out again and again on this particular 
night just as throughout past history. If the German 
gunners had been superhuman this tale would not 
have been told, but human nature, reckoned with by 
the attackers, was on our side; the initiative was ours. 

The material damage was very great, but, though 
it may sound paradoxical, of not much importance. 
The upper works and upper deck of the ship received 
the brunt of it. The most serious matter was the 
damage to our gangways. Several were shot away and 
many others damaged beyond further usefulness and, 
so far as could be observed at the time, only four were 
left us for the work in hand. Two heavy shell pene- 
trated the ship's side below the upper deck. One passed 
in just beneath the foremost flame-thrower hut and 
burst on impact. The other came through within a 
few feet of the first and wrecked everything in its 
vicinity. Two other heavy shell came through the 
screen door to the forecastle and placed one of the 
howitzer guns out of action. The funnels, ventilators, 
bridges, chart-house, and all such were riddled through 
and through. 

The damage to the personnel was exceedingly 
serious. Orders had been given that the storming par- 
ties should remain below, under cover, until the ship 
arrived alongside. The number of personnel in ex- 
posed positions was to be limited mainly to those 
manning the guns, rocket apparatus, and flame- 
throwers. The senior oflficers of the storming parties, 
however, stationed themselves in the most handy 
position for leading and directing the assault, with 



i82 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the result that they were exposed to the full blast of 
the hurricane fire from the Mole battery. Military 
officers had always acted in a similar manner what- 
ever their instructions might be. One cannot help 
feeling that in any fighting service, where discipline 
is based on leadership rather than on mere driving 
force, officers will do the same thing. Captain Hala- 
han, commanding the naval storming forces, who had 
repeatedly told me this was to be his last fight, was 
shot down and killed at the outset. Commander Ed- 
wards, standing near him on the gangway deck, was 
also shot down and completely incapacitated. Colonel 
Elliot, commanding the Marine storming forces, and 
his second-in-command. Major Cordner, were killed 
on the bridge, where they had taken up a commanding 
position in full view of the gangway deck. Many 
others were killed or wounded. The death of so many 
brave men was a terrible blow. Nobody knew better 
than they the tremendous risk attached to their 
actions — the pity of it was that they should not have 
lived to see the success for which they were so largely 
responsible. 

At one minute past midnight the ship actually 
arrived alongside the Mole, one minute late on 
schedule time, having steamed alongside at sixteen 
knots speed. The engines were immediately reversed 
at full speed and the ship bumped the Mole ver}^ 
gently on the specially constructed fender fitted on 
the port bow. 

The conning position in the flame-thrower hut was 
well chosen, our heads being about five feet above the 
top of the Mole wall. We had previously devoted 
many hours to studying photographs of the Mole 



ARRIVAL AT THE MOLE 183 

with the idea of recognising objects thereon. Our 
aerial confreres had photographed every portion of 
the Mole from almost every conceivable angle with 
both ordinary and stereoscopic cameras. We had also 
had picture post-cards and other illustrations at our 
disposal. Though none of us had ever actually seen 
the Mole itself we felt pretty sure of being able to 
recognise any portion of it immediately. In that we 
were over-confident. The smoke, the intermittent 
glare and flashes, the alternating darkness and the 
unceasing rain, added to the disturbance of one's at- 
tention caused by the noise and the explosion of shell, 
rendered observation somewhat difficult. As far as 
we could see we were to the westward of our desired 
position. The engines were, therefore, kept at full 
speed astern and the ship, aided by the three-knot 
tide running to the eastward, rapidly drifted in that 
direction. When sufficient sternway had been gath- 
ered the engines were put to full speed ahead to check 
her. A low building was then observed on the Mole 
abreast the ship, but it was not recognised immedi- 
ately as the northeastern shed (No. 3), which we had 
expected to appear much larger. The distance in the 
uncertain light was also very deceptive, the building 
in question appearing to be situated within a few feet 
of the outer wall, whereas it must have been at least 
forty-five yards away. 

But time was pressing. Our main diversion had 
certainly commenced, but at all costs we must have 
it fully developed before the blockships arrived at 
twenty minutes past midnight. The order was there- 
fore given to let go the starboard anchor. A voice 
tube, for this purpose, led from the flame-thrower hut 



i84 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

to the cable deck. The order was certainly not given 
sotto voce. But the noise at this time was terrific. I 
could not be certain whether the order was received 
as no answer was heard in reply. Certainly the an- 
chor was not let go. Meanwhile the engines were 
ordered at full speed astern and full speed ahead al- 
ternately to keep the ship in position ; the manner in 
which these orders were carried out by the engine- 
room staff, under the command of Engineer Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Bury, was admirable. No reply 
being forthcoming to questions as to the delay in 
anchoring, Rosoman left the conning tower and went 
below to investigate. The din had now reached a 
crescendo. Every gun that would bear appeared to 
be focused on our upper works, which were being hit 
every few seconds. Our guns in the fighting-top were 
pouring out a continuous hail of fire in reply. One 
could aptly say that we could hardly hear ourselves 
think. 

At last I had news from the cable deck — this was 
a great relief as I feared that the two heavy shell 
which burst between decks had killed all the anchor- 
ing party. The starboard anchor had jammed some- 
where. It had been previously lowered to the water's 
edge and nothing was holding the cable, but it refused 
to budge. The port anchor was, therefore, dropped 
at the foot of the wall and the ship allowed to drop 
astern until a hundred yards of cable had been 
veered. The cable was then secured. 

The ship immediately swung bodily out from the 
Mole. With the helm to starboard she swung in 
again, but with her bows so tight against the Mole, 
and her stern so far out, that the foremost gangways 



GRAPPLING THE MOLE 185 

just failed to reach the top of the wall. With the helm 
amidships the ship lay parallel to the wall, but no 
gangways would reach. With the helm to port the 
ship again swung away from the Mole. This was an 
exceedingly trying situation. Everything now de- 
pended upon the Dafodil (Lieutenant H. G. Camp- 
bell). 

It will be remembered that, as a result of the tow- 
ing hawser having parted, and in consequence of our 
increase of speed when running alongside, the Iris 
and Daffodil had been left behind. We knew that 
whatever happened we could absolutely depend on 
Gibbs ^ and Campbell making short work of any sur- 
mountable difficulty, and our trust was not misplaced. 
They must have cut off a considerable corner to have 
arrived as early as they did. The Iris steamed past us 
at her utmost speed, which was very slow, and went 
alongside the Mole about a hundred yards ahead of 
Vindictive exactly as laid down in the Plan. Of her 
more anon. 

After we had been struggling against our difficulties 
alongside for about five minutes Dafodil suddenly 
appeared steaming straight for our foremast in a di- 
rection perpendicular to the Mole. Campbell pushed 
her nose against us, hawsers were passed to his vessel, 
and he shoved us bodily alongside the Mole, exactly 
in accordance with the Plan. Really he might have 
been an old stager at tug-master's work, pursuing his 
vocation in one of our own harbours, judging by the 
cool manner in which he carried out his instructions 
to the letter. 

Immediately the two foremost gangways reached 

* Commander Valentine F. Gibbs. 



1 86 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the wall they were lowered until they rested on it. 
No other gangways were then available. The order 
was at once passed to "Storm the Mole." 

Owing to the light wind of the preceding day we 
had not expected to find any swell against the wall. 
The scend of the sea, however, was so heavy and so 
confused, as each wave rebounded, that the ship was 
rolling considerably. Every time she rolled over to 
port there was a heavy jarring bump which was 
probably caused by the bilge on the port side of the 
ship crashing down on the step of the Mole some few 
feet below the surface. The whole ship was shaking 
violently at each bump and rolling so heavily that we 
were greatly apprehensive of sustaining vital damage 
below the water-line. 

The Stokes gun batteries had already been bombing 
the Mole abreast the ship. The flame-throwers should 
also have helped to clear the way for our storming 
parties. The order had been given to switch on the 
foremost flame-thrower. Unfortunately the pipe lead- 
ing from the containers to the hut had been severed 
somewhere below by a shell explosion. This was not 
noticed before the order was obeyed, with the result 
that many gallons of highly inflammable oil were 
squirted over the decks. One hesitates to think what 
would have happened if this oil had become ignited. 

Incidentally the actual nozzle of this flame-thrower 
was shot away just after the order to switch on had 
been given by the officer in charge, Lieutenant A. L. 
Eastlake, attached R.E., who held the proud position 
of being the sole representative of the military on 
board the attacking vessels. Eastlake was the only 
other occupant of the hut and I don't think he will 



INFERNO 187 

easily forget the brief period that we experienced in 
that decidedly uncomfortable erection. Sparks were 
flying about inside, but somehow, at the time, one 
did not connect that pyrotechnic display with the 
fact that they emanated from the medley of missiles 
passing through it. Curiously enough neither of us 
was hit, but our clothing sadly needed repair — an 
experience which was common enough in shore fight- 
ing, but unusual afloat where the missiles are gener- 
ally rather too large to pass through one's headgear 
without removing one's head en route. 

The other flame-thrower fared no better. Com- 
mander Brock was in charge. He lit the ignition ap- 
paratus and passed down the order to "switch on." 
The whole outfit of oil ran its course, but unfortu- 
nately at the very commencement the ignition appa- 
ratus was shot away, with the result that the instru- 
ment was converted into an oil thrower instead of 
emitting a flame. 

Lieutenant-Commander B. F. Adams, leading a 
party of seamen, stormed the Mole immediately the 
gangways were placed. The only two gangways 
which could reach the Mole were, to say the least of 
it, very unsteady platforms. Their inboard ends were 
rising and falling several feet as the ship rolled; the 
outer ends were see-sawing and sliding backwards and 
forwards on the top of the wall. My own personal im- 
pression at the time was that these gangways were 
alternately lifting off and resting on the wall, but 
apparently that was not so. The fact remains, how- 
ever, that the run across these narrow gangways with 
a thirty-foot drop beneath to certain death was not 
altogether inviting. 



i88 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

The first act of the advance party, in accordance 
with the instructions, was to secure the ship to the 
wall by means of the grappling anchors. A great 
struggle to do this was undertaken. The foremost 
grappling anchors only just reached the Mole. Some 
men sat on the top of the wall and endeavoured to 
pull the grapnels over the top as they were lowered 
from the ship. These grapnels, by virtue of the use 
for which they were designed, were heavy. That 
fact, combined with the continuous rolling of the ship, 
made it exceedingly difficult to control them. Roso- 
man and a party of men on board joined in the strug- 
gle, but a heavy lurch of the ship broke up the davit 
on which the foremost grappling iron was slung and 
the latter fell between the ship and the wall. 

Adams' party were followed out in great style by 
the remainder of the seamen storming parties led by 
their surviving officers, and then by the Marines. I 
propose to tell later of what occurred on the Mole 
itself in so far as I have been able to gather from the 
parties concerned. 

As soon as it was clear that the grappling anchors 
had failed us owing to the heavy swell there was no 
other alternative than to order Dafodil to carry on 
pushing throughout the proceedings. 

A curious incident which has never been explained 
occurred just previously. Some individual in Vin- 
dictive had hailed Daffodil and called to them to shove 
off. "By whose orders.?" came the response shouted 
by Campbell from DaffodiPs bridge. "Captain Hala- 
han's orders," was the reply. As a matter of fact poor 
gallant Halahan had been killed some ten minutes 
earlier. "I take my orders from Captain Carpenter," 



WORK OF THE DAFFODIL 189 

shouted Campbell. "He's dead," was shouted back. 
"I don't believe it," responded Campbell, and inci- 
dentally he was right, though I have not the faintest 
idea what he based his belief on. As Mark Twain 
would have said, " the report of my death was much 
exaggerated." The incident was certainly curious, 
but of course (this for the benefit of those who, during 
the war, saw spies and traitors at every corner) there 
can only be the explanation that some poor wounded 
fellow must have been delirious. 

Campbell had been shot in the face, but such a 
trifle as that did not appear to have worried him, and 
he continued to push the Vindictive alongside from the 
moment of his arrival until the whole hour and five 
minutes had elapsed before we left the Mole. Origi- 
nally the Daffodil had been detailed to secure alongside 
Vindictive as soon as the latter was secured to the 
Mole and then to dis-embark her demolition parties 
for their work on the Mole. That part of the plan 
could not be carried out, however, though several 
of his parties climbed over her bows into Vindictive 
on their way to accomplish it. 

The demolition charges had been stowed outside 
the conning tower ready for use ; on the passage across 
we had come to the conclusion that this was a case of 
risking the success of the whole landing for the fur- 
therance of a secondary object, and the charges had 
therefore been removed to a safer position. This 
change of arrangement was indeed fortunate, for the 
deck on both sides of the conning tower became a 
regular shambles during the final approach. Yeoman 
of Signals John Buckley, who had volunteered to 
take up a position outside the conning tower in readi- 



I90 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

ness to fire illuminating rockets had remained at his 
post until killed. We found him there at the foot of 
his rocket tube in the morning, a splendid fellow who 
had been as helpful in the work of preparation as he 
was unflinching in the face of almost certain death. 
All the signalmen except one had been either killed or 
completely disabled, and almost every soul on the 
conning-tower platform had made the supreme sac- 
rifice. 

On the order being given to storm the Mole the 
storming parties had rushed up every available ladder 
to the gangway deck. At the top of the foremost lad- 
der the men, in their eagerness to get at the enemy, 
were stumbling over a body. I had bent down to drag 
it clear when one of the men shouted: "That's Mr. 
Walker, sir, he 's had his arm shot off." Immediately 
Walker, who was still conscious, heard this he waved 
his remaining hand to me and wished me the best 
of luck. This officer. Lieutenant H. T. C. Walker, 
survived. 

The high wall, towering above our upper deck, was 
now protecting the hull of the ship from gun-fire ; no 
vital damage could be sustained in that way so long 
as we remained alongside. The chief source of danger 
from which vital damage might accrue before we had 
completed our work at the Mole was that of the fast 
German motor boats stationed at Blankenberghe. 
The latter harbour was barely five minutes' steaming 
distance away, and, as the enemy would now be fully 
cognisant of our position, we might reasonably expect 
a horde of these craft to come to the attack with 
torpedo. It does not require much naval knowledge 
to realise that the diflaculty of avoiding torpedo fire 



THE FIGHT ALOFT 191 

under such circumstances would be wellnigh insuper- 
able. Where a torpedo craft of that description can 
suddenly rush in from the outer darkness a large ves- 
sel has to depend upon remaining unseen; but of 
course such tactics were now impossible, and, still 
further, a torpedo could not be avoided even if seen 
coming towards the ship. That we were not attacked 
in that manner was mainly due to the work of certain 
of our smaller craft specially detailed to deal with the 
Blankenberghe force; former experience of the latter 
also led us to believe that the German personnel in 
those boats had no stomach for a fight. 

Our guns in the fighting-top were directing a mur- 
derous fire into their special targets. Chief amongst 
those were the heavy gun battery at the end of the 
broad part of the Mole and the lighter battery on the 
lighthouse extension. In neither case could the ene- 
my's guns bear on the ship, and we had the advantage 
of taking the former battery from the rear and giving 
the latter a taste of enfilading fire from its western 
flank. But there was another target of importance. 
Immediately abreast the ship a German destroyer 
was berthed alongside the inner wharf of the Mole 
only eighty yards distant from the ship. We had an 
uninterrupted view of the greater part of her between 
the two northern sheds, her bridges showing well 
above the ground-level of the Mole. Our guns in the 
fighting-top, in charge of Lieutenant Charles N. B. 
Rigby, R.M.A., riddled that destroyer through and 
through. We could see the projectiles hitting the 
Mole floor whenever the gun was temporarily de- 
pressed, and then shower upon shower of sparks as 
they tore through the destroyer's upperworks. The 



192 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

vessel appeared to have sunk, as very little of her 
upper deck could be seen, although we had such an 
elevated view-point, but now I think it possible that 
the wall protected her vitals and that she escaped 
complete destruction from our gun-fire. 

There seems little doubt that our fighting-top was 
now coming In for the attention of most of the enemy 
guns. Presently a tremendous crash overhead fol- 
lowed by a cessation of our fire indicated that a heavy 
shell had made havoc with poor Rigby and his crew 
of eight men. As a matter of fact, that shell had 
wrecked the whole fighting-top, killed all the per- 
sonnel except two gunners who were both severely 
wounded, and dismounted one of the guns. The only 
survivor who was not completely disabled ■ — Sergeant 
Finch, R.M.A. — struggled out from the shambles 
somehow and, without a thought for his own wounds, 
examined the remaining gun, found it was still intact, 
and continued the fight single-handed. He continued 
to serve this gun and again did great execution until 
a second shell completely destroyed the remains of 
the top and put Finch completely out of action. The 
splendid work of Lieutenant Rigby and his guns' 
crews had been invaluable, and one cannot but at- 
tribute the complete success of our diversion very 
largely to these gallant men. Rigby himself had set a 
wonderful example; all who knew him had never 
doubted that he would do so. Finch survived and 
was afterwards voted the Victoria Cross by the men 
of the Royal Marines. 

As soon as the ship had been securely anchored the 
howitzer guns manned by the R.M.A., in charge 
of Captain Reginald Dallas-Brooks, R.M.A., com- 



THE HOWITZERS 193 

menced to bombard the targets specially assigned to 
them. The German batteries on the mainland were 
shelling our position at the Mole for all they were 
worth, but their efforts must have been hampered by 
the continuous fire of our howitzers. The presence of 
such weapons on board ship was, to say the least of it, 
most unusual. Findictive^s nature had undergone an 
unusual change as soon as she was secured to the 
Mole. Our position was known to within a few yards. 
Both direction and range of the enemy's batteries 
had been worked out beforehand for any position 
alongside the wall. We were, therefore, in the novel 
situation of being able to drop heavy howitzer shell 
upon the enemy's batteries less than a mile away, a 
decided change from ordinary battleship target prac- 
tice where ranges of ten to fifteen miles were the order 
of the day. 

The y.S-inch howitzer gun on the forecastle could 
not be used. A heavy shell had burst amongst the 
original gun's crew and had killed or disabled them all. 
A second crew was sent from one of the naval six-inch 
guns in the battery and was just being detailed to 
work the howitzer when another shell killed, or dis- 
abled, all but two men. Soon after opening fire the 
midship 7.5-inch howitzer was damaged by another 
shell which killed some of the crew, but the remainder 
repaired the gun under great difficulty and managed 
to resume the firing later on. The eleven-inch how- 
itzer on the quarter-deck was extremely well han- 
dled. This gun fired at a steady rate throughout the 
proceedings in spite of the darkness, the fumes, the 
difficulty of manhandling such large projectiles in a 
cramped-up space and the battering that the ship was 



194 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

receiving around them. The behaviour of the R.M.A. 
throughout was fine; they worked with a will which 
may have been equalled elsewhere, but which has cer- 
tainly never been surpassed ; the example set by Cap- 
tain Brooks was altogether splendid. 

Mention must be made of the pyrotechnic party, 
as we called them. Having located and reached the 
Mole ourselves, an early duty was that of indicating 
its extremity to the approaching blockships. For this 
purpose a rocket station was rigged up in my cabin 
below. The rocket apparatus protruded through a 
port in the stern of the ship and had been placed at an 
angle calculated to carry the rocket behind the light- 
house before bursting, so that the lighthouse would 
show clearly against an illuminated background. One 
of the party was told off for this position, instructed 
as to the object to be attained, and ordered to carry 
on according to his own judgment. I believe this man 
had never previously served afloat and had never been 
in action, but, like the rest of them, he did his bit 
without the slightest hesitation and, judging by re- 
sults, with one hundred per cent efficiency. Others of 
the pyrotechnic brigade landed with the storming 
parties and worked the portable flame-throwers, spe- 
cial flares, etc., before finally attending the smoke- 
making apparatus and assisting with the wounded. 
Lieutenant Graham S. Hewett, R.N.V.R., was in 
command of the pyrotechnic party. 

A few minutes after the storming of the Mole had 
commenced a terrific explosion was seen away to the 
westward, and we guessed that the submarine party 
had attacked the viaduct. A seaman was standing 
near me at the time and brought back to me an old 



THE VIADUCT EXPLOSION 195 

remark of mine, referred to on page 120, when he 
asked, "Was that it, sir?" The explosion presented 
a wonderful spectacle. The flames shot up to a great 
height — one mentally considered it at least a mile. 
Curiously enough the noise of the explosion could not 
be distinguished. The experiences of the submarines 
will be related presently. 

At about 12.15 A.M. the blockships were expected 
to be close to the Mole, and a momentary glimpse of 
them was obtained as they passed close to the light- 
house on their way to the canal entrance. So far so 
good. We saw nothing more of the blockships and 
received no further news of them until the operation 
had been completed. Nevertheless, no news was good 
news under the circumstances and we felt quite con- 
fident that the blockships had not been seriously 
hampered by the German Mole defences. Our pri- 
mary object was, therefore, attained; the diversion 
had been of sufficient magnitude. 

Our further tasks were firstly that of continuing the 
diversion until the crews of the blockships had had 
a reasonable chance of being rescued subsequent to 
sinking their vessels in the canal, secondly of re- 
embarking our storming parties and withdrawing to 
seaward, and thirdly of carrying out demolition work 
on the Mole during our stay alongside. It will be no- 
ticed that these three tasks are not mentioned in their 
proper sequence of event but in their order of impor- 
tance. It is obviously true that demolition work might 
be of assistance from the point of view of diversion, 
but not to a great extent when one realises that the 
enemy were already so animated with a desire to 
destroy our ship that they would hardly care one way 



196 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

or the other what our particular action on the Mole 
might be. The presence of the ship was the main di- 
version and so, at all costs, the ship must be kept 
alongside until the diversion was no longer required 
and until our storming parties had returned. 

At about half an hour after midnight the full force 
of the diversion had been developed. Although the 
ship was still being hit continuously and the inferno 
showed no signs of abatement one can say that the 
conditions had become stabilised. As far as we could 
gather we could not augment our efforts, but could 
only carry on for the time being. So we carried on. 

Being somewhat anxious as to the state of things 
between decks I took the opportunity of a hurried 
visit below. On my way down from the bridge I met 
Lieutenant E. Hilton-Young, R.N.V.R., our parlia- 
mentary representative. He was attired in his shirt- 
sleeves and minus any head-gear. His right arm was 
bandaged. I remember that he was breaking all the 
accepted rules of the drill-book by smoking a large 
cigar as he performed his prearranged duties of super- 
vising the foremost six-inch guns and his self-ap- 
pointed duty of cheering everybody up. On enquiry 
he informed me that he had "got one in the arm." 
I heard afterwards that even when he had collapsed, 
he refused to have his wound attended to, and had 
to be taken below by force. Eventually his right arm 
had to be amputated, but with his unfailing resource 
he did not let many hours pass by before commencing 
to educate himself in the art of left-handed writing. 

Every available space on the mess deck was occu- 
pied by casualties. Those who could do so were sitting 
on the mess stools awaiting their turn for medical 







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SCENE BETWEEN DECKS 197 

attention. Many were stretched at full length on the 
deck, the majority being severely wounded. Some 
had already collapsed and were in a state of coma; I 
fear that many had already passed away. It was a sad 
spectacle indeed. Somehow, amidst all the crashing 
and smashing on deck, one had not realised the sac- 
rifice that was taking place. 

During a fight at sea the personnel below know 
little or nothing of how things are going. This espe- 
cially applies to the stokehold and engine-room per- 
sonnel, who are, indeed, in an unenviable position. 
It applies, also, to the wounded who have been car- 
ried below. It is not difficult to imagine their feelings, 
especially when one considers how rapidly a vessel 
may sink after sustaining a vital injury. One does 
not need to be an advanced psychologist to under- 
stand the importance of keeping those stationed be- 
tween decks supplied with information as to what is 
occurring on deck. So I shouted out something about 
everything going splendidly, the Mole being stormed, 
the viaduct being blown up and the blockships having 
passed in. The cheer that went up will live long in my 
memory. Those who could stand crowded round and 
forgot their wounds. Some of those on the deck en- 
deavoured to sit up to ascertain the news. I did not 
then know that I had been reported as killed. The 
crowd almost barred my way in their excitement, and 
the question which caught my ear more than any 
other was, " Have we won, sir .? Hiave we won ? " just 
as if the whole affair had been a football match. 

The medical officers and their assistants, under 
the direction of Staff-Surgeon McCutcheon, were 
working at the highest pressure. The wounded were 



198 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

literally pouring down every available ladder in a 
constant stream. Dressing stations had been impro- 
vised at intervals along the deck. The ward-room and 
the sick bay being the two main stations. Everything 
humanly possible was being done to render first-aid 
and to alleviate suffering. There was no lack of ready 
helpers. All those of the latter who could do so were 
bringing the wounded down. Many of the less se- 
verely wounded were attending to those others who 
were badly hit. A Marine with his own head band- 
aged up was supporting in his arms an officer who 
was unconscious with a terrible wound in the head, 
and only relaxed his hold when the officer died. The 
work of McCutcheon and his confreres was beyond 
all praise; untiring energy, consummate care, and 
withal real brotherly bearing characterised their 
actions. 

The news of the blockships spread quickly, and one 
heard every now and then renewed outbursts of cheer- 
ing. The news had reached the stokehold and did 
much to relieve the tension amongst the personnel in 
that part of the ship. A few pieces of shell had fallen 
into the engine room, but no damage had been done. 

A return to the lower bridge showed little apparent 
change in the situation. Shell were still hitting us 
every few seconds and many casualties were being 
caused by flying splinters. Large pieces of the funnels 
and ventilators were being torn out and hurled in all 
directions — one wondered how much more of this 
battering the ship could stand. The exact nature of 
the various missiles and the direction from whence 
they came were of course unknown to us. It was 
afterwards suggested that the shore guns to the west- 



ANXIETY FOR THE DAFFODIL 199 

ward of Blankenberghe were doing much of the mis- 
chief. Certainly our position, tangential to the Mole, 
brought such a thing into the realm of possibility, but 
it would seem doubtful whether those German bat- 
teries, from which we were probably invisible, would 
risk hitting their own guns on the Mole from that 
flanking direction. However, all our guns which could 
fire at the enemy were fully occupied in accordance 
with the prearranged plan, so there was no particular 
object in ascertaining the position of new targets. 

Our chief anxiety at this period was the safety of 
Daffodil, which seemed to bear a charmed life. Fin- 
dictive^s hull was amply protected by the wall itself, 
but Daffodil was far more exposed. As already men- 
tioned the loss oi Daffodil would almost certainly have 
entailed the loss of the whole of the storming parties 
on the Mole. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE FIGHT ON THE MOLE. H.M.S. IRIS 

AS soon as the two foremost gangways reached 
the wall a party of seamen led by Lieutenant- 
Commander Adams had commenced the 
storming of the Mole. Lieutenant-Commander A. L. 
Harrison, the senior officer of the seamen storming 
parties, had been wounded in the head and was too 
dazed to land on the Mole until later. Commander 
Brock, having completed his duties in the aft flame- 
thrower hut, also stormed the Mole. 

Adams and a handful of men made their way along 
the parapet to the left and found an observation hut 
situated on it close by. This was bombed, but no oc- 
cupants were found inside. Brock is believed to have 
gone inside this hut for the purpose of examining its 
interior; there is no authentic evidence that he was 
ever seen again. Adams stationed some of his men to 
guard a ladder leading from the parapet to the floor 
of the Mole and then returned to find us struggling 
with the grappling anchors as already described. 
Adams then reconnoitred again to the eastward and 
located a German machine-gun firing at the parapet 
from the trench system on the floor of the Mole. 
Barbed wire surrounded this trench, which interposed 
between Vindictive and the three-gun battery at the 
end of the broad part of the Mole. The seamen were 
then detailed to bomb the trench position, but in do- 
ing so they suffered many casualties from machine- 



A SPLENDID SACRIFICE 201 

gun fire. The position on the parapet was almost 
entirely exposed to gun-fire from the Mole itself, the 
lookout station affording the only cover. The Ger- 
man vessels berthed at the inner side of the Mole had 
also joined in the fight. 

The terrific noise, the darkness, the bursting of 
shell, and the hail of machine-gun bullets rendered it 
exceedingly difficult for any one individual to make 
such observations as would lead to a connected ac- 
count of the fighting on the Mole itself. 

Just before arriving alongside the Mole, Lieutenant- 
Commander Harrison, in supreme command of the 
seamen storming parties after Commander Halahan's 
death, was struck on the head by a fragment of a 
shell; he was knocked senseless and sustained a broken 
jaw. On recovering consciousness he proceeded over 
one of the gangways to the parapet, where he took 
over command of the party detailed to attack the 
Mole batteries to the eastward, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Adams going back to obtain reenforcements. 
Gathering together a handful of his men, Harrison 
led a charge along the parapet itself in the face of 
heavy machine-gun fire. He was killed at the head 
of his men, all but two of whom were also killed, these 
two being wounded. 

Harrison's charge down that narrow gangway of 
death was a worthy finale to the large number of 
charges which, as a forward of the first rank, he had 
led down many a Rugby football ground. He had 
"played the game" to the end. To quote the final 
words in the official notification of his posthumous 
award of the Victoria Cross — "Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Harrison, although already severely wounded 



202 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

and undoubtedly in great pain, displayed indomitable 
resolution and courage of the highest order in pressing 
his attack, knowing as he did that any delay in silenc- 
ing the guns might jeopardise the main object of the 
expedition, i.e., the blocking of the Zeebrugge-Bruges 
Canal." 

With Harrison's death the Navy lost an officer who 
was as popular and as keen as he had been invaluable 
to the success of this particular operation, especially 
in the preparatory work. 

Able-Seaman McKenzie, one of the survivors of 
Harrison's party, finding himself alone, did good exe- 
cution with his Lewis gun in spite of being wounded 
in several places; he eventually returned to Vin- 
dictive after accounting for a number of the enemy. 

The Marines, now commanded by Major B. G. 
Weller, R.M.L.L, had followed the seamen over the 
gangways. 

The prearranged details of the operations on the 
Mole had to be somewhat modified owing to the fact 
that Vindictive was further to the westward than 
originally intended. The reason for the latter has 
already been given, but a further word may not be 
out of place. The responsibility for the actual i>osi- 
tion of the ship was entirely my own; the error in 
position was, therefore, my own also. When the at- 
tack was originally planned the intention had been to 
endeavour to place the ship with her stern seventy 
yards from the western gun of the battery on the 
lighthouse extension. Actually Vindictive^ s gangways 
rested on the Mole nearly three hundred yards to the 
westward. One can only conjecture what would have 
happened, under the circumstances of the failure of 



STORMING OF THE MOLE 203 

the smoke screen owing to the change of wind, if the 
ship had proceeded past the six-gun battery at a speed 
sufficiently slow for berthing so close to the battery 
itself. Whether the ship would ever have reached the 
Mole, or whether there would have been any storm- 
ing parties left on arrival alongside, can only be 
guessed. It certainly looks as if our mistake in posi- 
tion was as providential as it was unintentional. 

Lieutenant F. T. V. Cooke, who afterwards greatly 
distinguished himself, led out the first party of Ma- 
rines and silenced a party of Germans who were ob- 
served firing at the parapet from a position near No. 2 
shed. Another party under Lieutenant Lamplough 
then established a strong point near No. 3 shed for the 
purpose of dealing with any enemy approaching from 
the westward. His party also attacked and bombed 
a German destroyer berthed at the inner side of the 
Mole. 

Another party was ordered to the eastward to reen- 
force the seamen. As soon as the position was more 
clear the main party of the Marine force, under Cap- 
tain E. Bamford, commenced an assault on the Ger- 
man positions covering the Mole battery. 

It is not possible to say how many of the storming 
parties reached the Mole — the loss of officers and 
men and the resulting temporary disorganisation 
naturally prevented the collection of definite informa- 
tion. Suffice it to say that a large number stormed the 
Mole in furtherance of our diversion, and that the 
latter was undoubtedly successful in that we attained 
our primary object of assisting the blockships to pass 
an all-important obstacle in the Mole batteries. 

Before passing on to other phases of the operation a 



204 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

general idea of the difficulties faced by the storming 
parties may be of interest, together with a brief ac- 
count of the manner in which these difficulties were 
surmounted. 

From the time of our arrival the Mole abreast the 
ship was subjected to extremely heavy fire. Pre- 
sumably the shore guns, including the Kaiser Wilhelm 
battery with its twelve-inch guns and the Goeben 
battery (9.4-inch guns) situated almost within point- 
blank range, were shelling the Mole for all they were 
worth, regardless of damage to their own property or 
of danger to their own personnel. That, of course, 
would be a correct action, the repulse of the enemy 
always being of first importance. 

The parapet on the high wall was almost entirely 
destitute of cover. The difficulty of placing the scal- 
ing ladders from the parapet to the floor-level of the 
Mole and of descending them whilst carrying such 
paraphernalia as rifles, bombs, flame-throwers, Lewis 
guns, etc., can easily be imagined. The difficulty 
would certainly not be lessened by the fact that the 
men would have their backs to any enemy who might 
be awaiting them on the Mole itself. The fighting 
amidst entirely strange surroundings in the face of 
properly organised strong points held by the enemy 
would not be easy. Add to that the certain losses and 
consequent disorganisation entailed during the as- 
sault, the difficulty of recognising friend from foe at 
night, and the blinding glare of star shell or search- 
lights alternating with momentary periods of inky 
darkness. 

Undoubtedly the assault would be difficult enough. 
But what of the retirement ? The bodies of any men 



DAFFODIL AND IRIS 205 

who were killed or disabled on the Mole could only 
be re-embarked by way of the vertical ladders against 
the wall. It would be bad enough to descend them in 
the first place, but a herculean task to carry a body 
twenty feet up a vertical ladder under incessant shell 
and machine-gun fire. Yet — and I think this fact 
sums up the splendid gallantry of these men — of the 
large number of men who stormed the Mole, many of 
whom were killed or completely disabled, the total 
number left on the Mole after the retirement, includ- 
ing both dead and wounded, amounted to little more 
than a dozen. 

Daffodil^ as already described, was prevented from 
landing her demolition parties in the prearranged 
manner, but some of them, led by Sub-Lieutenant 
F. E. Chevallier, had climbed into Vindictive and 
made their way to the Mole. Lieutenant C. C. Dickin- 
son, commanding the demolition parties, and a party 
of his men on board Vindictive had landed at the com- 
mencement of the assault. They placed a couple of 
ladders, descended them, and then proceeded across 
the Mole, killing some Germans who were apparently 
making for the ladders. Demolition charges were 
placed in position, but not actually exploded owing 
to the presence of our own men in the vicinity. There 
is little doubt that the demolition parties would have 
been able to carry out considerable destructive work 
if more time had been available. Whatever the results 
of their efforts it is certain that Dickinson, Chevallier, 
and their men did all that was possible under the cir- 
cumstances. 

Iris had reached the Mole and dropped her anchor 
at the foot of the wall, about 12.15 a.m., her position 



2o6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

being roughly one hundred yards ahead, i.e., to the 
westward, of Vindictive. The heavy swell was tossing 
her about like a cork, with the result that the use of 
the parapet anchors was extremely difficult. After 
several failures to get these parapet anchors hooked 
to the top of the wall Lieutenant Claude E. K. Hawk- 
ings, one of the officers of the storming party, or- 
dered some men to hold up one of the scaling ladders. 
They could not actually lean it against the wall; the 
rough nature of the latter and the surging of the ship 
would have combined to break the ladder immedi- 
ately. The ladder was, therefore, merely sloping 
towards the wall without any support at its upper 
end. Hawkings ran up it and leaped to the top of the 
Mole, the ladder being smashed to pieces a moment 
later. He sat astride the wall for the purpose of fixing 
an anchor and appears to have been immediately 
attacked by some enemy on the parapet itself. He 
was seen defending himself with his revolver before 
he was actually killed. It was terribly sad that his 
great act should have cost him his life. 

Lieutenant-Commander George N. Bradford, who 
was actually in command of the storming party in 
Iris and whose duties did not include that of securing 
the ship, climbed up the ship's derrick, which carried 
a large parapet anchor and which was rigged out over 
the Mole side of the ship. The derrick itself was crash- 
ing on the Mole with each movement of the ship, 
which, in turn, was rolling and pitching heavily; a 
more perilous climb can scarcely be imagined. Wait- 
ing his opportunity, Bradford chose the right moment 
and jumped to the wall, taking the anchor with him. 
He placed the latter in position, but almost imme- 



DEATHS OF HAWKINGS AND BRADFORD 207 

diately was riddled with machine-gun bullets and fell 
into the sea between Iris and the Mole. Gallant at- 
tempts were made to rescue his body, but owing to 
the darkness and the rush of the strong tidal stream 
he was swept away beyond recovery. 

Nothing could have been finer than Bradford's 
efforts to secure the ship. He had been a splendid 
fighter in the "ring"; it was against his nature to give 
in as long as there was the remotest chance of winning 
through ; his death brought us the great loss of a great 
gentleman. Really, one cannot conceive greater brav- 
ery than was shown by these two officers, who have 
set an example which will surely never be forgotten. 

The anchor placed by Bradford had either slipped 
or been shot away, with the result that Iris suddenly 
surged out from the Mole. It was then obvious that 
the difficulty of securing to the Mole was insuper- 
able, so Commander Gibbs very rightly decided to 
land his men across Vindictive. He therefore ordered 
the cable to be slipped and then steamed round the 
stern of Dafodil and came alongside Vindictive. This 
change of plan, necessitated by the unfavourable 
state of the sea, showed a highly creditable degree of 
initiative. It must be realised that these movements 
and proceedings of Iris had occupied over half an 
hour; it was about 12.55 a.m. before Iris was secured 
to Vindictive. By that time the order for the retire- 
ment had been given. A few men scrambled out of 
Iris, but that ship was almost immediately ordered 
to shove off. She therefore left Vindictive and shaped 
course to the northward. She had barely turned when 
she came under a heavy fire from some enemy bat- 
teries. Two large shell and several small shell hit her, 



208 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

and were closely followed by three more large shell. 
The lookout house at the port extremity of the bridge 
was destroyed and a serious fire was caused on the 
upper deck. 

Valentine Gibbs, who had remained on the bridge 
throughout the operation, was mortally wounded. I 
had known "Val," as we had always called him, since 
he was a boy of thirteen. Even at that age he had 
shown himself to be absolutely fearless. Later in life 
he had risen rapidly in his profession and would as- 
suredly have been marked out for high command in 
due course. In peace days he had won the great race 
on the Cresta Run at St. Moritz, in war he had volun- 
teered for every dangerous operation for which he had 
the remotest chance of selection. At last his oppor- 
tunity had come and he lived for nought else than 
to put Iris alongside Zeebrugge Mole. I was told 
afterwards that in his short periods of consciousness 
after being wounded he asked and repeated but one 
question, "How are things going.?" and he continued 
to ask how things were going until he died. I cannot 
write more of "Val" — words and phrases fail to do 
him justice. 

The havoc in Iris was serious. From Vindictive she 
appeared to have been sunk, for she suddenly dis- 
appeared in a cloud of smoke and flame. 

Major C. E. E. Eagles, D.S.O., in command of the 
Marine storming parties in Iris, was killed, and many 
of his men were killed and wounded at this period. 
Artificial smoke was emitted and a small motor boat 
also laid a smoke screen to shoreward of Iris — this 
probably accounted for her sudden disappearance 
from view. 





LIEUT. GEORGE N. 
BRADFORD, R.N. 




LIEUT. CLAUDE E. K. 
HAWKINGS, R.N. 






LIEUT. RICHARD D. 
SANDFORD, R.N. 



COMMANDER VALENTINE 
F. GIBBS, R.N. 



HAVOC IN IRIS 1209 

The navigating officer had been seriously wounded. 
Lieutenant Oscar Henderson took command. Petty 
Officer Smith was illuminating the compass with a 
torch in one hand and steering with the other. Able- 
Seaman F. E. Blake, having extinguished the fire on 
the bridge, employed himself in throwing overboard 
live bombs which were lying amongst the burning 
debris on the upper deck. 

Iris had not received her share of good fortune. 
Nevertheless, although she actually failed to land her 
storming parties, there is every probability that her 
proceedings assisted to enhance the success of the di- 
version at the Mole and thereby materially assisted 
towards the safe passage of the blockships, i.e., the 
attainment of our object. 



CHAPTER V 

THE ATTACK ON THE RAILWAY VIADUCT 

IN the previous chapter I mentioned that the ex- 
plosion of the submarine took place shortly after 
the storming of the Mole had commenced. 

The immediate purpose in destroying the railway 
viaduct connecting the Mole to the mainland was 
twofold : firstly, that of preventing the Germans from 
sending reenforcements across to the help of the Mole 
garrison; secondly, that of augmenting the main di- 
version. There were, however, ulterior objects also. 
Firstly, the destruction in itself would be a valuable 
part of the general work of demolition designed to 
reduce the efficiency of the Mole as a naval and aerial 
base ; secondly, the loss of the railway would deny to 
the enemy the use of the Mole as a place of embarka- 
tion for military purposes. If deprived of railway 
communication the Mole would lose a high percentage 
of its special war value. 

Two old submarines, C i, commanded by Lieu- 
tenant Aubrey C. Newbold, and C 3, commanded by 
Lieutenant Richard D. Sandford, were chosen for the 
purpose — each carrying a volunteer crew of one 
officer and four men in addition to the officer in com- 
mand. 

The submarines were provided with special control 
apparatus so that the personnel, after having set the 
apparatus to guide the vessel to its destination, could 
abandon their craft before reaching the viaduct itself. 



ATTACK ON THE VIADUCT 211 

For the purpose of abandonment each submarine 
was given motor-driven skiffs and special ladders. 
The latter might enable the crews to climb up the 
viaduct and escape before the explosion took place, 
the motor skiffs being supplied for escaping to sea- 
ward if that was found to be feasible. 

Each submarine carried a heavy cargo of high ex- 
plosive. This latter was fitted with time fuses and 
special instruments so that there would be sufficient 
delay between the ignition of the fuse and the final 
explosion. At a prearranged minute after passing 
position G, the submarines were to have slipped from 
their towing hawsers and then to have made the best 
of their way to the viaduct. Unfortunately C i was 
so much delayed by the parting of a hawser that she 
could not continue her voyage to the viaduct without 
running the risk of hampering C 3. The latter, exactly 
in accordance with the Plan, slipped from tow and 
proceeded under her own engines on the prearranged 
courses. At midnight the submarine appears to have 
been sighted in the light of a star shell. Searchlights 
immediately picked her up and some firing was seen 
in their direction. Artificial smoke was immediately 
made use of, but the wind, having then commenced 
to blow towards the north, was found to be unfavour- 
able. The firing was only of short duration and the 
artificial smoke was switched off. A few minutes later 
the viaduct showed up clearly against a glare in the 
background and course was altered to ensure strik- 
ing exactly at right angles. Sandford disdained to use 
the control apparatus to take his submarine into her 
position. 

The vessel was run under the viaduct, at a speed 



212 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

of nearly ten knots, immediately between two of the 
vertical piles. She charged against the horizontal and 
diagonal girders with such force as to penetrate the 
framework of the viaduct as far as her own conning 
tower, whilst being lifted bodily about a couple of 
feet on the frames. Firmly wedged under the railway 
in a position about fifty yards from the northern end 
of the viaduct the first part of the operation was 
completed. It is difficult to account for the small op- 
position offered to her approach by the enemy. Pos- 
sibly they mistook her for a friend. Another sugges- 
tion is that they thought she was endeavouring to 
pass under the viaduct en route to the canal, and 
that, knowing this was impossible, they hoped to cap- 
ture her intact. That suggestion sounds extremely 
unlikely. Possibly the diversion caused by our efforts 
at the other end of the Mole had distracted the at- 
tention of the defence commanders; the men may 
have feared to take unexpected measures on their own 
responsibility. Whatever the reason for the lack of 
enemy opposition, there was certainly no lack of diffi- 
culty. The darkness, suddenly giving way to the 
blinding glare of searchlights, the navigational diffi- 
culties, and the necessary care in handling such an 
awkward vessel combined to make their arrival a 
very fine feat. But finer was to follow. 

Several of the enemy had appeared on the viaduct 
and commenced to fire on her with machine-guns from 
close range ; the latter cannot have amounted to many 
feet! The crew lowered a motor skiff and Sandford 
ordered them to abandon ship. He then fired the time 
fuse and jumped into the boat. Their purpose was 
now to steam away to the westward at utmost speed 




Ci-OWH copyright — Imperial ]l'ar JJusriin 

THE RAILWAY VIADUCT 

This aerial photograph shows the break in the viaduct planked over b>' 

the Germans. Three German seaplanes are rising to attack the 

photographer's plane 



DESTRUCTION OF THE VIADUCT 213 

so as to get well clear before the explosion took place. 
Unfortunately the skiff's engine was useless — the 
propeller had been broken! Oars had been provided 
for such an emergency and the crew pulled away from 
the viaduct for dear life. As soon as the boat was clear 
of the viaduct itself, the firing became intense, both 
from the viaduct and from the shore. The German 
searchlights were directed on to the boat. 

Many miracles occurred that night, but none more 
extraordinary than the escape of this little boat with 
its two officers and four men. Presently Sandford 
himself and his petty officer were severely wounded ; 
the stoker was also wounded. The boat was hit again 
and again, but fortunately the motor pump was 
working and the water could be rapidly ejected. Sand- 
ford was again wounded. 

The skiff had managed to struggle about three 
hundred yards from the viaduct, when there was a 
deafening roar as submarine C 3, the viaduct above 
her, the railway on the viaduct, and the Germans on 
the railway were hurled to destruction. It must have 
been a wonderful moment for Sandford and his crew. 

The enemy searchlights were immediately extin- 
guished and the firing died away. A few minutes later 
a picket boat — the ordinary type of steamboat car- 
ried by all large men-of-war — emerged from the 
darkness and hailed the skiff. The occupants of the 
latter were assisted into the picket boat, which then 
proceeded seawards and placed them on board the 
destroyer Phcebe. 

The picket boat, under the charge of Lieutenant- 
Commander F. H. Sandford, R.N., brother of the 
commander of the submarine, had been detailed for 



214 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

this rescue work. She had made a great part of the 
overseas journey under her own steam and had ar- 
rived in the nick of time to effect the rescue. Sandford 
— the Lieutenant-Commander — had been largely 
responsible for working out the details of the attack 
on the viaduct in addition to the preparations for the 
demolition work on the Mole. His handling of the 
picket boat — incidentally she returned the whole 
way home again under her own steam — was ex- 
cellent. 

Submarine C i saw what was probably the glare of 
the explosion caused by C 3, but could not be certain 
whether the latter had reached her destination or not. 
They therefore waited until they considered ample 
time had passed for C 3 to have arrived at the viaduct 
if all had gone well. C i then approached the Mole 
en route towards the viaduct and sighted Vindictive 
retiring to the northward. This appeared to signify 
that the forces were retiring and that the operation 
had either been completed or had been found im- 
practicable owing to the change of wind. Lieutenant 
Newbold, therefore, had to decide as to whether he 
should continue for the sake of augmenting the de- 
struction caused by C 3 or whether he should haul off 
so as to be available for any further services required. 
It was a difficult decision to make. He chose the lat- 
ter and earned the Vice-Admiral's commendation for 
doing so. 

Those of us who were au fait with the details of all 
phases of the operation little thought we should ever 
see these heroic attackers of the viaduct again. The 
chances against manoeuvring a submarine into the 
viaduct were very considerable, the chances of any 



LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP 215 

of the personnel being rescued were apparently nil. 
Nobody knew that better than the personnel con- 
cerned. The use of the control apparatus would have 
greatly increased their chances of being rescued, but 
they refused to consider preservation of life until the 
success of their undertaking had been assured. They 
cannot have expected to return. Yet there was no 
dearth of volunteers. The personnel had been selected 
in much the same way as those from the Grand Fleet. 
If the secret could have been made known beforehand 
and volunteers asked for in the ordinary way we 
should probably have had the whole submarine service 
begging to be allowed to take part. 

The execution of this most difficult submarine 
operation was beyond all praise; it was, indeed, a mir- 
acle that the crew of C 3 lived to witness the unquali- 
fied success of their efforts. Before the night was 
ended these gallant lives were again in jeopardy. 

We heard afterwards that a German cyclist corps 
was hurriedly sent to reenforce the Mole garrison, 
and, not knowing that the viaduct had been de- 
stroyed, they were precipitated into the sea and thus 
infringed the Gadarene copyright. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE SMOKE SCREENING. SUBSIDIARY ATTACKS 

THE author is particularly anxious that each 
phase of the operation and the work of each 
class of vessel should be clearly understood, 
so that the reader may fully appreciate the work of 
the blockships, the latter forming the crux of the 
whole operation. It will be convenient, therefore, to 
describe in this chapter the proceedings of those 
small craft whose work was not carried out in actual 
company of the blockships themselves. 

The general idea of the smoke screens has already 
been described. A large number of small craft, in- 
cluding coastal motor boats, motor launches, and 
destroyers, were required for the purpose. 

At given intervals after the force had passed 
through position G the several units left the force 
to carry out their various duties. The latter com- 
prised laying screens shoreward of the main line of 
advance, further screens to cover the shore batteries 
on each side of Zeebrugge, others close off Blanken- 
berghe for the purpose of hampering the German 
motor boats at that place, and a screen close off the 
German battery on the lighthouse extension of the 
Mole. The earlier screens were so efficient that they 
undoubtedly prevented the enemy from discovering 
our presence until we were close to our objective. 
When the wind changed, however, the ideal screening 
arrangements were no longer possible. Such an event- 
uality had been allowed for, and, in accordance with 



COASTAL MOTOR BOATS 217 

their instructions, the screening craft, regardless of the 
great danger, ran inshore close to the German bat- 
teries and did their utmost to ensure the attainment 
of our object. 

The coastal motor boat (C.M.B.) detailed for 
"fogging" Blankenberghe was C.M.B. 16, Lieutenant 
D. E. J. MacVean, R.N.V.R. Owing to temporary 
difficulties with the engines, and uncertaint};^ of posi- 
tion due to drifting while carrying out repairs, this 
boat accompanied Vindictive to the Mole, which was 
first seen thirty yards away. MacVean then pro- 
ceeded to Blankenberghe harbour. On arrival near 
the entrance he came under fire of a four-gun bat- 
tery, but placed his smoke floats close to the entrance 
piers and kept renewing them at intervals until the 
whole operation had ceased, when he returned to 
harbour. This piece of work was typical of the C.M.B. 
flotilla, which, most ably commanded by Lieutenant 
A. P. Welman, R.N., estabhshed a new naval tradi- 
tion. 

Welman, himself in command of C.M.B. 23B, 
found it necessary to undertake the duties of another 
C.M.B. in addition to his own, owing to a difficulty 
in communicating a modification in the orders. He 
was personally responsible for a very important part 
of the screening, namely, that close off the Mole 
batteries. In spite of the concentrated fire from the 
latter, and the difficulties due to the change of wind, 
this gallant officer, who had always allotted himself 
the most dangerous tasks, with the able assistance of 
two other C.M.B.'s, maintained a fog screen which 
must have been an important factor in our success. 
C.M.B. 22B steamed close in under the Mole battery 



2i8 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

and laid smoke floats within a few yards of the guns. 
It is remarkable that these coastal motor boats should 
have escaped. A single shell would be sufficient to 
send such a frail craft to the bottom. 

Before Vindictive^s arrival at the Mole two coastal 
motor boats had left the force for the purpose of at- 
tacking German vessels inside the Mole. They soon 
lost sight of one another in the fog and became 
separated. C.M.B. 7, Sub-Lieutenant L. R. Blake, 
R.N.R., first sighted the Mole about one hundred and 
fifty yards away and steamed close round the light- 
house at high speed. Having located the defence 
booms of barges and nets he followed down the line 
of the latter until close inshore and then stopped for 
the purpose of selecting a target. Observing an enemy 
destroyer alongside the Mole he steamed straight 
towards her at high speed and fired his torpedo at her. 
He then stopped to observe the result. The torpedo 
was seen to explode near the forebridge of the de- 
stroyer, but the conditions of visibility rendered it 
impossible to ascertain the definite result. During this 
time he was being heavily fired at by machine-guns 
on the Mole and by the shore batteries to the east- 
ward of the canal. Small enemy vessels suddenly 
appeared and engaged him, and he was further fired at 
from a dredger which had a machine-gun. C.M.B. 7 
had other duties to fulfil in connection with smoke 
screening. Whilst proceeding at high speed for that 
purpose she collided with an unlighted buoy, which 
made a large hole in her bows. Speed was increased 
to lift the bows clear of the water. It soon became 
apparent that the damage which she had sustained 
precluded all further chance of being usefully em- 



TORPEDOING THE ENEMY 219 

ployed, so course was set for home. An engine defect 
oft Ostende necessitated stopping; this, in turn, 
brought them into imminent danger of sinking. 
Eventually one of our destroyers took her in tow and 
brought her safely to Dover. 

The other, CM. B. 5, Sub-Lieutenant C. Outhwaite, 
R.N.V.R., had found herself within fifty yards of the 
Mole and had immediately altered course to pass 
round the lighthouse. She then sighted a German 
torpedo-boat destroyer steering to the northeastward 
and at once increased to utmost speed with the object 
of attacking her. C.M.B. 5 was evidently seen in the 
light of star shell and the German switched on her 
searchlight and opened fire. As soon as the motor 
boat was sufficiently close she fired a torpedo, which 
struck the destroyer in the fore part of the vessel. By 
this time some guns on the Mole had taken up the 
firing. Under concentrated fire from two directions 
the motor boat was forced to haul off, and was unable 
to witness the fate of the destroyer or to search for 
survivors. This motor boat then proceeded to the 
eastward and rendered useful assistance to the smoke- 
screening vessels operating in that direction. 

Three other coastal motor boats, Nos. 25, 26, and 
21, had been detailed for yet another form of attack 
on the Mole, namely, that of dropping Stokes bombs 
on its western portion around the seaplane base. 
These three craft obtained many hits on the Mole 
from a range of only fifty yards, one of them actually 
remaining stopped opposite the seaplane sheds and 
pumping her bombs over the outer wall just as if there 
had been no enemy in existence. 

C.M.B. 32 waited until the blockships had passed 



220 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the Mole en route to the canal, and then, as soon as 
the moment appeared to be favourable, she dashed 
in at utmost speed and fired a torpedo at a German 
vessel berthed alongside the Mole. The torpedo was 
heard to explode, but the visibility prevented the 
actual result from being observed. This attack was 
carried out under extremely heavy machine-gun fire. 

The work of the other coastal motor boats, in con- 
nection with the blockships' movements, will be 
described later. 

Eleven torpedo-boat destroyers took part in the 
inshore operations ; many others were utilised as sup- 
ports to seaward and as escorts to the bombarding 
monitors. The destroyer flotilla was commanded by 
Captain Wilfred Tomkinson, under whose direction 
their work of preparation had been carried out; he 
accompanied the Vice-Admiral in H.M.S. Warwick. 

Of the eleven destroyers, H.M.S. Warwick , flying 
the Vice-Admiral's Flag, had a roving commission so 
that the Vice-Admiral could direct the whole opera- 
tion and render assistance where necessary. The most 
favourable position from which to direct events was 
in the vicinity of the Mole lighthouse. 

Two other destroyers, Phcebe, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Hubert E. Gore-Langton, and North Star, 
Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth C. Helyar, were 
also detailed to operate near the lighthouse. These 
two vessels experienced a very anxious time. At the 
commencement of the attack they patrolled in com- 
pany with Warwick, Commander V. L. A. Campbell, 
firstly with the object of preventing torpedo at- 
tacks by enemy vessels from being directed against the 
storming vessels at the Mole, and secondly for the 



DESTROYERS 221 

purpose of assisting the smoke screening if required. 

Just before the Mole was reached at the commence- 
ment of the attack these three destroyers, which had 
been stationed ahead of the main force during the 
approach, eased down to allow Vindictive to pass, 
and then commenced their patrol. They passed just 
inside an area of very heavy barrage fire and they 
frequently came under fire from the Mole. The smoke 
screens made it very difficult for them to keep touch 
either with the movements of other vessels or with 
each other. Very soon the Phoebe and North Star be- 
came separated from the Warwick; the latter con- 
tinued her patrol until the attack was virtually at an 
end. 

North Star, on becoming separated from the others, 
proceeded towards her patrol area, but had great 
difficulty in ascertaining her position owing to the 
smoke. Suddenly an enemy vessel was encountered 
and the track of a torpedo was clearly seen in the 
glare of the enemy's searchlight. North Star returned 
the compliment, but it is probable that her torpedo 
missed similarly to that fired by the enemy vessel; 
the latter was lost sight of almost immediately. Con- 
tinuing her efforts to locate the Mole, she found her- 
self close inshore to the eastward of the Mole. After 
putting her helm hard-over, some ships were seen right 
ahead, and were recognised as the blockships making 
their final run to the canal. The Mole was then seen 
to the northward and a torpedo was fired at a vessel 
alongside it. At this moment North Star was lit up 
by a searchlight and the German batteries opened a 
heavy fire upon her. She passed close to the Mole and 
fired three more torpedoes at vessels alongside it, but 



222 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

the conditions of visibility once more prevented the 
resuhs from being observed. When passing the Hght- 
house North Star received several hits in the engine- 
room and boiler-rooms and was completely disabled. 
Her fate will be recounted presently. 

H.M.S. Phcebe, after becoming separated from War- 
wick, commenced to patrol off the lighthouse in ac- 
cordance with her instructions. Presently she fell in 
with the steamboat which had rescued the crew of 
Submarine C 3 . The latter, who were in urgent need 
of medical attention, were transferred to Phcebe, which 
vessel then continued her patrol as before. Later on 
North Star was sighted in a crippled state and Phcebe 
at once went to her assistance. 

North Star was still being illuminated by search- 
lights and heavily fired at. Phcebe laid out a smoke 
screen to hide her and then took her in tow — a most 
difficult operation under the circumstances. Unfor- 
tunately the tow parted and the smoke screen drifted 
away before the wind. Once again heavy fire was 
directed at these vessels and they were being fre- 
quently hit. Phcebe again took North Star in tow, but 
the towing wires were cut by shell explosions ; to make 
matters worse, the Phcebe^s steam siren was hit and 
commenced to fill the air with its discordant shrieking, 
thus assisting the enemy to locate them. Phcebe next 
endeavoured to push North Star bodily away from 
the batteries, but this proved to be impossible. The 
only other thing to be done was to save North Star's 
crew and to sink her to prevent capture. Phcebe, there- 
fore, laid out another protective smoke screen and 
lowered her boat for the rescue work. Helyar in North 
Star very reluctantly had to order "abandon ship," 



FATE OF THE NORTH STAR 223 

and this was carried out by means of her boats and 
rafts. One boat unfortunately capsized, but the others 
were picked up and the whaler from Phcsbe made sev- 
eral trips for survivors. 

But Phcebe had not given up hope. She laid out 
yet another smoke screen and made another attempt 
to take North Star in tow, going alongside her for the 
purpose. Helyar and some of his crew had remained 
on board North Star and passed the wires to Phcebe. 
The North Star was still being hit repeatedly by shell 
and commenced to list over as a result of the damage. 
Phoebe then persuaded Helyar to leave his ship and 
took him on board after embarking the remainder of 
the crew. 

On going astern to avoid the searchlights, another 
man was seen on board North Star. Phcebe at once 
returned alongside and ordered the man to jump 
across. During all this time Phoebe herself had been 
repeatedly hit, resulting in several casualties, but 
Gore-Langton considered that he ought to sink North 
Star before leaving her. His ship then came in for 
increased fire from the German batteries, and as a 
result of the smoke, was unable to locate North Star 
again — probably she had sunk ^ already as she had 
certainly been in a sinking condition when Lieutenant- 
Commander Helyar left her. For forty-five minutes 
the struggle to save North Star had been carried out 
within point-blank range of the German batteries, 
which had kept up an incessant fire almost through- 
out. Phoebe herself had received considerable damage 
and it seems almost a miracle that she survived the 

* The wreck of North Star was afterwards located on the bottom to 
the northeastward of the lighthouse. 



224 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

ordeal. Anything finer than the conduct of the com- 
manders of these two vessels, and of their ships' com- 
panies, cannot be conceived. Yet it was only typical 
of the destroyer service as a whole, this latter obser- 
vation being perhaps the best commendation of all. 
The gallant crew of Submarine C 3, previously 
transferred to Phoebe from the picket boat, had seen 
more than their share of the fighting. 

The remaining destroyers, Whirlwind^ Myngs, 
Trident, Mansfield, Velox, Morris, Moorsom, and 
Melpomene, all carried out their patrolling duties 
close to the northward of Zeebrugge without any 
incidents that require special mention here. 

Captain R. Collins, R.N., in charge of the motor 
launches, was on board M.L. 558, commanded by 
Lieutenant-Commander Chappell, R.N.V.R. This 
motor launch rendered useful work in assisting the 
blockships to find the Mole before the latter vessels 
had penetrated the smoke screen, and also directed 
the picket boat towards the viaduct en route to rescue 
the crew of the submarine. Considering the dangerous 
locality in which M.L. 558 was operating, she was 
fortunate in being hit by only one shell. 

M.L. 424, commanded by Lieutenant O. Robinson, 
R.N.V.R., was less fortunate. Soon after passing 
through the smoke screen she was badly hit — her 
captain and two men being killed and another man 
wounded. The second-in-command. Lieutenant J. W. 
Robinson, R.N.V.R., finding the launch was com- 
pletely disabled, decided to abandon her. Having got 
the crew into the dinghey, he set fire to his boat and 
left her in flames; the occupants of the dinghey were 
picked up by M.L. 128. 



MOTOR LAUNCHES 225 

M.L. no, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander 
Young, R.N.V.R., was also unfortunate. She was 
struck and badly damaged by several shell, which 
killed her commanding officer and a petty officer, 
another officer and two men being wounded. The 
second-in-command, Lieutenant G. Bowen, ordered 
the crew to abandon the vessel in the dinghey. This 
was done after the launch had been sunk to prevent 
any possibility of its capture by the enemy. The sur- 
vivors were picked up by M.L. 308. 

The motor launches detailed for smoke-screening 
did splendid work, as did all the launches which took 
part in the operation. Some detailed stories of the 
remaining launches will be given presently. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE WORK OF THE BLOCKSHIPS 

THE blockships had eased down soon after 
passing through position G so as to drop 
astern of Vindictive sufficiently far to enable 
that vessel and her consorts to create the necessary 
diversion. The conning and steering positions in each 
ship were triplicated and fully manned so that, in the 
event of one position being destroyed, the handling 
of the ship could immediately be taken over by an- 
other party. Guns' crews were standing by their guns 
ready to defend their vessels against attacks by enemy 
craft or to retaliate against the batteries in the hope 
of reducing the latter's fire. 

At about midnight heavy firing was heard close 
at hand, but nothing could be seen owing to the dense 
smoke screen which was then drifting slowly to sea- 
ward. During the first quarter of an hour after mid- 
night the blockships passed through an area which 
was apparently being barraged with shell fire. They 
were steaming in the order Thetis, Commander Ralph 
S. Sneyd, Intrepid, Lieutenant Stuart S. Bonham- 
Carter, and Iphigenia, Lieutenant Edward W. Bill- 
yard-Leake. 

At twenty minutes past midnight the Mole was 
sighted right ahead in the glare of the rockets fired 
from Vindictive; the blockships had just been hailed 
by M.L. 558, who gave the direction of the light- 
house. 

Thetis increased to full speed and, passing round 



r^ 





AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN THROUGH THE CLOUDS A FEW 

HOURS AFTER THE ENTERPRISE 

Note the blockships sunk in the entrance, the break in the viaduct, 

and the southern barge missing from the boom 



DASH FOR THE CANAL 227' 

the end of the Mole, steered for the extremity of the 
barge boom. A fairly heavy fire was being directed 
at her by such guns of the Mole-extension battery as 
were still in action; as far as could be seen, nothing 
was fired by the three-gun heavy battery at the end 
of the broad part of the Mole. The ship's guns opened 
fire at the lighthouse, which was believed to be used 
as a signalling and observation station, and at the 
southernmost barge; the latter was sunk. At this 
stage Thetis was caught by the strong east-going tidal 
stream and was set towards the boom of entanglement 
nets. The ship passed over the latter between the 
two northern buoys and tore the nets away with her 
momentum. The piers at the entrance to the canal 
were then sighted, but the propellers were so badly 
fouled by the nets that the engines were brought to a 
stop. 

It must have been at about this moment that the 
enemy first realised the true nature of the enterprise. 
The attacks on the Mole, the blowing up of the via- 
duct, the explosions of torpedoes on the inside of the 
Mole, the smoke, the rapid changes of visibility, and 
the terrific noise on all sides had combined to leave 
the enemy in a hopeless state of stupefaction as to our 
real intentions. We heard afterwards that they be- 
lieved a forced landing on the coast was in progress. 
The impossibility of using one's defensive measures 
to the best advantage when the initiative lies in the 
hands of the attackers has already been referred to. 
Suffice it to say that the enemy do not appear to have 
discovered the real purpose of our operations until 
too late to make the best use of their defensive 
measures. 



228 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Thetis now came under extremely heavy fire both 
from the direction of the Mole and from shore bat- 
teries near the canal. Her six-inch gun on the fore- 
castle was replying to the shore batteries. She ap- 
peared to have grounded about three hundred yards 
from the canal entrance. Thetis now appeared to be 
settling down. All chances of struggling into the 
canal entrance appeared to be hopeless. She had been 
hit again and again and was on fire in several places. 
She had taken the brunt of the firing whilst her two 
consorts were following comparatively undamaged. 
She could do little more now than assist Intrepid and 
Iphigenia to reach their objectives. Prearranged 
signals, therefore, were made to these other two ships 
guiding them to the canal. It must be remembered 
that it was now half an hour after midnight. Intrepid 
and Iphigenia, in that order, passed close to Thetis. 
Thanks to the latter's signals they were able to locate 
the entrance piers; the further movements of those 
two vessels will be described in a moment. 

As soon as Iphigenia was clear Captain Sneyd in 
Thetis ordered the artificial smoke to be turned on, 
and had almost decided to abandon ship when En- 
gineer Lieutenant-Commander Boddie succeeded in 
getting the starboard engine to go ahead. 

The ship moved slowly forward for a short dis- 
tance, but was apparently dragging her stern along 
the bottom. As far as could be seen she was not only 
in the dredged channel leading to the canal, but was 
lying across it. The ship was undoubtedly in a 
sinking condition, so her captain decided to blow the 
bottom out of her in accordance with the Plan. 

The blockships had each been fitted with explosive 



SINKING THE BLOCKSHIPS 229 

charges inside the bottom of the ship. These charges 
had been connected electrically to a firing arrange- 
ment which could be operated from alternative posi- 
tions in the ship. The petty officer in charge of the 
foremost firing keys had been killed and they could 
not be found owing to the fumes from bursting shell 
and those from the artificial smoke. The firing keys 
at the other end of the ship were, therefore, pressed 
after the crew had been ordered on deck. The charges 
immediately exploded. The bottom of the ship was 
blown out; in a few moments the vessel had sunk. 
The upper deck was now just under water. The ship's 
company abandoned the ship, which was still under 
incessant fire, in the only remaining boat and pulled 
away to the northward, where M.L. 526, which had 
followed the blockships, picked them up. The Thetis'' 
boat was the cutter. It had been badly holed by shell 
fire and was crowded to its full capacity. Some of the 
crew were wounded; Sneyd and his second-in-com- 
mand had been wounded and gassed. The proceed- 
ings of M.L. 526, which also rescued some of the crew 
from another blockship, will be described later. 

Intrepid had experienced a certain amount of shell 
fire when approaching the Mole, having apparently 
passed through an area which was being barraged 
by the enemy. She passed the Mole without difficulty 
and navigated between the obstruction booms. The 
jinking of the southernmost barge and the tearing 
away of the entanglement nets by Thetis, with the 
resultant widening of the unobstructed channel, had 
greatly reduced the chance of Intrepid getting into 
trouble at this point. During the final run to the 
canal she had escaped serious damage from gun-fire 



230 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

because nearly all the German guns were concen- 
trating either on Thetis or on the forces attacking 
the Mole. Having located the entrance pier, pass- 
ing close to Thetis en route ^ Intrepid entered the canal 
and proceeded up the latter until just inland of the 
coast-line. Having reached the exact position as 
signed to her, Lieutenant Bonham-Carter at once 
commenced to turn his ship across the channel. As 
soon as he found she could be turned no further — it 
must be remembered that the navigable channel at 
that position was exceedingly narrow — he decided 
to blow the bottom out of the ship. The crew had 
been previously ordered to take to the boats, but 
Engineer Sub-Lieutenant Meikle and three ratings 
had not been able to leave the engine-room when the 
charges exploded. Fortunately these four individuals 
escaped destruction. The ship sank immediately. 

One cutter full of men pulled out to seaward and 
was picked up by M.L. 526, which has already been 
mentioned as saving the crew of Thetis. Another 
cutter pulled out to sea, actually past the Mole, and 
was picked up by the destroyer Whirlwind. Lieu- 
tenant Bonham-Carter, Lieutenant Cory -Wright his 
second-in-command, Sub-Lieutenant Babb the navi- 
gator, and four petty officers were the last party to 
leave the sunken vessel. They launched a raft and 
proceeded to paddle it towards M.L. 282, which had 
followed the blockships into the canal. Whilst on the 
raft this party had a very trying experience. The 
Germans had a machine-gun on the shore within a 
few yards. This gun and many others had been pour- 
ing a hot fire into the ship. A lifebuoy light had 
been inadvertently left on the raft and automatically 



F 



M 



i-r 



K, f. 





THE THREE BLOCKSIIIPS SHORTLY AFTER THE ATTACK 




INTREPID AND IPHIGENIA 
The former the nearer to the camera 



COMPLETING THE BLOCK 231 

lit up on reaching the water. This gave away their 
movements. Every effort was made to extinguish the 
light; they even sat on it, but could not either obscure 
or destroy it for some time. The machine-gun bullets 
were cutting up the water all round them, and it was 
extraordinary that none of the party was killed. It is 
difficult to imagine any more awkward situation. By 
dint of great efforts they managed to reach the motor 
launch and all got into her in safety. 

Iphigenia had followed Intrepid and had rounded 
the Mole with much the same experience as the latter 
ship. Having dropped somewhat astern she increased 
to full speed and made for the canal. By this time so 
many star shell were being fired and so many search- 
lights being used that there was not much difficulty 
in locating the entrance piers; she was also assisted 
by the signals from Thetis. Passing close to the latter, 
Iphigenia was twice hit by shell, one of which cut a 
steam pipe, with the result that the forepart of the 
ship was enveloped in steam. In addition to that she 
shortly afterwards ran into thick smoke and tempo- 
rarily lost sight of the entrance. 

Suddenly the western pier loomed up close ahead. 
Lieutenant Billyard-Leake ordered "full speed 
astern." The ship ran between a dredger and a barge; 
on going ahead again she pushed the barge up the 
canal. There appeared to be a gap between the bow 
of the Intrepid and the eastern bank of the canal, so 
Iphigenia was steered to close it. Turning his ship by 
going alternately ahead and astern, Billyard-Leake 
managed to get her round well across the channel and 
then grounded with his bows on the eastern side. He 
ordered the crew to abandon ship and exploded his 



232 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

charges. Exactly as had occurred in the other two 
ships, the bottom was blown out and the ship sank at 
once. The upper deck was still above water. 

The entire crew, officers and men, got away in a 
single cutter, the other boat having been severely 
damaged. M.L. 282 was then seen close ahead of 
the ship. The cutter pulled up to her and most of 
the crew managed to get on board. The remainder 
turned the cutter and again pulled to the launch. All 
except about three men, of whom one had been killed, 
climbed into the launch at the second attempt. The 
cutter herself was secured to the bows of the launch, 
which, having just picked up the raft party from 
Intrepid, was still heading up the canal. The launch 
went astern and backed out of the canal, stern first, 
with the cutter in tow. No less than a hundred and 
one survivors from the blockships were on board the 
motor launch. Under ordinary circumstances such 
craft can carry from forty to fifty passengers with a 
bit of a squash ; a hundred and one passengers, several 
of them wounded, must have crowded every inch of 
her deck. 

M.L. 282, commanded by Lieutenant Percy T. 
Deane, R.N.V.R., and M.L. 526, commanded by 
Lieutenant H. A. Littleton, R.N.V.R., had followed 
the blockships, exactly in accordance with the Plan, 
during their perilous journey from the Mole. These 
officers had been specially chosen for the rescue work 
from the large number of volunteers for that danger- 
ous task. 

M.L. 282 had steamed straight into the canal and 
stopped between the two sunken blockships. She 
came under heavy machine-gun fire from close range, 



RESCUE OF THE CREWS 233 

but was not in the least deterred from the work of 
rescuing the blockships' survivors. The fact that this 
motor launch was not sunk and that the crew sur- 
vived was little short of a miracle. Lieutenant Deane, 
with his precious cargo, turned his boat round as soon 
as he was clear of the canal. Owing to the steering 
gear having been damaged, he was forced to steer by 
means of working the engines at unequal speeds. He 
passed as near to the Mole as was possible to escape 
the gun-fire from that direction — the reverse of the 
usual procedure being necessary under the peculiar 
circumstances in which they found themselves. After 
passing the Mole the launch was steered to the north- 
westward and fell in with the Vice-Admiral's vessel, 
H.M.S. Warwick. Many casualties had been sus- 
tained as a result of the continual fire which she had 
experienced. 

M.L. 526 had steamed into the sunken blockships 
in the canal, embarking many of Intrepid' s men from 
a cutter, and then proceeded to Thetis, where all the 
survivors from that vessel were also embarked from 
a cutter. The motor launch had come under heavy 
fire from the shore guns and her escape added one 
more item to the long list of miracles which took 
place that night. With sixty-five survivors Lieutenant 
Littleton steamed out to sea past the Mole and made 
the entire passage to Dover under her own steam, 
in spite of the gruelling which his frail vessel had gone 
through. 

The rescue work, as carried out by these two 
motor launches, compels admiration. Their chances 
of success had seemed to be exceedingly remote. Yet, 
in spite of all the difficulties, they had rescued no less 



234 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

than one hundred and sixty-six men from right under 
the enemy's batteries. It will be remembered that 
Intrepid had not disembarked her surplus crew at 
position D on the passage across, with the result that 
she carried no fewer than eighty-seven officers and men 
into the canal. Of these, every single officer and man 
was brought back to Dover, although one petty officer 
had been killed and one officer mortally wounded 
whilst being rescued. 

Of the crew of M.L. 282 one officer and two men 
(out of four) laid down their lives in this splendid 
achievement. Of all the blockships' officers and men 
not a single living soul fell into the hands of the enemy. 

In a subsequent chapter I shall give a more detailed 
description of the results of the actual blocking. 

There can be no two opinions concerning the han- 
dling of the blockships. The utmost that can be said 
of the diversions, from the point of view of their con- 
nection with the main object of the enterprise, is that 
they assisted the blockships to pass a danger point 
nearly a mile short of the canal entrance, and, to a 
lesser extent, diverted some of the enemy's attention 
during the final run to the blocking position. 

From the vicinity of the Mole batteries to their 
final destination the blockship commanders had to 
depend almost entirely on their own efforts. Running 
the gantlet of modern batteries at point-blank range 
would ordinarily appear to be foolhardy in the ex- 
treme. Yet these officers made light of the task and 
showed that difficulties cannot always be judged by 
first impressions. The navigation alone was hazard- 
ous enough ; concentration of thought in that particu- 
lar direction must have been greatly hampered by the 



WELL DONE, BLOCKSHIPS 235 

kaleidoscopic conditions of the situation. But per- 
haps the finest feat of all was the splendid display 
of seamanship in the face of extraordinary difficulty. 
The complete absence of local knowledge, the oppo- 
sition of the enemy, and the unavoidable lack of 
practice in sinking vessels under such conditions, all 
combined to make the task appear quite impracti- 
cable. Yet all difficulties were surmounted and the 
object of the operation was achieved. 

Of all the happenings on that memorable night 
the outstanding feature, which turned success from 
a possibility into a certainty, was the magnificent 
handling of the blockships by Commander Sneyd 
and Lieutenants Bonham-Carter and Billyard-Leake. 
This fact cannot be too strongly emphasised, for, 
although it was naturally and fully realised in the 
Navy, there were indications that it was not so well 
grasped by the man-in-the-street. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE RETIREMENT 

IT had been arranged that the storming parties on 
the Mole should have twenty minutes' warning of 
Vindictive leaving the outer wall. A maximum 
length of stay alongside had also been laid down 
so that, under certain circumstances, watches would 
provide some guide as to the amount of time available. 

The warning signal for leaving the Mole was to 
consist of a succession of long and short blasts on the 
siren, or a particular method of waving the searchlight 
beams, or, if all other means failed, a message con- 
veyed by runner. 

At about 12.50 A.M., three-quarters of an hour after 
Vindictive^s arrival alongside, the question of the 
length of stay was considered. The blockships had 
been seen passing the lighthouse en route to the canal, 
the viaduct had been blown up. The diversion on the 
Mole had throughout served to attract the fire of a 
large number of enemy batteries. From this followed 
the deduction that some chance of rescue work had 
probably offered itself to our motor launches. It was 
likely that in another twenty minutes these latter ves- 
sels would have definitely succeeded or failed in their 
object. 

The primary object for which the attack on the 
Mole was designed had been attained. There re- 
mained the secondary object of demolition. The only 
guns in Vindictive which could have borne directly 
on the Mole had been put out of action. Her upper 



BEGINNING OF THE END 237 

works were still being hit every few seconds with 
a continually increasing list of casualties amongst 
those in exposed positions. Owing to the failure of the 
Mole anchors no member of the storming parties 
could hope to return if Daffodil was disabled. That 
the latter vessel had thus far escaped destruction was 
little short of a miracle. The maximum period al- 
lowed for the operations of the storming parties would 
expire at twenty minutes past one. Thirty minutes 
remained. If the warning signal was made immedi- 
ately, the storming parties would have their maximum 
time cut down by only ten minutes. 

The question which arose out of the foregoing con- 
siderations was as to whether it was worth while to 
remain alongside during the last ten minutes for the 
sake of demolition work whilst risking, at the least, 
the loss of the whole of the storming parties then on 
the Mole. 

Shortly after 12.50 a.m. the order was given to 
make the retirement signal. Findictive^s sirens had 
both been shot away. The starboard searchlight had 
received a direct hit from a projectile and had been 
hurled off the bridge down to the upper deck. The 
port searchlight had also been put out of action. An 
order was passed to Daffodil to make the retirement 
signal on her siren. The latter spluttered and gurgled 
whilst emitting a veritable shower bath, but presently 
began to show signs of being useful. A low groan de- 
veloped into a growling note which in turn travelled 
gradually up the scale until loud enough to be heard 
at a distance. The signal was repeated several times 
and then came an anxious period of waiting. 

At about this time a large stack of Stokes bomb 



238 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

boxes, containing fused bombs, was set on fire by 
a shell. All the fire-extinguishing apparatus in the 
vicinity had already been shot away. The chief 
Quartermaster, Petty Officer E. G. Youlton, whilst 
shouting to others to take cover, extinguished the fire 
by hauling out the burning boxes and stamping on 
them. A few moments later the fire broke out afresh. 
Youlton repeated his very gallant efforts and suc- 
ceeded in saving a very awkward situation. 

The storming parties commenced to return to the 
ship almost at once. Many of the ship's company, 
officers and men, assisted in carrying the wounded 
on board over the gangways, which were as rickety 
as ever. One Marine carried a disabled man on 
board, placed his charge on the deck, kissed him on 
both cheeks and was heard to remark, "I was n't 
going to leave you. Bill." 

I have seen both statements and illustrations to 
the effect that our storming parties, before leaving, 
erected a staff on the Mole and hoisted a Union Jack 
upon it. It may seem a pity to spoil a good story, but 
this event was quite imaginary. A memento of our 
visit, however, was prepared in the shape of a board 
to which were attached our visiting cards bearing the 
letters P.P.C., but there is no very clear evidence as 
to whether this memento was left on the Mole, though 
I believe that was the case. 

A shell burst just outside the conning tower whilst 
three of us were discussing the probability of any 
men being still on the Mole. Lieutenant-Commander 
Rosoman was shot through both legs; Petty Officer 
Youlton had an arm shattered ; a very slight wound in 
the shoulder was my own share of the damage. 



THE RECALL 239 

By the time that fifteen minutes had elapsed from 
the sounding of the retirement signal practically all 
the storming parties had returned. No more men were 
seen to come back, but I had given a definite promise 
that the full twenty minutes' notice would be allowed. 
After repeated assurances from other officers, backed 
up by my own personal observation, that no others 
were returning we decided to leave the Mole. The 
cable had already been unshackled ready for slipping 
overboard when no longer required. 

Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman, in spite of his 
wounds, accompanied me to the conning tower. He 
absolutely refused to sit down, but remained standing 
so that he could keep a lookout through the slit in 
the armour. 

The conning tower was of very small dimensions. 
Four wounded men had previously crawled inside 
and had died where they lay. Three or four other 
wounded men had crawled in later on and had col- 
lapsed. One of the telegraphs to the engine-room had 
been shot away, but the telephone was intact. 

All the other compasses having been destroyed, we 
had to depend upon the conning-tower compass. The 
magnetic directive force on a compass needle is neces- 
sarily very weak in a conning tower of such small di- 
mensions. The ship had received so many hard knocks 
that the magnetism on board was pretty certain to 
have undergone considerable change. Thus, whereas 
this particular compass was somewhat independable 
before, it was now exceedingly unreliable. 

In spite of the many hundreds of times that I must 
previously have instructed young officers that no iron 
should be placed within five feet of the compass, I have 



240 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

my first lieutenant to thank for pointing out that the 
presence of so many steel helmets in the conning 
tower was inadvisable. 

Daffodil was ordered to tow Vindictive'' s bow away 
from the wall. Lieutenant Campbell obeyed at once; 
our anchor cable was slipped overboard. Directly 
after the strain came on the DaffodiVs hawser the 
latter broke, but it had served its purpose. " Full speed 
ahead" was ordered and the ship moved forward 
almost immediately. This was at i.ii a.m. 

A large steel boom — the original mainmast of the 
ship — had been rigged over the port side of the 
quarter-deck, jutting out rather further than the port 
propeller with the object of saving the latter from 
hitting the wall. When Vindictive' s helm was put 
over to port, her stern swung towards the Mole, but 
the boom saved the situation as a result of a heavy 
blow against the wall. 

As soon as Vindictive had moved a few feet the 
gangways slipped off the wall and fell overboard with 
a resounding crash. For a few moments the wreckage 
fouled and stopped the port propeller, but quickly 
cleared again without having done any serious dam- 
age. 

It is not difficult to gauge the feelings of the enemy 
when they first noticed the ship moving off. We had 
taken them more or less by surprise on arrival and 
had managed to storm the Mole in spite of every 
effort to prevent us. The enemy could not have been 
over-pleased about that. The ship had been able 
to remain at the Mole for one hour and ten minutes 
without sustaining any vital damage. That fact was 
not calculated to engender a pleasant frame of mind 



THE GERMAN'S LAST STRAW 241 

amongst the enemy. But they knew exactly where we 
were. They knew we should endeavour to leave sooner 
or later; they knew that any attempt to do so would 
inevitably expose the vitals of the ship to their bat- 
teries at point-blank range; they thought they knew 
that our fate was sealed immediately we were clear 
of the wall ; there could be no surprise about leaving. 
But all such matters had been carefully thought out 
beforehand. Vindictive, Iris, and Daffodil each car- 
ried several sets of artificial smoke apparatus for use 
on retirement. Immediately we started to go ahead 
orders were given for the smoke to be turned on. In 
less than a minute all previous fog records were 
beaten beyond comparison. Thus in place of a victim 
the enemy found a fog. 

We steamed away to the northwestward at utmost 
speed. The flames were pouring through the holes in 
the funnels; the ship had the appearance of being 
heavily on fire. The wind being now offshore brought 
the fog along with us ; fortunately for the navigation 
we had a clear lookout ahead. The enemy cannot 
have seen much more than the vivid glare of our 
funnel flames illuminating the upper part of the fog. 
From all accounts their batteries were far from idle. 
As the ship sped seaward we had the sensation of the 
ship jumping at irregular but frequent intervals. This 
may have been due to the concussion of heavy shell 
striking the water near the ship. Whether any shell 
hit us or not during the retirement is unlikely to be 
known. One could hardly see one's own feet. The 
ship had already been hit so often that any further 
damage of the same description would hardly have 
been noticed. Suffice it to say that no vital damage 
to the hull was received. 



242 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

After steaming for twenty minutes the first lieu- 
tenant reported a light off the starboard bow. It was 
the Blankenberghe buoy, which we had passed during 
the approach. We altered course to pass close to the 
buoy and then for our line of retirement. 

Presently the dark form of a vessel was sighted 
ahead. Our guns' crews were ready for any emer- 
gency, but the vessel proved to be H.M.S. Moorsom, 
one of the patrolling destroyers. All the bridge sig- 
nalling lamps had been destroyed. With an ordinary 
pocket torch we flashed a signal requesting Moorsom 
to lead us as our compass was hopeless. 

On the way across to Zeebrugge my anxiety with 
regard to accuracy of compass course had led me to 
criticise the steering of one of the quartermasters. 
Now, on the return voyage, I had become quarter- 
master, in the absence of Petty Officer Youlton, and 
am afraid the steering was execrable. That fact was 
officially recorded by the Commanding Officer of 
Moorsom who, knowing nothing about our amateur 
steersmanship, reported, "... Vindictive appeared 
. . . steering a very erratic course!" Fortunately the 
services of another petty officer, as steersman, were 
obtained later on. 

Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman combined the 
duties of lookout and navigator ; his advice was most 
helpful. A visit from the stretcher parties relieved 
the congestion in the conning tower. Another mem- 
orable incident was the arrival of the Paymaster with 
a jug full of a certain stimulating beverage which put 
new life into us; I shall not complete the testimonial. 

Several signals were interchanged with Moorsom 
on the subject of shoals; it was a great relief when 



HOMEWARD BOUND 243' 

we eventually located a buoy marking a danger spot. 

Vindictive was steaming nearly seventeen knots 
until daylight — a great achievement on the part of 
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Bury and his de- 
partment. 

Soon after daylight a destroyer was observed to be 
racing up from astern at high speed. She quickly 
ranged up alongside and proved to be H.M.S. War- 
wick. The first signal from her, "Well done, Vindic- 
tive^^ cheered us up immensely, not because of its 
actual import, but because it looked very much as if 
the Vice-Admiral were alive. To make sure we en- 
quired if that surmise was correct and, greatly to our 
relief, received a reply in the affirmative. 

H.M.S, Warwick had continued throughout the 
operation to patrol in a central position, namely, near 
the Mole lighthouse. She had come under a heavy 
fire and altogether experienced a couple of hectic 
hours. Soon after one o'clock she had moved towards 
Vindictive and suddenly came upon the latter leaving 
the Mole. Vindictive' s smoke screen made it impos- 
sible to keep touch, so the Vice-Admiral decided to 
search for Iris and Daffodil in case they should re- 
quire assistance. Shortly after this M.L. 282 was met 
and transferred her blockship survivors to Warwick^ 
who was also informed that Iris and Daffodil had 
left the Mole. Warwick then escorted some motor 
launches out of the danger zone, and, after rallying 
several other craft at a prearranged rendezvous, she 
steered for Dover and overtook Vindictive as men- 
tioned above. 

Admiral Keyes ordered Moorsom to lead Vindic- 
tive to Dover, to which place Warwick proceeded at 



244 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

high speed to land her wounded and to arrange for 
the arrival of the casualties from the remaining 
vessels. 

The weather being misty, we did not sight Dover 
until within a mile or so. Our reception was wonder- 
ful, the result of the operation being already known 
at Dover. I think everybody cheered himself hoarse 
that morning. Presently we were ordered to pro- 
ceed alongside the railway jetty. Within me there 
was some feeling of satisfaction at having berthed the 
ship at Zeebrugge, a place which I had never seen, in 
face of certain difficulties additional to the tide. Any 
feeling of pride, however, was quickly dispelled when, 
in accordance with the routine of the port, on my 
ship being ordered to proceed alongside Dover jetty 
in broad daylight, with no opposition from the enemy, 
and with every convenience in the way of hawsers and 
bollards, a -pilot was sent on hoard to handle her! 

On arrival alongside the wounded were disem- 
barked into a Red Cross train, which immediately 
took them off to hospital. Those who had laid down 
their lives were then carried ashore; this, indeed, was a 
sad parting. Finally we moved out to a buoy to make 
room for other vessels. 

After our arrival at Dover it was discovered that 
a large block of concrete was jambed between a 
fender and a ledge on the port side of the ship. Ap- 
parently a German shell fired from one of the heavy 
land batteries had struck the upper part of the outer 
wall and had torn away this block, which fell into the 
position mentioned. This concrete block, weighing 
nearly half a ton, was hoisted on board. A few pieces 
were taken as souvenirs. The main portion was pre- 




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A SOUVENIR FROM THE MOLE 245 

sented to the Imperial War Museum and formed 
rather a unique piece of evidence, not only of the fact 
that Vindictive lay alongside the Mole, but of the 
exact position at which the Mole was stormed. The 
illustration facing page 74 shows the damaged portion 
of the wall from which this block of concrete was torn. 
Daffodil was exceedingly fortunate in having 
escaped serious damage. Her hull had been exposed 
to the fire of the German batteries throughout the 
whole hour and the odd minutes during which she 
had been keeping Vindictive alongside the Mole. On 
the retirement signal being made everything was 
prepared for towing the bows of Vindictive away from 
the wall. Immediately the order was received, Lieu- 
tenant Campbell turned his ship and commenced to 
tow. The hawser had parted almost at once, but that 
was of no consequence. Daffodil then steamed away 
to the northward under cover of her own artificial 
smoke and eventually spoke H.M.S. Trident, The 
latter took her in tow and brought her safely to Dover, 
which was reached at i p.m. The enthusiastic recep- 
tion commenced all over again. It must be realised 
that the fate of each vessel was unknown to the ma- 
jority of the remainder until some hours after the 
completion of the operation. 

It has already been described how /m, after leaving 
Vindictive and suffering severe damage from hostile 
gun-fire, had been smoke-screened by a motor boat 
and had disappeared from view. This smoke screen, 
augmented by further smoke from their own appa- 
ratus, undoubtedly saved Iris from destruction. 
Under the directions of Lieutenant Oscar Henderson, 
R.N., who had assumed command after his captain 



246 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

had been mortally wounded, Iris steamed away to 
seaward and eventually proceeded to Dover under 
her own steam, whilst being escorted by other vessels 
met with in the small hours. She arrived at Dover 
at 2.45 P.M. and, once more, everybody cheered him- 
self hoarse. 

At intervals throughout the forenoon and afternoon 
of the 23 d the several vessels and craft arrived at 
Dover. We then had the opportunity of piecing to- 
gether the information obtained from each unit and 
were thus able to gauge the probable results attained. 

The air force had been requested to obtain new 
photographs of Zeebrugge as early as practicable, 
but the sky was so clouded over that no absolutely 
indisputable evidence was obtained until 2 p.m., 
when a photograph was taken through a chink in the 
clouds. This photograph showed the positions of the 
inner blockships and the break in the railway viaduct. 
The operation had been an unqualified success. 

The operation at Ostende had unfortunately failed. 
The difficulties of navigation had been accentuated 
by the change of wind which brought the artificial fog 
back to seaward. The consequent obscuration of the 
harbour entrance made it necessary to place some 
dependence on a buoy which had, unknown to us and 
by the merest coincidence, just been moved a mile or 
so to the eastward by the enemy. In spite of the most 
gallant attempt by Commander A. E. Godsal in 
H.M.S. Brilliant and Lieutenant-Commander H. N. 
M. Hardy in H.M.S. Sirius, ably assisted as they 
were by their officers and men and by a large number 
of other craft, the blocking attempt had not achieved 
success. The Vice-Admiral decided, therefore, to 



THE OPERATION AT OSTENDE 247 

make another attempt at the earliest possible mo- 
ment. Vindictive, being the only suitable vessel avail- 
able, was immediately prepared for this further 
service. Owing to a continuation of impossible 
weather conditions the operation could not be carried 
out until May loth; thus it is clear that if our expe- 
dition had not started on their journey on April 22d 
the operation at Zeebrugge could not have taken 
place during the allotted period. 

Just one other reference to the further use of Vin- 
dictive cannot be omitted. Immediately on their re- 
turn, after the failure to block Ostende, both officers 
who have been mentioned above as commanding the 
blockships at that place, begged to be given ships for 
a further attempt. They had failed through no fault 
of their own and had gone through some terrible ex- 
f>eriences. Nothing could curb their ardour, and I 
believe they gave the Vice-Admiral no peace until he 
consented to give them another chance. Poor Godsal. 
Nothing could have been finer than his handling of 
the old Vindictive on the night of May Qth-ioth, but 
he was killed at the very moment when complete suc- 
cess seemed to be assured; Ostende was partially 
blocked. 

It was with considerable feelings of regret that, on 
April 25th, we made way in Vindictive for the new 
crew destined to take her to Ostende. It was a sad 
farewell. 

The behaviour of the wounded had been splendid ; 
their cheerfulness was unbounded. One poor fellow 
who had suffered severe internal injuries as well as 
the loss of both legs was asked if he was sorry that 
he went over to Zeebrugge. He replied, "No, sir, 



248 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

because I got on the Mole." That was all that mat- 
tered to him. There was practically no chance of 
saving his life, but "he had got on the Mole." 

The spirit of all the men in Vindictive was fine. 
Nevertheless, I do not deceive myself into imagining 
that these men were exceptional. They only repre- 
sented one small contingent of many which fought at 
Zeebrugge and Ostende on St. George's Day; the 
combined crews of all the vessels in the operation 
only represented a trifling percentage of our total 
naval personnel ; the behaviour of my men was merely 
typical of all those others. 

Those of our survivors who had not been sent to 
hospital with wounds proceeded on a few days' leave 
before rejoining their depots or their ships in the 
Grand Fleet. What a piratical appearance the crew 
presented on their departure! Many of them had 
lost all their clothes, except those in which they stood 
during the action. Those others whose clothes had 
survived the fight were not much better off. The 
souvenir hunters had raided my ship, had "picked 
up" some of the men's belongings, and had even been 
inconsiderate enough to break into my cabin and 
make a complete clearance of the officers' handbags 
placed there for safety. 

One last story of a personal nature. On receipt of 
the news at Dover a young officer, in his desire to do 
me a kindness, decided to wire the good news to my 
wife. He forgot that she would know nothing of the 
enterprise or even of its preparation, and he worded 
the telegram: "Operation successful. Husband quite 
all right." The recipient's feelings may be easily 
imagined; she guessed it was appendicitis! 




^<<'ik 



CHAPTER IX 

THE MATERIAL RESULTS 

THE results of the operations on the night of 
April 22-23, 191 8, were undoubtedly impor- 
tant. They can be classified under the two 
headings of "material" and "moral." 

The degree of moral effect cannot usually be as- 
sessed until long after an operation has been com- 
pleted. Recognisable evidence comes to hand very 
gradually. The actual results of moral effect may be 
early experienced without being recognised, espe- 
cially in the case of effect on the enemy's morale. 

Material results are more easily gauged. In this 
particular case photographic evidence was soon ob- 
tainable. 

I must recall to the reader's mind the description of 
the entrance channel of the canal. It was shown in 
Part I, Chapter II, how very narrow the navigable 
channel had become owing to the silting of the sand, 
and how rapidly the latter process would accentuate 
the obstructive quality of a sunken vessel. It was 
also shown why the channel at the shore end of the 
two curved piers was the ideal position at which to 
place the blockships. Intrepid and Iphigenia had been 
sunk by us exactly at their selected positions. Each 
vessel spanned right across the dredged channel, and 
therefore blocked it effectually. For the first time in 
naval history a blocking operation had been carried 
out successfully in the face of up-to-date defence 
measures. 



250 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

Some of the photographs, taken at high tide, appear 
to show sufficient space through which vessels could 
pass on either side of the blockships. But the pres- 
ence of water does not signify the presence o^ sufficient 
water to float such craft as submarines and destroyers 
even at high tide. Two other photographs show 
clearly that the ends of the vessels were practically 
on the edges of the sandbanks. 

The Germans, as prompt in propaganda as they 
were unenterprising in sea-fighting, at once published 
a communique to the effect that the operation had 
utterly failed, adding that the blockships had been 
sunk by the German batteries before reaching their 
goal. Curiously enough, their official statements were 
strangely silent on the subject of prisoners. They 
also averred that the attack on the Mole had been 
driven back. Not content with these "terminolog- 
ical inexactitudes," they went so far as to take a 
photograph to prove their contention. The photo- 
graph was taken with the camera pointed inland. 
The land was eliminated from the background in the 
original so as to give the impression that the camera 
was pointing out to sea. A line was drawn between, 
and parallel to, the blockships and marked "The line 
of the channel," whereas it was a line nearly at right 
angles to the channel. Words were added to the ef- 
fect that the photograph proved clearly that the chan- 
nel was not blocked, and copies of the photograph 
were circulated all over Germany and neutral coun- 
tries. What wonderful liars! — but clumsy! The amus- 
ing part of it was that we knew the German naval 
authorities reported "Zeebrugge is blocked" to their 
craft stationed elsewhere, and, further, our airmen 



THE WORK OF SALVAGE 251 

obtained photographs day after day showing some 
twenty-three torpedo craft and twelve submarines 
bottled up at Bruges. 

From the morning after the operation until the 
Germans finally evacuated Zeebrugge, our aerial 
bombers dropped, on the average, four tons of bombs 
daily on that place. Our special measures with re- 
gard to constructive work in each blockship, designed 
to hamper the work of salvage, must have presented 
the enemy with a formidable problem. The work of 
clearing the channel was certainly not assisted by the 
dropping of bombs upon the salvors. To what extent 
the Germans attempted to remove the vessels is un- 
known to me, but we do know well enough that none 
of the three was moved a foot nor were they cut away 
to allow vessels to pass over them. Thanks to our 
airmen, we knew, almost from hour to hour, what 
measures were being taken to dredge a new channel. 
I believe that no torpedo craft or submarines could 
use the exit for a considerable time, and that about 
five months elapsed before they could enter or leave 
the canal at any other period than the top of high 
tide. 

Having contrived that each blockship should em- 
body all the main obstacles to salvage work, we were 
more or less confident that, if once placed in position, 
these ships could not be easily removed. Subse- 
quently, at the earliest opportunity, our own salvage 
service commenced their endeavours to clear the 
canal. In January, 192 1, two years and three months 
after Zeebrugge was again in the hands of the Allies, 
the last of the three blockships was moved sufficiently 
to enable the channel to be used with freedom. A 



252 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

great amount of labour and money had already been 
expended, but still further efforts were required be- 
fore the canal could be altogether freed from obstruc- 
tions. One may certainly remark that the canal was 
"well and truly blocked." 

Information reached us afterwards that the Kaiser 
personally visited Zeebrugge shortly after the opera- 
tion so that he could discover the actual truth for 
himself. What his remarks were on arrival is not 
known to me, but a photograph in my possession, 
taken on that occasion, certainly does not give him 
an air of affability. 

The main material result, then, was that the canal 
was blocked and that the services of twelve subma- 
rines and twenty-three torpedo craft were unavail- 
able for a considerable period. As long as the canal 
remained blocked, German submarines detailed for 
operating against Allied commerce in the English 
Channel and other waters outside the North Sea 
were, for the most part, compelled to do so from the 
Heligoland Bight. This increased the length of voy- 
age to and from their areas of operation and conse- 
quently reduced the duration of their stay in such 
waters. 

But there were other material results. Firstly, the 
German High Command considered it necessary to 
send reenforcements to Ostende in the shape of mod- 
ern destroyers. Now vessels, like individuals, cannot 
be in two places at once. Those sent to Ostende had 
to be drawn away from the Heligoland Bight, con- 
sequently the forces in the latter area were weakened 
in strength pro rata. 

The loss of German lives and vessels and the dam- 



THE RECKONING 253 

age sustained during the action were by no means 
negligible. 

Then again the efficiency of Bruges as a naval base 
was greatly lessened because the canal exit to Ostende 
proved to be too shallow for the larger craft. The 
fuel, dockyard, and stores at Bruges were also ren- 
dered comparatively useless as means of support for 
sea-going vessels. 

The Mole, as a seaplane base, must have lost much 
of its value owing to the severance of the railway com- 
munication, heavy stores having to be transported 
to the Mole by sea-carriers. Finally, the work of 
"locking the stable door after the horse had been 
stolen," as practised by the enemy on this occasion, 
entailed extra mining at sea, mounting additional 
guns on the outer wall, and covering the floor of the 
Mole with such an abundance of barbed wire as to 
make the place exceedingly uncomfortable for them- 
selves. 

Our own losses consisted of one destroyer and two 
motor launches; no other vessel was rendered unfit 
for further services. Our casualties at Zeebrugge 
amounted to approximately one hundred and seventy 
killed, four hundred wounded, and forty-five missing; 
the majority of the latter were believed to have been 
killed. The casualties in Vindictive, including her 
storming parties, were sixty killed and one hundred 
and seventy-one wounded. 

With regard to the loss of material we had not paid 
a high price considering the results achieved. The 
loss of personnel was small in comparison with losses 
sustained in military fighting, but was none the less 
keenly felt by those of us who had been in personal 



254 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

touch with these splendid fellows. They had all 
realised the danger and had been perfectly willing to 
lay down their lives in the attainment of the desired 
end. They did not die in vain. 



T 



CHAPTER X 

THE MORAL EFFECT 

^ g ^HE moral effect on the enemy was shown, to 
a certain degree, almost at once. The fact 
that they thought it necessary to indulge in 
falsehood to appease their own countrymen, although 
they must have realised that the truth would inevi- 
tably become known, was clear enough proof that their 
morale was badly shaken. 

Their earliest report stated that the attack had 
failed and that three British cruisers had been sunk 
at Zeebrugge. The latter portion of the statement 
was correct. The ships had, indeed, been sunk — by 
ourselves. All reference to the destruction of the via- 
duct was withheld until later. The fact of no prisoners 
being captured from any of the three British cruisers 
was never mentioned. As soon as our own reports 
had been circulated, the German authorities appar- 
ently considered it necessary to account for our 
success by stating that some Belgian fishermen had 
been arrested for piloting our vessels into position! 

Imagine, for a moment, the effect on our own pub- 
lic if they heard that the enemy had attacked Dover, 
stormed the breakwater and remained in possession 
of it for over an hour, destroyed the railway jetty, 
and blocked the entrance. Even such a case as that 
would not be wholly analogous, for the blockships 
at Zeebrugge had sunk themselves nearly a mile 
inside the outer entrance. Imagine the outcry and the 



2S6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

question, "What is the Navy doing?" It is not diffi- 
cult to conceive the downfall of highly placed person- 
ages and the feeling of insecurity that would pervade 
the atmosphere in our own country. Not only would 
the public be shaken by such news, but the loss of 
morale would be felt in the fighting services, firstly 
as a result of their own ineptitude, and secondly 
because of the visions of further enemy operations 
which would be conjured up. 

Some such effect as described above was inevitable 
amongst both the German civilian element and their 
fighting services. We know that the operation caused 
a great scare at Bruges. Many of the German officials 
there hurriedly collected their effects ready for 
evacuating the city; it had been reported that the 
allies were landing an immense force on the coast of 
Flanders. 

It is not generally known that friendship between 
the German Navy and Army was conspicuous by 
its absence. They had been at daggers drawn for 
some years; the Crown Prince himself was in the 
habit of being openly rude to naval officers of 
high rank. This antagonism was evidenced recently 
in a letter written by a certain German general to 
his brother-in-law, a young officer in our Navy. 
Apparently the general hated the German Navy to 
such an extent that his letter remarked that there 
were two British officers with whom he particularly 
desired to shake hands — one was the officer in 
charge of our siege guns on the Flanders coast and the 
other was the officer commanding the attack on Zee- 
brugge ; his friendly feelings arose from the fact that 
these two officers had "put it across" that section 



EFFECT ON GERMAN MORALE 257 

of the German Navy which had charge of the 
Flanders coast defences. 

The German Information Bureau had never ceased 
to sing the praises of their Navy; that fact was con- 
ducive to increasing the shock received by the enemy 
when they learned the truth. Many excuses have 
been invented in Germany to account for the fact 
that the final breakdown of morale which immedi- 
ately preceded the ignominious flight of their War 
Lord emanated from the so-called High Seas Fleet, 
and that this breakdown coincided with the receipt 
of orders to try conclusions with our fleet. It can 
hardly be styled far-fetched if one suggests that the 
loss of morale was intimately connected with the situ- 
ation at sea. It is also not outside the bounds of 
possibility that, in some measure, the events of St. 
George's Day, 191 8, assisted towards the debacle. A 
certain highly placed German official at Bruges cer- 
tainly exaggerated when he averred that "the hopes 
of the Fatherland were buried at Zeebrugge," but 
such a statement as that clearly indicates the weaken- 
ing of confidence. 

The other aspect of the efi^ect on morale may be 
worthy of mention. I refer to the effect on our own 
public, on our fighting services, and on neutral and 
Allied countries. 

The great German military offensive, which every- 
body realised indicated the supreme effort on the 
part of the enemy, was in full swing in the month of 
April. The Allied troops were stubbornly contesting 
every inch of ground, but were being steadily pushed 
back on important sections of the main battle front. 
The British Fifth Army had suffered appalling losses. 



258 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

The Allies had their backs to the wall. The tension 
at home was apparent in all walks of life, and the 
extremely anxious days of 1914 were being repeated. 
Future generations will never be able to realise the 
depression and anxiety which pervaded the public 
mind. Everybody was wondering what the outcome 
would be, and there were days when one hardly dared 
to scan the morning paper. That very fact had pro- 
vided us with an additional reason for wishing to 
register a success. 

There is very little doubt that the success attained 
had a marked effect on the public; the latter fairly 
jumped at the opportunity to show enthusiasm. In 
addition to that, the public palate was tickled by 
the unusual and apparently spectacular nature of the 
attack. 

This sudden rise of the "moralometer" served a 
good purpose. The pessimist changed his tune, the 
optimist earned the qualification "cheery." To those 
ignorant of naval matters the operation seemed to 
have bordered on the accomplishment of the impos- 
sible. "We always knew," they declared, "that our 
fighting men were invincible." Their old certainty 
of ultimate victory was re-born. That was all to the 
good. Modern war is national war. War is not merely 
a struggle between fighting forces, but between the 
opposing "crowds." The destruction of an enemy's 
Army or Navy is of primary importance as a means 
to an end, but the ultimate end and aim of each bel- 
ligerent is to exert influence on the "crowd," to 
nourish the will to win amongst their own public and 
to bring about a feeling of hopeless despair, a com- 
plete loss of morale, throughout the enemy's country. 



EFFECT ON BRITISH MORALE 259 

It is for that important reason that the sentiments of 
one's own pubhc must ever be borne in mind by the 
Higher Command. 

The receipt of the news on the western front is re- 
ported to have been beneficial. Every fighting force 
must occasionally have its dark days ; they are never 
so dark that news of success on another front will fail 
to bring a ray of light. Those of us in the fleet itself 
had often experienced such feelings of elation when 
our military brothers had brought ofi^ a "coup." The 
Navy and Army, and the Air Force with them, are 
one at heart. The fighting services are interdepend- 
ent. Our Navy cannot win a war unaided any more 
than our Army can prevent Great Britain from being 
defeated by starvation. The waging of war, in the 
case of a maritime country which is unselfsupporting, 
cannot rightly be divided into naval warfare, military 
warfare, and combined naval and military operations, 
though the three types are commonly referred to and 
in that order. All war in which the British Empire 
is involved is in the nature of combined naval and 
military warfare. The actions of one arm are inevi- 
tably reflected in the other. 

The Grand Fleet, from which so many of our offi- 
cers and men were drawn for the operation on St. 
George's Day, was naturally elated at the result. 
Certainly the morale in the fleet had always been of 
a high order, but an extra touch of enthusiasm was 
not without value. 

Of the effect in neutral countries I am not compe- 
tent to speak, but I have some personal knowledge 
of the manner in which the news was received in the 
United States. The enthusiam in that part of the 



26o THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

world was genuine enough and undoubtedly assisted 
to cement the friendship between that country and 
our own Empire, a friendship which has a firm foun- 
dation even if the latter be occasionally hidden 
beneath a political superstructure which we are apt 
to mistake for the foundation itself. 



CHAPTER XI 

SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE 

THIS book would be incomplete if I omitted 
to append some general remarks on the opera- 
tion and on the factors which led to success. 
First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in com- 
parisons. The enterprise described in this book at- 
tracted attention owing to its somewhat unusual 
type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless, 
there are many points of similarity between the attack 
on Zeebrugge and the military trench raids which 
took place night after night on the Allied fronts. The 
preliminary bombardment, the advance under cover 
of darkness and smoke, the wild firing of star shell, the 
rush across No Man's Land, the encounter with 
barbed wire and other defence material, the leap 
down into the enemy's trench, the hand-to-hand 
fighting, the holding of the position whilst demolition 
work was in progress, and the final withdrawal when 
the object had been attained ; such was a trench raid 
as carried out again and again by our brothers in the 
Army. In their case the following day brought a two- 
line communique, e.g., "Last night in the Ypres 
salient our troops carried out a trench raid ; they cap- 
tured seven prisoners." In our case the communique 
and unofl[icial reports filled many pages. I would 
warn the reader not to be misled into thinking that 
the military raids were any less hazardous than our 
own. 



262 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

The story provides just one more illustration of the 
fact that, however large may loom the difficulties with 
which one is confronted, the means to overcome them 
can usually be found if one possesses the "will to win 
through." 

The fundamental principles of war demand the 
Offensive and Concentration. The all-important ele- 
ment of strategy to be utilised against a strongly en- 
trenched enemy is that of Surprise. From the latter 
spring Diversion and Mystification. 

An attempt has been made to describe the manner 
in which the seemingly impossible was accomplished 
without very great difficulty. 

The plan was built up on the foundation of surprise 
— not surprise in the sense that something would sud- 
denly occur where all had been quiet up to that mo- 
ment, but surprise in that the real object of the enter- 
prise would be concealed up to the latest possible 
moment, the concealment to be brought about by 
mystifying the enemy and diverting his attention. 

Whilst concentrating all available powers of of- 
fence against the enemy, and allowing nothing to 
divert us from our main object, we took every step 
to bewilder the defence and to shift the weight of the 
difficulties upon the shoulders of our opponents. But 
that was only the foundation. The material brought 
into use was the best available at the moment; it is 
not suggested that, given further time, it would have 
been incapable of improvement. 

Earlier in this book a few remarks were offered on 
the importance of the personnel. Many further re- 
marks could now be added after the story has been 
told. I only propose, however, to deal with certain 



THE AUXILIARY SERVICES 263 

aspects which, by their nature, are less likely to be 
reaHsed by the man-in-the-street. 

It has already been mentioned that a considerable 
percentage of the vessels and craft engaged in the 
attack were commanded and manned by officers and 
men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve. The majority of the smoke- 
screening craft and rescue craft came under that 
heading. Without the smoke the operation must have 
failed. Without the rescue work the price paid for 
success would have been excessive. These represent- 
atives of the auxiliary naval services earned a full 
measure of admiration. Their daring in the face of 
danger, their coolness in situations which lacked 
nothing in excitement, their initiative when con- 
fronted with the unexpected, and their perfect co- 
operation with the remaining forces engaged in the 
enterprise, were worthy of the best traditions of the 
Navy. The more that one considers the dependence 
upon seamanship, the practical use of technical 
knowledge, the mental and physical strain, the value 
of perfect discipline, and the initiative called for on 
such an occasion, the greater is one's admiration for 
these fine fellows of whom the majority had seen com- 
paratively little of sea life and had lacked that severity 
of training which is inseparable from the naval 
profession. 

The reports of all Commanding Officers contained 
one particular similarity — I refer to the behaviour 
of the men. The cynic who might be inclined to dis- 
count such unqualified praise, on the plea that the 
men were specially chosen, could easily be silenced. 
The specially selected personnel were certainly picked 



264 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

with difficulty, not because the desired qualities were 
rare, but for exactly the opposite reason. The Grand 
Fleet and naval bases contained many thousands of 
such men ; the embarrassment lay in deciding who 
of these thousands should be taken to make up the 
seventeen hundred and eighty personnel required. 
But the latter were only required for some ten vessels 
out of one hundred and sixty-two; required because 
those ten vessels were out of commission and there- 
fore had no crews. The remaining one hundred and 
fifty-two vessels and craft took part in the operation 
with their ordinary crews, and I repeat that the be- 
haviour of the crews of all units was exemplary. 

But co-operation between units, and efficiency of 
individuals, are not alone sufficient to ensure success. 
Absolute confidence and perfect co-operation between 
officers and men, founded on true discipline, is of vital 
importance. Without these, little or nothing can be 
achieved in war. The seeds of these vital requirements 
were sown by our forefathers. Those of our predeces- 
sors who, although too old to serve in the Great War, 
were still in the land of the living had reason to feel 
proud at the success attained by their pupils. 

There is one other human aspect which cannot 
be omitted without leaving a serious blank in these 
pages. That aspect is the one of Leadership. 

Leadership has been defined as that power in a man 
which causes others to follow him irrespective of the 
direction in which he leads. 

It would be a presumption, almost amounting to an 
impertinence, for me to endeavour to measure out the 
praise which is due to the Vice-Admiral in command 
of the enterprise, now Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. 



THE MORAL 265 

The reader will understand my difficulty. In past 
history, again and again, it was manifest that some of 
the outstanding factors which led to success were the 
personality of the leader, the supreme confidence in 
him held by all ranks, his realisation of the powers 
and limits of his subordinates, his personal courage, 
and his intensity of purpose. The outstanding factors 
which brought success on the particular occasion de- 
scribed in this book have served to repeat and illus- 
trate these old historical lessons. 

A few more words and I shall have finished. 

I venture to suggest that this particular exploit pro- 
vides just one more example, such as are recorded 
again and again in the histories of most civilised 
countries, of what can be accomplished in the face of 
difficulty. Unfortunately, when hostilities cease, we 
are prone to forget, not only the sacrifices by which 
successes were achieved, but also the principles which 
guided us in the achievement. We are all ready 
enough to admit that confidence and co-operation are 
of prime necessity for the preservation of our lives and 
our interests when danger threatens us in war, but, 
somehow, when the welfare of communities is threat- 
ened in days of so-called peace, by international sus- 
picions, by revolutionary doctrines, by economic 
difficulties, by unemployment, and by political 
schisms, we weaken ourselves as a result of deconcen- 
trating into numberless camps, one against the other, 
in direct opposition to those fundamental principles 
which are the root cause of our existence. 

It is all very strange, and, I suppose, very human, 
for nothing is stranger than humanity. How many of 
us reahse that our superiority over the rest of the ani- 



266 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE 

mal world is directly attributable to the fact that hu- 
man beings, alone, have sufficient understanding to 
combine when danger threatens ? Having successfully- 
combined for the greatest of all causes, are we now to 
revert to the instincts of the inferior animals ? Are we 
to persuade ourselves that co-operation merely results 
from paper treaties rather than from a common spirit, 
forgetting that officers and men, armies and navies, 
needed no signed agreements between them for the 
overthrow of the greatest menace to civilisation that 
the world has ever seen? 

The Great War is over; is a Great Peace to fol- 
low? 

What is our object? Surely it is the welfare of 
civilised communities and the progress of those who 
are less enlightened. 

There will always be secondary objects calculated 
to divert us from our purpose. There will always be 
individuals who, for their own ends, will endeavour 
to sow discord and confuse the issue. It is of para- 
mount importance that we keep our object in view, 
and that we cultivate intensity of purpose and whole- 
heartedness, without which our object is unattain- 
able. 

We know that the right spirit exists, but it is of 
little value if we keep it locked away within us until 
disaster is imminent; the mere fact of its existence 
cannot keep us free from danger any more than the 
existence of medicine stored at the apothecary's can 
protect us from infection and illness. 

Let each one of us, each class, each sect, each na- 
tion, each group of nations, do all that is humanly 
possible to foster that spirit, to further mutual under- 



THE MORAL 267 

standing, to breed confidence in one another, and to 
co-operate for the weal of all. 

Without such confidence and co-operation success is 
impossible; with them, our well-being is assured. 



THE END 



APPENDIX 

The following vessels and craft took part in the simultane- 
ous blocking operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende. 
The Zeebrugge Enterprise 
(a) Special services during the oversea voyage 
Aerial Escort — 

6ist Wing of Royal Air Force. 
Other services — 

Special service vessel Lingfield, Motor Launches Nos. 
555, 557. 

(b) Offshore forces 

Outer Patrol — 

Scout — Attentive. 

Destroyers — Scott, Ulleszvater, Teazer, Stork. 
Long-range Bombardment — 
Monitors — Erebus, Terror. 
Destroyers — Termagant, Truculent, Manly. 

(c) Inshore forces 

Flagship — 

Destroyer — Warwick (Flag of Vice-Admiral R. J. B. 
Keyes). 
Blockships — 

Light Cruisers — Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia. 
Storming Vessels — 

Light Cruiser — Vindictive. 

Special vessels — Iris, Daffodil. 
Attack on Viaduct — 

Submarines — C I, C 3, and one picket boat. 
Aerial Attack — 

Aircraft — 65th Wing, Royal Air Force. 
Other Operations — 

Destroyers — Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield, 
Whirlwind, Myngs, Felox, Morris, Moorsom, Mel- 
pomene. 



270 APPENDIX 

Motor Launches — Nos. 79, no, 121, 128, 223, 239, 
241, 252, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308, 314, 345, 397, 
416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533, 549, 552, 558, 
560, 561, 562. 

Coastal Motor Boats — Nos. 5, 7, 15, 16A, 17A, 21B, 
22B, 23B, 24A, 25BD, 26B, 27A, 28A, 30B, 32A, 35A. 

The Ostende Enterprise 
{a) Bombarding forces 

Monitors — 

Marshall Soult, Lord Clive^ Prince Eugene^ General Crau- 
furd, M. 24, M. 26, M. 21. 
Destroyers — 

Mentor, Lightfoot, Zubian. 
Motor Launches — 

Nos. 249, 448, 538, and three others. 
French Destroyers and Torpedo Boats --" 

Lestin, RouXj Bouclier, and Torpedo Boats Nos. i, 2, 3, 
and 34. 
French Motor Launches — Nos. i, 2, 33, 34. 
British Siege Guns in Flanders. 

(b) Inshore forces 
Blockships — - 

Light Cruisers — Sirius, Brilliant. 
Destroyers — 

Swift, Faulknor, Matchless^ Mastiff, Afridi, Tempest, 
Tetrarch. 
Motor Launches — 

Nos. II, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279, 
283, 429, 512, 532, 551, 556. 
Coastal Motor Boats — 
Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 29A, 34A. 

Covering Squadron for both Enterprises 
Forces from Harwich — 
Light Cruisers, seven. 
Leaders, two. 
Destroyers, fourteen. 



INDEX 



Acetylene gas, use of, for salvage, 47, 

Adams, Lieut.-Comdr. B. F., R.N., 187, 

188, 200, 201 
Admiralty, Board of, responsibility of, 

Aerial attack — 

at first attempt, 146, 147 

at final attempt, 171 
Jfridi, H.M.S., App. 
Aircraft — 

German in Flanders, 6, 41 

utility in defence, 40, 41 
Allied lines of communication, 3, 12, 13 
Anchoring of Vindictive, 184 
Approach, the story of the, 173 ff. 
Astronomical conditions, 134 
Attack, expected duration of, 132, 134 
Attempt — 

the first, 141 /., 15s 

the second, 153, 154 

the final start, 165 
Attentive, H.M.S., App. 

Babb, Sub-Lieut., R.N., 230 ' 
Bamford, Captain E., R.M.L.L, 203 
Barrage firing from coast batteries, 37 
Bases, use of advanced, 19 
Beatty, Admiral Sir David, 63, 104, 

105, 107, 108 
Billyard-Leake, Lieut. Edward W., 

R.N., 226, 231, 234, 23 s 
Blake, Able-Seaman F. E., R.N,, 209 
Blake, Sub-Lieut. L. R., R.N.R., 218 
Blankenberghe, 

buoy,_ 174, 175, 242 

description, 8, 9 

German craft at, il, 12, 190 
Blocking — 

alternative methods of, 17, 42, 43 

favourable position for, 44 

influence of current, 57 

previous attempts elsewhere, 54-56, 

summary of difficulties, 41, 56 

Blockships — 

capabilities of, 49, 52, 69, 70 
credit due to, 73, 234, 235 
difficulty of sinking, 56, 57, 58 
preparatory work in, 52, lOO 
types of, 45-47, 69, 70 
See Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia 



Blockship's crews, disembarkation of 

surplus, 124, 125, 170, 171 
Boddie, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr., R.N., 

228 
Bombardment — 

by our monitors, 16, 84, 174, 175 
previous attempts at, 35, 43, 44 
Bonham-Carter, Lieut. Stuart S., 

R.N., 226, 228, 230, 234, 235 
Botha, H.M.S., 91; App. 
Boudier, French destroyer, App. 
Bowen, Lieut. G., 225 
Bradford, Lieut. George N., R.N., 206, 

207 
Brilliant, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App. 
British morale, effect on, 258, 259 
Brock, Wing-Commander Frank, 

R.N.A.S., 98, IIS, 116, 153, 187, 

200 
Bruges, 9, 10, 11, 270 
Brussels, merchant steamer, 29 
Buckley, Yeoman of Signals John, 

R.N., 189, 190 
Buoys, lack of dependence on, 8, 91, 92 
Bury, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr. W. A., 

R.N., 184, 243 

Calais, 13 

Cameroon River, German attempt to 

block, 58 
Campbell, Lieut. H. G., R.N., 185, 

188, 189, 240, 245 
Campbell, Commander V. L. A., R.N., 

220 
Canal system in Flanders, 9-11 
Casualties, British, 253, 254 
Cement, use of, in blockships, 52 
Chappell, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 

224 
Chevallier, Sub-Lieut. F. E., R.N., 205 
Clerical work, 140 
Coast defences, German, 35-38 
Coastal Motor Boats, 144, 145, 149- 

151 
No. 5, 219; App. 
No. 7, 218, 233; App, 
No. 16, 217; App. 
Nos. 21, 25, 26, 219; App. 
No. 22B, 217; App. 
No. 23B, 217, 232; App. 
No. 32, 219, 220; App. 
Nos. 2,4, 10, 12, 15, I7A,I9,20,24A, 



272 



INDEX 



27A, 28A, 29A, 30B, 34A, 3sA; 

App. 
Collins, Captain Ralph, R.N., 224 
Command of the sea, 3, 4 
Compasses, damage to — in Vindic- 
tive, 239, 240 
Concentration, 144, 145, 262 
Cooke, Lieut. F. T. V., R.M.L.I., 203 
Co-operation, value of, 264 
Cordner, Major, R.M.L.I., 182 
Cory-Wright, Lieut., R.N., 230 
Crews, size of, in blockships, 86, 124. 

Daffodil, H.M.S. — 

choice of, 79, 80 

duties of, 81, 86, 176 

fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119 

previous history, 80 

proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 188, 
189, 199, 205, 237, 240 

retirement of, 245 
Dallas-Brooks, Captain Reginald, 

R.M.A., 192, 193, 194 
Darkness, use of, 37, 38, 132 
Davidson, Captain A. P., R.N., III 
Deane, Lieut. Percy T., R.N.V.R., 232, 

233 
Defence measures, 61, 62 
Defences, summary of German, 41 
Demolition — 

object of, 76, 77, 19s, 196 

training for, iii, 112 

the work of, 189, 205 
Depths — 

at Blankenberghe, 9 

in entrance channel at Zeebrugge, 

48,49, 131 
Destroyers, 84, 220, 221 
D'Eyncourt, sir Tennyson, lOO 
Dickinson, Lieut.-Comdr. C. C, R.N., 

III, 205 
Diversions, 59, 60, 61, 196, 208, 279 

practibility of using, 61 
Douglas, Captain H. P., R.N., 90 «. 
Dover — 

the return to, 243, 244 

the reception at, 244 
Dover Patrol — 

memorials, 15 

morale, 96, 97 

work of, 13, 14, IS, 97, 98 
Dover Straits, difficulty of dosing, 13, 

14 
Dunkerque, 13 J 

Eagles, Major C, E. E., R.M.L.I., 208 
Eastlake, Lieut. A. L., attached R.E., 
186, 187 



Edwards, Commander, R.N.V.R., 182 
Elliot, Lieut.-Col. Bertram N., 

R.M.L.L, III, 112, 128, 182 
Endurance of German submarines, 4, 5 
Erebus, H.M.S., 174; App. 

Faulknor, H.M.S.; App. 

Finch, Sergeant, R.M.L.L, 192 

Flame-throwers in Vindictive, 115, 186, 
187 

Flanders Coast — 

description of, 6, 7, 8, 22, 24, 25 
value to Germany, 5-7, 10-12 

Fog, effect on attackers, 60, 175 
effect on defence, 59, 175 

Fogs, artificial, 59, 60 

Franks, Lieut. Ivor B., R.N., IIO 

French motor launches Nos. I, 2, 33, 
34; App. 

French Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, 34; 
App. 

Fuel, 4 

Function of the Navy, 3 

Gas, poison, 60 

Geddes, Sir Eric, 157 

General Craufurd, H.M.S.; App. 

Geographical situation, 6, 7 

German bases in Flanders, 6, 10, 29 

German craft based on Flanders, 6 

German High Seas Fleet, 3, 4, 19, 21, 

94, 95 
German morale before the attack, 96, 

97, 104 
German morale after the attack, 255- 

257 
German reports of the attack, 250, 251 
German submarines, 4, 5, il, 12, 13, 

. 14, 16 , . ^ 

Gibbs, Commander Valentine P., 

R.N., 185, 207, 208 
Godsal, Commander A. E., R.N., 42, 

246, 247 
Goeben battery, 204 
Gore-Langton, Lieut.-Commander Hu- 
bert E., R.N., 220, 223 
Grand Fleet — 
duties of, 94, 95 
work of, 102, 103 
Groynes, 7, 24, 25 
Guerre de Course tactics, 5 

Halahan, Captain H. C, R.N., ill, 

114, 116, 128, 182, 201 
Hardy, Lieut.-Comdr. H. N. M., R.N., 

246 
Harrison, Lieut.-Comdr. A. L., R.N., 

200, 201, 202 



INDEX 



'^n 



Harwich, forces from; App. 
Haselfoot, Lieut.-Comdr. F. E. B., 

R.N., 90 n. 
Hawkings, Lieut. Claude E. K., R.N., 

206 
Heligoland, 19 
Helyar, Lieut.-Comdr. Kenneth C, 

R.N., 220, 222, 223 
Henderson, Lieut. Oscar, R.N., 209, 

Hermione, cutting out of — in 17991 

TT 54, 55 

Hewett, Lieutenant Graham S., 

R.N.V.R., 194 
Hilton-Young, Lieut. E., R.N.V.R., 

196 
Hindustan, H.M.S., III, 118, 119, 120, 

^ I2S, 127; App. 
History — 

lack of encouragement from, 58 
object of studying, 54 
Historical analogies, 54-56, 58 
Howitzers in Vindictive, 79, 98, 193, 

194 
Hydrographic Department, 91 

Initiative, 89, 149, 150 

Instructions, the art of writing, 66, 67 

Intrepid, H.M.S., 70, 143, 170, 228, 

229-231, 232, 234; App, 
Iphigenia, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 228, 
229, 231, 232, 234, 241, 243-251; 
App. 
Iris, H.M.S. — 
choice of, 79, 80 
duties of, 81, 86 

fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119 
proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 205- 

209 
retirement of, 245, 246 

Jakobynessen battery, 37 

Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, R.N., 17, 

Kaiser's visit to Zeebrugge, 252 
Kaiser Wilhelm battery, 204 
Keyes, Vice-Admiral Roger J. B., 
R.N., 14, 63, 109, 113, 114, 167, 
168, 220, 243, 246, 263, 264, 265, 
282 
appreciation of, 63, 68, 69 
connection with planning, 67, 68, 

82 
postponement decision, 147, 148 

Lamplough, Lieut. C. R. W., R.M.L.I., 
203 



Leadership, 264, 265 

Lestin, French destroyer; App. 

Lightfoot, H.M.S.; App. 

Lines of communication, 3, 12, 13, 96 

Lingfield, H.M.S.; App. 

Littleton, Lieut. H. A., R.N.V.R., 232, 

233 
Lord Clive, H.M.S.; App. 
Lock gate, 10, 22, 28, 43, 44, 49 
Losses, British material, 253, 254 1 

MacVean, Lieut. D. E. J., R.N.V.R., 

217 
Mails, precautions, 120 
Manly, H.M.S.; App. 
Mansfield, H.M.S., 224; App. 
Marine Artillery, 104, 112, 113, 126, 

192-194 
Infantry, 104, III, 112, 126 
Marines, embarkation of, 118, 119 
Marshal Soult, H.M.S.; App. 
Martinique, attack on — in I794i 54, 

55 
Mastif, H.M.S.; App. 
Matchless, H.M.S.; App."* 
Material results obtained, 249-253. 
Materiel, relation to personnel, 181 
McCutcheon, Staff Surgeon, R.N., 197, 

198 
McKenzie, Able Seaman, 202 
Medical, 197, 198 
Meikle, Engineer Sub-Lieut., R.N., 

230 
Melpomene, H.M.S., 224; App. 
Mentor, H.M.S.; App. 
Mercantile Marine, appreciation, 143, 

144 
Merrimac, U.S. steamer, 54, 58, 88 
Meteorological conditions, 131 
Military training, 112, 113 
Minefields, German, 38, 39 ' 
Mines — 

effect of, 93, 94, 173 

precautions against, 94 I 
Mine-sweepers, 6, 39, 94 
Monitors, 36, 146, 174 
Monitors: M. 21, M. 24, M. 26; App. 
Moon, state of, 134 
Moorsom, H.M.S., 224, 242, 243; App. 
Moral results obtained, 255-260 
Morale, 96, 97 
Morris, H.M.S., 224; App. 
Motor launches, 144, 225, 240 
Motor launches: — 

No. no, 225; App. 

No. 128, 224; App. 

No. 282, 230, 231, aja, 233, 234; 
App. 



274 



INDEX 



No. 308, 225 ; App. 

No. 424, 224; App. 

No, 526, 229, 232, 233; App. 

No. 558, 224, 226; App. 

Nos. II, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 79, 
105, 121, 223, 239, 241, 249, 252, 
254, 258, 262, 272, 274, 276, 279, 
280, 283, 314, 345, 397, 416, 420, 
422, 429, 448, 512, 513, 525, 532, 

533) 538, 549, 551. 552, 555i 556, 
557. 560, 561, 562; App. 

Myngs, H.M.S., 224; App. 

Napoleon's maxim, 95 

Navigation, coastal, 56, 57 

difficulties and dangers, 7, 8, 40, 41 
importance of accuracy, goff., 178 
open sea, 56 

Nelson, Lord, 55, 147, 148 

Newbold, Lieut. Aubrey C, R.N., 210, 
214 

Nieuport, 6, 7, 8 

North Star, H.M.S., 220, 221, 222, 223; 
App. 

Objectives, difficulty of locating, 42, 

. 56, 71 
Objects, secondary, 77 
Offensive measures, 16, 17, 43, 262 
Officers, choice of, 106, 107 
Orders — 

art of writing, 66, 67 
the drafting of the, 66, 67, 140, 156, 
166 
Osborne, Commander E. 0. B. S., 

R.N., 178 
Ostende — 

attack on, in 1798, 54, 55, 56 
description of, 9, 10, 11, 12 
difficulty of locating entrance, 42, 71 
reason for blocking, 42 
reason for omitting story, 41, 42 
Outhwaite, Sub-Lieut. C, R.N.V.R., 
219 

Patrol craft, German, 40, 96 
Peace, 266 

Period available for attack, 134 
Personnel, remarks on behaviour, 263, 
264 

selection of, 102 ff. 

training of, 112, 125, 126 
Phoebe, H.M.S., 220-224; Appu 
Photography, 129, 1 30, 246 
Plan — 

credit for, 17, 18, 19 

how built up, 262 

inception. 17. 18, 67 



history of, 17, 18, 6^, 68 
modifications of, 65 
previous suggestions, 17, 70 
various stages of, 64 f., 72, 76 

Plans department, 17, 67 

Poison gas, 60 

Port Arthur, attempts to block, 54, 56, 
S8 

Postponement, first, 148 
second, 154 

Power, Rear Admiral L. E., R.N., 100 

Preparations — 
preliminary, 12$ ff, 
final, 145, 167, 168 

Preservation of life, 87 

Prince Eugene, H.M.S.; App. 

Printing the orders, 140 

Puerto Cabello, attack on, in 1799} 54 

Pyrotechnic Brigade, 194 

Rain, effect of, 171, 172, 173 
Rescue of men from Mole, 218 
Rescue work, 87, 88, 89, 132, 229 jf., 
244-249 

vessels, 84 
Results — 

material, 249-253 

moral, 255-260 
Retirement, 132, 252-260 
Rigby, Lieut. Charles N. B., R.M.A., 

191,192 
Robinson, Lieut. J. W., R.N.V.R., 224 
Robinson, Lieut. O., R.N.V.R., 224 
Rocket apparatus, 194 
Rodman, Rear Admiral Hugh, U.S.N., 

107, 108 
Rosoman, Lieut.-Comdr. R. R., R.N., 

176, 184, 188, 238, 239, 242, 259 
Roux, French destroyer; App. 
Royal Air Force — 

6ist Wing, 85, 130 

65th Wing, 85, 146 
Royal Naval Reserve, 130, 263 
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 1 30, 

263 
Rufigi River, attempt to block, 54 

St. George for England, 169 
Salvage — 

effect of silt on, 23, 24, 25, a8, 51 

German attempts, 251 

importance of, 44, 45 

previous experience, 25 

remarks on, 25, 26, 44 jf., 25 1, 252 
Sandford, Lieut.-Comdr. F. H., R.N., 

213, 214 
Sandford, Lieut. R. D., R.N., 210, 21 1^' 
213 



INDEX 



275 



Santiago, attempt to block in 1898, 54, 

56,58 
Scott, H.M.S.; App. 
Seamanship, importance of, 41, 57, 

58 
Seaplane base, German, 12 
Secrecy, 100, iii, 120, 121, IJJ 
Secret, divulging the, 108, ng, 120 
Shoals, 7, 41 
Siege guns, 84 

Signalling difficulties, 137, 138 
Silt, description, 23, 24 

effect of, 24, 28, s I 
Sirius, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App. 
Smith, Petty Officer, R.N., 209 
Smoke, artificial — 

limitations of, 59, 60, 99 

use of, 59, 60, 83, 99, 100, 175, 176, 
208, 216, 217, 218, 246 
Smoke-screen vessels, 83, 175 
Sneyd, Commander R. S., R.N., 226, 

228, 229, 235 
Souvenir hunters, 248 
Staff, operational duties, 66, 67, 139 
Star shell, 38, 175 
Stonewall Jackson's maxim, 60, 61 
Stork, H.M.S.; App. 
Storming the Mole, 186, 187, 188, 2CX>- 

204, 213 
Submarines — 

attack on viaduct, 82, 100 

defensive use, 40 

German, 4, 40 

shelters, 10, II 
Submarines — 

C I, 210, 211, 214; App. 

C 3, 210-211, 213, 215, 224; App. 
Success, chances of, 54, 62 
Supporting squadrons, 146 
Surprise, 59, 60, 61, 262 
Surveys, 7, 91 
Swift, H.M.S.; App. 
Swin Deep, 118, 153 
Synchronisation of events, 137, 138, 
170 

Teazer, H.M.S.; App. 

Tempest, H.M.S.; App. 

Teneriffe, Nelson's attack on — in 

1797, 54, 55 
Termagant, H.M.S.; App. 
Terror, H.M.S., 174; App. 
Tetrarch, H.M.S.; App. 
Thetis, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 226 /., 

233; App. 
Tidal stream — 

description, 7, 24, 30, 74 
effect, 24, 92, 174, 183 



Tide, rise and fall, 8, 48, 49 

Tigris River, blocking of, 58 

Time factor, 137-139 

Time table, 138, 156 

Tomkinson, Captain Wilfred, R.N., 

220 
Towing — 

necessity for, 142 

of Iris and Daffodil, 142, 143, 173 
Trench raid, analogy, 112, 113, 265 
Trident, H.M.S., 224, 245; App. 
Truculent, H.M.S.; App. 

Ulleswater, H.M.S.; App. 
United States — 

battle squadron, 107 

personnel, 107, 108 

Velox, H.M.S., 224; App. 
Viaduct — 

attack on, 194, 195, 210-215 

description, 23, 25, 82, 83 
Vindictive, H.M.S. — 

anchoring, 184 

attack on Ostende, 247 

choice of, 76, 126 

command of, 114 

damage, 181, 182, 198, 238, 239, 241, 
255, 256 

fitting out of, 77-79, 100, 1 10 

position at Mole, 128, 129, 202, 203 

proceedings of, 143, 148, 150, 170, 
173, 176, 179/., 200/. 

retirement of, 236^. 
Visibility, 156, 165 
Volunteering — 

for danger, 89, 122-125, 189, 202 

how arranged, 104, 105, 122, 123 
Von Capelle, Admiral, 158 

Walcheren expedition, 136 
Walker, Lieut. H. T. C, R.N., 190 
Warwick, H.M.S., 144, 168, 173, 220, 

221, 222, 233, 243; App. 
Weather, vagaries of, 41, 93, 246 
Weller, Major B. G., R.M.L.I., 202 
Welman, Lieut. A, P., R.N., 217 
Wemyss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, R.N., 

Whirlwind, H.M.S., 224, 230; App. 
Wind, importance of direction, 60, 13 1, 

176 
Wounded, behaviour of, 196, 197 

Youlton, Petty Officer, E. G., R.N., 

238, 242 
Young, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 22$ 
Yser Canal, 7 



276 



INDEX 



Zeebrugge, 7, 8, 9, II 

batteries, 28, 29, 31, 33 

craft based at, 11, 32 

German belief in security at, 33, 34 

German constructions at, 26, 28, 29 

canal, 10, 22 

canal lock, 22, 29, 43, 44, 49 

navigable channel, 28, 49 

obstruction and boom, 32, 33, 41, 227 

tidal harbour, 22 

village, 22 
Zeebrugge Mole, description, 22, 23, 
24, 26, 27 

approach to, 27-30 

attack on: see Storming the Mole 



buildings on, 26, 28, 29, 32, 183 

currents alongside, 30 

garrison, 32, 81, 82 

lighthouse extension, 27 

outer wall, 26-28, 73, 74, 76 

peace use, 22 

seaplane base, 29, 32 

souvenir, 244, 245 

viaduct, 23, 25 

Vindictive' s position, 128, 129, 202, 
203 

war use, 29, 30 
Zero time, meaning and object, 170, 173 
Zone of fire, German batteries, 30 
Zubian, H.M.S.; App. 



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